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ABSTRACT
A SYSTEMATIC FRAMEWORK FOR RADIO FREQUENCY IDENTIFICATION
(RFID) HAZARD MITIGATION IN THE BLOOD TRANSFUSION SUPPLY CHAIN
FROM DONATION TO DISTRIBUTION
by
Natalie Rahming
The University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, 2012
Under the Supervision of Professor Timothy Patrick, Ph.D.

The RFID Consortium is developing what will be the first FDA-approved use of radio
frequency identification (RFID) technology to identify, track, manage, and monitor blood
throughout the entire blood transfusion supply chain. The iTraceTM is an innovative
technological system designed to optimize the procedures currently employed when
tracing blood from the donor to the recipient. With all novel technologies it is essential to
consider not only the advantages, but also the potential harms that may come about from
using the system. The deployment of the iTraceTM consists of two phases: 1) Phase One –
application of the iTraceTM from the donor to blood center distribution, and 2) Phase Two
– application of the iTraceTM from blood center distribution to transfusion. This
dissertation seeks to identify the possible hazards that may occur when utilizing the
iTraceTM during Phase One, and to assess the mitigation and correction processes to
combat these hazards. A thorough examination of verification and validation tests, as
ii

well as of the system design, requirements, and standard operating procedures was
performed to qualify and quantify each hazard into specific categories of severity and
likelihood. A traceability matrix was also established to link each hazard with its
associated tests and/or features. Furthermore, a series of analyses were conducted to
determine whether the benefits of implementing the iTraceTM outweighed the risks and
whether the mitigation and correction strategies of the hazards were effective. Ultimately,
this dissertation serves as a usable, generalizable framework for the management of
RFID-related hazards in the blood transfusion supply chain from donor to blood center
distribution.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
The elimination of tragic, yet avoidable, medical errors is not an impractical illusion but,
rather, a purposeful objective to pursue. Working towards this goal will improve
healthcare delivery, reduce healthcare costs, and most importantly, expunge the human
cost of such preventable tragedies. Medical errors occur frequently and, while many
impose little potential for harm, those that do result in injury can lead to severe
consequences (1). It has been estimated that as many as 44,000 to 98,000 Americans die
from medical errors each year (1-6). As such, this vast magnitude of errors in medicine
underlines the need for improved safeguards during healthcare delivery. Despite the
common practice of identifying and penalizing the persons committing the errors, it has
become increasingly evident that it is more effective to focus on the healthcare systems
themselves (1, 7). The systems can utilize technology to both mitigate and correct errors.
A systems analysis of medication errors found that the top eight of the 16 major types of
system failures discovered could have been averted with better medical information
systems (1, 7). Hence, using technology to enhance the access, availability, and
dissemination of healthcare information, and thereby restructuring current methods, is
worthwhile. In order to embark on the path towards an idealized medical system absent
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of avoidable missteps, a deliberate approach involving the addition of innovative
technologies and the optimization of current processes is valuable.
One area of healthcare where the elimination of medical errors is vital is the blood
transfusion medicine supply chain. According to a 2005 US Department of Health and
Human Services Report (8), in 2004 approximately 1,322 national medical treatment
centers reported a total of 32,128 transfusion-related adverse events. These include
various issues involving sample documentation, labeling, storage, and lab handling
throughout the entire supply chain process (9). Ultimately, these seemingly trivial errors
can lead to the most critical transfusion hazard: mis-transfusion (2, 10-16).
Mis-transfusion occurs when the wrong blood is given to the wrong person. All humans
possess a type within the ABO blood group (Table 1). The four key types are A, B, AB,
and O. There are two antigens (i.e. A, B) and two antibodies (i.e. Anti-A, Anti-B). An
individual’s blood type is determined by whether or not an individual’s red blood cells
carry the A antigen (i.e. Blood Type A), the B antigen (i.e. Blood Type B), both the A
and B antigens (i.e. Blood Type AB), or neither antigen (i.e. Blood Type O). Healthy
individuals produce red blood cell antibodies against A or B antigens that are not
expressed on their own cells. For example, an individual carrying the A antigen, who
therefore has Type A blood, will make anti-B antibodies. These anti-B antibodies will
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attack and destroy the red blood cells carrying the corresponding antigen. Thus, if a Type
A individual receives Type B or Type AB blood, red cell hemolysis or agglutination may
take place (Table 2). At best, mis-transfusion necessitates therapeutic and diagnostic
interventions and, at worst, it may result in death. In order to evaluate the best means of
eliminating medical errors such as mis-transfusion from the blood transfusion supply
chain, it is necessary to describe this process end-to-end.
Table 1: ABO Blood Types

ABO
Blood Type
A
B
AB
O

Antigen
A
Yes
No
Yes
No

Antigen
B
No
Yes
Yes
No

Antibody
Anti-A
No
Yes
No
Yes

Antibody
Anti-B
Yes
No
No
Yes

Table 2: Blood Compatibility

Patient Type

Compatible Red Cell Blood Types

A
B
AB
O

A, O
B, O
AB, A, B, O
O

The blood transfusion supply chain begins with the collection of blood from the donor.
At this time, essential data elements such as blood type, donor identification number, and
other patient information details are gathered and stored. The next step in the chain
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involves physically packing blood products into their appropriate containers. Containers
have associated temperature properties and capacity constraints which dictates the type
and quantity of items that can be included. After that, the containers are loaded onto
transport trucks and released for pick-up. The containers then go through the check-in
stage, where station operators inspect the containers for missing or excess items. The
products are labeled with information taken at the time of collection and moved to
inventory. Finally the product and its associated information are verified and distributed.
At any point during this process, there exists the potential for misplacement of items,
inaccurate transfer of data, or imprecise monitoring of products and information. As such,
it is clear that improving the identification, tracking, monitoring, labeling, and storing of
blood products during the entire supply chain process would reduce the incidence of mistransfusion.
Many blood centers and hospitals have examined the utilization of radio frequency
identification (RFID) as a means of enhancing the tracking, monitoring, labeling, and
storing in the blood transfusion supply chain, and have found it to be very promising (1727). RFID is the interaction and exchange of electromagnetic radio waves between tags
and readers, enabling automatic identification and data capture (AIDC) and real-time
information of marked objects (28-30). RFID is a technology that is composed of
transponder tags, readers, and a hardware system to which information is written. Also,
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RFID systems operate at a range of frequencies. The antennas of RFID readers exchange
electromagnetic radiation waves with the tags. The readers then send information to
servers via wireless networks or docking stations. Readers may be handheld or located in
gates and tunnels where they can read multiple items simultaneously, as opposed to the
current system of using barcodes which require line-of-sight individual readings.
Given the capacities for speedy information transmission and batch reading of multiple
items, RFID is capable of supporting the need for rapid and effortless access to process
data generated in the blood supply chain including collection, manufacturing, testing,
labeling, inventory, and distribution (30). Furthermore, RFID is a reputable technology in
logistics for identifying and tracking items, aiding in the monitoring and optimizing of
logistical processes (17, 31, 32). For example, RFID technology is common in the
automotive industry and is gaining widespread acceptance in supply chain processes such
as retail applications (17). Additionally, the benefits of RFID have already been
demonstrated in medical asset management. By tracking medical devices using RFID,
both the amount of time spent searching for a device and the cost of replacing lost items
can be significantly reduced (32, 33). Moreover, several other logistical areas have
examined RFID as a potential solution including: access control and time registration;
protection of expensive equipment; localization of equipment, staff, and patients in
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healthcare facilities; organization of logistic processes for beds, containers, and apparel;
safe identification of products and patients; and, protection against imitation drugs .
In response to the potential of RFID for automatic identification and data capture (AIDC)
and monitoring of blood and blood products across the whole transfusion medicine
supply chain, a consortium of blood centers (BloodCenter of Wisconsin, Milwaukee, WI,
Carter Blood Care, Dallas, TX, and Mississippi Blood Services, Jackson, MS), hospitals
(Baptist Health Systems, Jackson, MS, and University of Iowa Hospital and Clinics, Iowa
City, IA), the University of Wisconsin-Madison RFID lab, and several technology
partners (SysLogic, Inc., TAGSYS, Zebra Technologies, Psion TekLogix, Mediware
Information Systems) are developing and evaluating the first comprehensive RFID
system to document and track blood from donor to recipient (19). This system is designed
to identify, manage, track, and monitor the condition of blood products from the
beginning to the end of the blood supply chain. RFID technology is capable of both
preventing medical accidents in the health industry as well as initiating an effective,
rapid, and corrective response in the case of an emergency (34). For instance, in cases
where it is possible for incorrect administration of medication to occur, RFID has been
shown to enable accurate medical data transmission by offering a control for the
identification and facilitating the administration of the correct quantity and type of drugs
(34).
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The system being deployed by the consortium will be the first FDA-approved use of
RFID technology throughout all phases of the blood supply chain. This system, iTraceTM,
utilizes passive RFID technology that is superior to simple barcode-based AIDC
methodologies in several ways (19, 35-38). Unlike barcode-based AIDC technologies,
RFID technology does not require line-of-sight. This means that the tag and reader are
not required to be within visual range of one another in order for data transmission to
occur. Also, while barcodes must be read one at a time, RFID allows for batch – or
concurrent – reading of multiple items simultaneously without disrupting the processing
of the data or its accuracy. In addition, RFID possesses a broader field of readability, is
more durable and capable of enduring harsh environments, and is able to store more
editable information on its chips than barcodes. This is important as it demonstrates the
ability of RFID to more efficiently track and monitor products and information by
working at longer ranges, withstanding damage, and holding more relevant information
on its chips. Additionally, whereas barcodes are generally used once and discarded, RFID
technology enables the data to be completely erased and the tag to be reused if necessary.
Moreover, RFID tags may be integrated with sensors to assist with time and temperature
tracking, reducing waste and diminishing patient danger due to spoiled products.
RFID technology is generally applied when there is a need to read tagged items outside
of the short visual range of a bar code (39). In addition, processes like the transfusion
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medicine supply chain may involve environmental conditions such as temperature, dirt,
or contamination that make optically scanning barcodes ineffective (40). Also, RFID
technology allows for better tracking and reconciliation of products. Additionally, it
augments the precision of product locations by utilizing its tag memory qualities of data
encoding and storage, as well as its broader field of readability and batch reading
capabilities (30). Furthermore, RFID may boost the accuracy of tracking time and
temperature, reducing product waste and increasing the quality and availability of blood
products due to its integration of temperature sensors to assist with time and temperature
tracking (30). Hence, RFID is the preferred solution for the blood transfusion medicine
supply chain. While the employment of barcodes alone has been somewhat effective at
reducing medical errors, the systems are not fully efficient as individual scanning of each
item and searching for relevant data does little to reduce staff workloads (41-46).
The iTraceTM system incorporates RFID technology as a complement to the traditional
procedures. It will initially serve as a supplement to, not a replacement of, the barcode so
that it will work with current processes, not against them (37). The integration of
barcodes and RFID tags has the potential to improve complex systems and support, and
align all components to produce optimal outcomes (6). This is significant as it will reduce
tragic errors such as mis-transfusion, eliminate the human cost of these errors, and enable
better delivery of healthcare.
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Bar codes will still be utilized as a backup in case of unforeseen RFID troubles or system
failures during the implementation and testing period. Barcodes will be applied as a
secondary identification source for ensuring that the products are properly labeled. The
iTraceTM was created for a more intelligent blood supply chain where every element
works together cohesively (47).
The impact of integrating these technologies into a useful system triggers an evaluation
of the value proposition. In other words, in order for the tool to be implemented, it must
be apparent that the return on investment is sufficient (1), and that the deviation from
inexpensive barcode-alone processes would be worth the venture of implementing this
new system. The consortium conducted an impact analysis to quantitatively model and
estimate the effects of RFID on the business metrics of the blood center (38). The
analysis consisted of two primary components: organizational impact and cost/benefit
analysis. In terms of the business metrics, it was concluded that the key gains would be in
productivity and quality due to automated processes, reduction of discarded products, and
enhanced inventory management. For the cost/benefit model, the chief outputs measured
were total expected costs, total expected benefits, expected payback period, and net
present value. The consortium projected that there would be a $83,560 (11.2%) return on
investment (ROI) over 5 years resulting in an approximate 4 year payback period. For
larger organizations, the recovery may be less than three years (approximately 30
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months), but for smaller institutions the payback period may be as much as 6.9 years (2).
Ultimately, the researchers of the consortium estimated that, by improving quality control
and identification procedures through RFID, the blood banking industry would save more
than $9 million per year and result in 40,000-45,000 fewer units of discarded blood
products (9). Thus, it may be justifiable operationally and economically, particularly for
larger organizations, to employ RFID technology in the blood supply chain.
Moreover, since iTraceTM software introduces a new technology to the Transfusion
Medicine field, a pre-market approval from the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) is
essential before employment of the new software is permitted. All technological devices
in their infant stages trigger an array of questions concerning the effects of their use.
Although the benefits of using the tool may appear tangible, the uncertainty of the actual
advantages or consequences of using the technology remains until confirmation is
attained through research and testing. Thus, it is very important to identify and
understand not only the gains, but also the hazards of employing new technologies.
The potential hazards of using new technologies can be seen in the story of the Therac-25
(48). This notoriously defective system would malfunction up to 40 times per day as a
result of its software. In a 20-month period, the software defects led to massive radiation
overdoses for six cancer patients, leading to the deaths of three. In dealing with medical
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devices and, hence, the lives of others, the existence of potential harms may outweigh the
likely advantages.
Several types of hazards – technological, implementation, functional – may occur.
Technological hazards are potential sources of harm originating from technology or
system conditions, or from the interaction of human activity with these conditions.
Implementation hazards are potential harms related to technology usage in an everyday
setting. Functional hazards are the potential harms which may disrupt the ability of the
system to perform its intended duties appropriately and accurately. Full awareness of the
hazards, as well as system specifications and strategies for mitigation and correction are
essential. Since the iTraceTM is the first tool to account for complete blood supply chain
management from the donor to the recipient, the risks of utilizing RFID in blood supply
operations has not previously been assessed.
There are two phases for the implementation of the iTraceTM. “Phase One” encompasses
all of the activities at the blood center starting with blood donation, manufacturing,
testing, inventory management, shipping, and distribution of blood products to the
hospital. “Phase Two” comprises all activities of transfusion services at the hospital
starting with receiving blood products and ending with cross-matching and transfusing
patients. The consortium has completed development and a pilot for both phases and is

12

currently finalizing all documentation and deliverables necessary to submit for Medical
Device Class II clearance from the FDA for iTraceTM Phase One. The submission will be
done in accordance with Section 510(k) of the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, which
requires device manufacturers to register and notify the FDA of their intent to market a
medical device. This is known as Premarket Notification - also called PMN or 510(k).
In this instance, the RFID Blood Transfusion Consortium becomes a medical device
manufacturer that is required to submit a premarket notification because of the intent to
introduce a device into commercial distribution for the first time or reintroduce a device
that will be significantly changed or modified to the extent that its safety or effectiveness
could be affected. In the case of the iTraceTM, the substantial change is the addition of
RFID to the current blood supply chain processes. Building a comprehensive analysis of
its technological, implementation, and functional hazards is a key component of receiving
approval before releasing to the commercial market. Since the project is still in its early
phases and the types of hazards that would be encountered vary extensively between the
two Phases, the analysis presented here will focus solely on Phase One.
A major function of any new project or development is a thorough risk analysis. It
includes rigorous, fact-based methodologies with predefined criteria for assessing the
risks associated with all elements of the offering. It also consists of structured reviews of
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each potential hazard to assess the status, severity, problems, issues, and dependencies.
Additionally, mitigation strategies are developed to define the preventive actions required
to minimize the risk, and correction strategies are designed to address the hazard in the
instance of occurrence. SysLogic’s Quality System Manual and FDA guidance
documents provided preliminary direction for these analyses.
Although the Consortium used these applicable standards and pre-identified hazards for
the implementation and functional portions of the project, assistance was needed on the
technology portion. Using RFID in this environment is an entirely new practice, and help
from someone with biomedical and health informatics training was essential in
uncovering the issues that could potentially occur. In response to this need, I was tasked
with discovering what these technological hazards could be. The consortium also wanted
help in producing a thorough analysis – including the categorizing, qualitative and
quantitative ranking, and mitigation/correction strategy evaluation – of all of the hazards
that could take place throughout Phase One. As this assessment was a requirement for
FDA 510K approval and critical for the system evaluation overall, I was responsible for
completing this initiative as well. My role was a key component in revealing potential
harms, assessing the system’s value, and answering questions regarding the system’s
usability.
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Therefore, the purpose of this project was to conduct a hazard analysis of this new
medical device to deduce answers to the following inquiries: 1) how the benefits of the
tool outweigh the existence of the potential hazards, 2) how sufficient are the applied
mitigation and correction strategies, and 3) how may the methods employed to qualify
and quantify the hazards into specific categories be transferred to other new medical
devices.
There were several objectives to this study. The first was to identify all of the possible
hazards that may occur when using the iTraceTM from donation at the blood center to
blood product distribution at the hospital, and rate the severity of each. The consortium
had already begun to identify hazards based on the SysLogic Quality Document and FDA
guidance documents which detailed what hazards are commonly encountered with
medical devices, as well as which steps to take during the verification and validation
milestones of product development. I managed the identification and assessment of the
technological hazards associated with RFID use in the blood supply chain. Next, an
analysis of the severity and likelihood for all hazard types was performed. The strategies
taken to eliminate, mitigate, prevent, or respond to those hazards were then documented.
Third, the effectiveness and success of these methodologies were assessed. Fourth, an
evaluation of whether the application benefits of the iTraceTM were worth the risks was
completed. Lastly, the ultimate goal of the project – to construct a comprehensive hazard
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analysis and traceability matrix, establishing the foundation of a systematic framework
for managing RFID-related hazards in the blood transfusion medicine supply chain from
donation to distribution for generalized use with other technologies – was completed.

RESEARCH QUESTIONS
RQ 1: How do the benefits of using the iTraceTM outweigh the potential
RFID-related hazards?
RQ 2: How sufficient are the mitigation and correction strategies for
managing RFID-related hazards in the blood transfusion medicine supply
chain from the donation to blood center distribution?
RQ3: How can the methods utilized in this paper effectively qualify and
quantify the associated hazards into standard categories which may be
transferable to other newly deployed RFID-based healthcare technologies?
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CHAPTER 2: BACKGROUND
This chapter will provide insight into the primary design features of the iTraceTM. It will
also give details on the particular “pain points” or situations in which there is the highest
demand for RFID use, as well as on the “touch points” or areas within the blood
transfusion supply chain where RFID-enabled processes are the most advantageous. In
addition, the types of hazards that may be encountered during Phase One will be
described. Lastly, background information on the RFID consortium itself will be
supplied.
iTRACETM DESIGN
The iTraceTM design consists of specific RFID technologies, various RFID touch points,
and a particular architecture formulated for best use practices from donation to blood
center distribution.

RFID Technology
Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) is a technology which identifies items by using
electromagnetic radio waves (wireless air interface) to interact and exchange data
between transponder tags and readers (30) (Figure 1). It is generally composed of
transponder tags, readers, and a hardware system to which information is written, and it
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operates at a range of frequencies. Tags may be active, passive, or semi-active/passive.
Active tags are battery-powered and able to emit signals without activation by a reader.
Passive tags “awaken” when in the field of the reader. The power from the reader
prompts them to communicate. Semi-active/passive tags use a thin battery, which can be
used to increase the read range of the tag, to power the chip. The iTraceTM solution uses
the passive tag, which is the most widely accepted for healthcare supply chain solutions
(40, 41, 49).

RFID Reader
Antenna

Computer

Antenna Coil

IC Chip

Figure 1: RFID Technology Structure

The readers of RFID systems have antennas that exchange electromagnetic radiation
waves with the tags. The information that is read by the reader is sent to servers via
wireless networks or docking stations. Readers may be handheld or located in gates and
tunnels where they can read multiple items within a single container at once.
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There are three different kinds of frequencies on which RFID can work that determine the
range at which the tags can be read. The first is low frequency. Low frequency (LF)
bands typically work at frequencies of 125-134 KHz. High Frequency (HF) bands operate
at 13.56 MHz. This is the global ISO-standardized frequency, and is widely accepted for
use in the healthcare industry. Ultra High Frequency (UHF) works at 850-900 MHz.
These are the most expensive tags, possessing the best ranges and transferring data the
fastest. However, UHF licenses vary in allowance due to health and safety issues. UHF is
capable of exciting water molecules in blood products to the extent that they would likely
raise the temperature of the blood beyond acceptable levels. The iTraceTM employs the
international standard 13.56MHz, which is the recommended standard for blood
transfusion medicine (30, 38, 40, 50).
Furthermore, RFID tags are capable of storing information and carrying all major data
about the product. The minimum suggested memory capacity of 2 Kbits enables the use
of International Society of Blood Transfusions (ISBT) 128 data structure and messaging
(30). The data on the tag may be locked to protect sensitive information, or it may be
unlocked to allow for reuse of tags. Data carrier-independent ISBT 128 compliant figures
which use 7-bit ISO 646 (ASCII) characters are used for the tag memory (35). Tag user
memory is distributed in 4-byte physical memory blocks which are individually
addressable and locatable (35).
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iTraceTM Architecture
The iTraceTM is made up of a set of devices installed and used at the central blood center,
remote fixed donation sites, and remote mobile donation sites as described in the
iTraceTM Technical Specifications documents.
The components of the central blood center facility include a server on which the
software and application are installed, a network of fixed and handheld RFID/barcode
readers and antennae that are connected to a server via the blood center’s local area
network (LAN), one or more servers on which the blood center’s Blood Establishment
Computer System (BECS) is installed, one or more client workstations used to access the
iTraceTM, and a network connection through which a server connects to and interoperates
with devices at remote donation sites.
Remote fixed and mobile donation sites both contain hardware components such as a
server software installed on a PC connected to the internet and a Wi-Fi LAN at the
donation site, one or more handheld RFID/barcode readers that are connected to the
donation site Wi-Fi LAN and interact with the server, and printers and supplies used to
print shipping manifests, blood donation record forms, and labels. Additionally, for fixed
remote sites, an electronic interface between the electronic blood donation record and the
server software which reduces manual entry for each collection may be employed.
Similarly, a USB thumb drive may also be used to store donation record information.
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For all site types, there is a set of design features and underlying assumptions on which
all of the applications that comprise the iTraceTM depend. These include the physical
items tracked, the use of RFID tag identification numbers (TINs) and user memory,
containers, locations, notes and tracks, and hardware devices supported at each touch
point. Moreover, the physical location and movement of the following items are all
tracked with the iTraceTM: blood donation records (BDRs), test tube sets, blood bags, and
containers. Each item is distinguished and identified by the RFID system using a
combination of RFID tags and bar code labels using ISBT128 format. While blood bags
and containers have RFID tags attached, test tube sets and BDRs are identified by bar
codes. Collection bags use 14 x 31mmRFID tags placed under the standard ISBT 128
DIN label (35). The items are tracked both individually and as a set. All of the
applications that comprise the iTraceTM are designed to work with either bar code only or
RFID-enabled blood bags and containers, allowing the RFID application to have a backup in case the tag becomes unreadable.
Every item within a collection, as well as the set itself, shares the same donation
identification number (DIN). However, each item is further identified by its type (BDR,
test tube, or blood bag), content type name (RBC-1, RBC-2), and globally unique tag
identification number (TIN). The TIN is fixed at the time of manufacturing, can never be
changed, and is guaranteed to be unique even across different tag manufacturers.
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Each RFID tag has a small amount of random access user memory that can be used to
store information about the item to which it is attached. The tags record the following
information: Product Code, ABO/Rh, Donation Identification Number, and Product
Expiration Date. The Procedure Code is also collected to assist in the manufacturing
process. The user memory can be read and written multiple times. Areas of the tag may
be hidden to inhibit modification. Furthermore, the tags are capable of responding to a
one-time “kill” signal, which triggers the self-destruction of the tag such that neither the
TIN nor the user data memory can ever be read or written again.
There are four readers that are used in the iTraceTM: Tagsys L400, PA600, Tracient
Paddle, and traditional barcode scanners. They can be directed to read tag TINs or read
and write tag user memory. During the writing of information to the tag’s user memory,
the software first directs the reader to write the desired data to the tag’s user memory and
then read the data back from the tag. The software confirms that the data was successfully
written to the tag. Data written to the blood bag tag is never read or used by the system
software. Only the TIN is read at each of the RFID-enabled touch points to associate,
retrieve, and process blood bag information from the database. Figure 2 depicts the RFID
reader display.
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1D/2D Bar code scanner
13.56 MHz RFID reader
Dual thumb triggers, 1 each side
Li-ion rechargeable battery
with charging cradle

Figure 2: iTraceTM Reader Display

PAIN POINTS
The dynamic nature of the blood transfusion supply chain results in considerable
difficulties in information acquisition, processing, and management (51). As the volume
of information increases, so does the potential for human error. Consequently, blood
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centers are turning to information technology resources to improve the productivity and
efficiency of blood banking processes (17-27).
Blood banks are looking to RFID technologies for identification, authentication, tracking,
traceability, management, labeling, inventory, security, sensing, and regulatory purposes
(32, 52). The auto identification and data capture capabilities of RFID enable the
elimination of mistakes and the optimization of processes. RFID technology in healthcare
has also been shown to be cost effective for healthcare operations (53). The combination
of these benefits helps facilitate the construction of transparency and trust for the
healthcare system through the use of a total quality systems approach.
The goal of the iTraceTM is to enhance the delivery of transfusion medicine by supporting
the operational process at critical points. Process owners from blood banks participating
in the consortium identified “pain points” in the current transfusion supply chain
processes. “Pain points” denote areas throughout the supply chain where inefficiencies or
errors often occur (38). Each pain point was ordered according to the frequency of the
incidence and the magnitude of the consequence.
In Phase 1 – from donation to blood center distribution – there were four primary pain
points (35, 38) (Figure 3). The first involved reconciling data with physical reality. This
means it was necessary to ensure that the data record detailing the expected amount and
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type of products matched the amount and type of products that were actually delivered.
With the current barcode process, each blood product must be tracked and accounted for
individually. The RFID-enabled iTraceTM solution was designed to construct
unit/container relationships, allowing for better tracking and faster container
reconciliation of products.
The second pain point dealt with physically locating products. Like the first pain point,
this was reflective of single product tracking constraints. The solution was to use RFID to
capture details and log data/update a database with the most recent location of all
products encountered during searches to enable better traceability.
Similarly, the third pain point was the difficulty in scanning multiple items. Unlike the
barcode-based processes currently in place, the RFID processes enabled by the iTraceTM
will support the preferred capacity to read multiple units simultaneously and without the
necessity of line-of-sight reading. This will facilitate rapid donation check-in and
shipment verification at the blood center. The iTraceTM is capable of reading all of the
units in a closed container at the same time, considerably increasing efficiency.
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Each blood product
tracked individually

No temperature-controlled
alert in place

•

Build RFID unit  RFID container
relationships
ships enabling better tracking and
faster reconciliation

Physically locating
products

•

Use RFID to update “last seen” location of all
products encountered during searches

Rapid check-in and
shipment verification

•

Use RFID’s ability to read multiple units in
closed containers to dramatically reduce labor

•

Provide an alert if the time between “last
seen” in a uncontrolled temperature locations
is too long

Reconciling data with
physical reality

Track time out of
temperature- controlled
locations

Figure 3: Pain Points

The final pain point identified during Phase One was difficulty in tracking time and
temperature. Existing barcode
barcode-only
only procedures do not utilize temperature-controlled
temperature
alerts. The iTraceTM solution remedied this pain point by providing alerts if and when the
time between scans/reads in uncontrolled or incorrect temperature locations exceeded
ex
expectations. As such, it appears evident that RFID is capable of solving many of the
challenges facing
ing traditional blood banking operations. The analysis of the current
processes and pain points served as the groundwork for designing the iTraceTM, and
enabling its application across various process touch points.
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iTRACETM TOUCH POINTS
The touch points are the areas of the blood supply chain in which the iTraceTM
complements the current processes (Figure 4). According to the Functional Specifications
Document of the consortium, they include the following actions throughout the supply
chain: collection, pack container, load and release pickup, check-in container, label
product, check-in inventory, verify container, check-in returns, check-in imports, and
inventory management functions.

Figure 4: iTraceTM Touch Points

Collection
During donation collection, RFID technology is used to uniquely identify and track
physical components that make up the collection such as BDRs, test tube sets, and blood
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bags. It is also used to gather key data elements for collection. The selected information
about the collection is encoded and stored in the RFID tag memory associated with the
blood bags included in the collection.

Pack Container
When packing the container, RFID associates items with their containers by their DIN as
they are physically packed into the containers. This facilitates fine-grained tracking of
each item’s location, as well as the formulation of pick-up documentation to be used in
reconciliation activities. Each container has an associated type, capacity, and temperature
property, which is used to determine the maximum quantity and kinds of items that can
be packed in the container. The container types and capacity constraints are verified as
each item is packed.

Load and Release Pickup
RFID technology enables the association of containers with a pick-up as they are loaded
onto transport trucks, allowing the detailed tracking of the container’s location. The
technology also permits automatic creation of pick-up documentation for use in
reconciliation. This establishes a chain of custody transfer from the donation site to the
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pick-up transport service as well as visibility for products in transit from remote donation
sites to blood centers to assist in advanced production planning.

Check-In Container
During the check-in stage, the RFID technology reconciles the content of each container
individually and as a whole, giving the check-in station operator the ability to view and
classify containers, as well as found, missing, and excess items within each container.
Items are “batch read,” meaning they are read simultaneously. The information that is
read is sent electronically to the Blood Establishment Computer System (BECS) to
check-in the items.

Label Product
Product labeling information from the BECS for the blood bag being returned to the
blood center is received. Additionally, the RFID encodes, updates, and verifies the
information (DIN, product code, expiration date, ABO/Rh, etc.) on the bag’s RFID tag
memory.
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Check-in Inventory
The RFID provides chain of custody details when newly-labeled products move from the
labeling area into inventory, updating both the back-end BECS as appropriate as well as
the product’s inventory storage location information that is maintained in the RFID
system.

Verify Container
RFID, again, allows for batch reading of an outbound shipping container’s contents and
performs a final verification of a packed shipping container’s content before the container
leaves the blood center.

Check-in Returns
When the blood bag is returned to the blood center, product labeling information from the
BECS is received. Simultaneously, encoding, updating, and verifying of the information
on the bag’s tag memory occurs. Any patient information that is located on the tag is
removed.
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Check-in Imports
During check-in imports, product labeling information from the BECS is received, and
the information on the bag’s RFID memory is encoded, updated, and verified. The
product’s inventory storage location is also updated.

Inventory Management Functions
The RFID technology helps the user find blood bag products in inventory and move them
to new locations in single batch operations. Additionally, it helps the user update the
inventory of items currently stored in a specified location as a single batch operation. The
BECS is updated appropriately.
The impact of RFID appears to be substantial. Yet, until the risks of utilizing the
technology are examined, the full impact of its application cannot be measured. The
hazards of using RFID technology in the first half of the blood transfusion supply chain
must be assessed and the appropriate responses disclosed so that a functional, valuable
framework may be established.
POTENTIAL iTRACETM HAZARDS
The three primary types of hazards that are encountered are during Phase 1 of the BSC
are technological, implementation, and functional. My role was to serve as the project

31

lead for the technology hazard group, identifying, testing, and analyzing technological
hazards that may occur with the introduction of RFID technology into the blood supply
chain processes. The implementation and functional hazards listed were derived from the
SysLogic Quality Plan document which details hazards commonly met with the adoption
of new medical devices. The Project Manager and various members of the consortium
identified them as potential hazards that may impact the use of the iTraceTM tool.

Technology Hazards
Technological hazards involve the read/write efficiency of the RFID system and the
effects of the high frequency (HF) radio frequency magnetic waves on other medical
devices and the blood products themselves. They also include tag and system capabilities
and survivability under harsh conditions. There are safety and critical functionality
requirements that must be fulfilled in order for the successful mitigation of the hazards
associated with the iTraceTM. The safety and critical design requirements for the potential
technology hazards of the iTraceTM include the following:
•
•
•

Preventing Read/Write Errors or Failure.
Ensuring No Adverse Effects of RFID Technology on Blood Products.
Ensuring Performance Capability of RFID Tags During the Most Common Blood
Supply Chain Processes.
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•
•

Ensuring RFID Tag Survivability After Experiencing the Most Demanding
Conditions in the Blood Supply Chain.
Ensuring No Interference of RFID High Frequency (HF) and Electromagnetic
Interference (EMI) with Other Systems.

The specific hazards that were pinpointed and assessed will be discussed in Chapter 4.

Implementation Hazards
SysLogic, Inc. maintains a list of recognized or foreseeable hazards associated with
medical devices under both normal and abnormal conditions. Previously identified
hazards are also taken into account. Possible implementation hazards encompass a broad
range of issues related to the realization or execution of the device specifications. They
include matters involving the database, interface, data processing, data corruption or loss,
and audit trail items. The safety and critical design requirements for the implementation
of the iTraceTM consist of the following:
•
•
•

Preventing Sequencing or Timing Errors
Preventing Data Loss / Corruption
Preventing External Interface Errors

Functional Hazards
The functional hazards identified and tested are also components of SysLogic, Inc.’s
known and foreseeable list of risks associated with medical devices. Functional hazards
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consist of any potential risks to the performance of the system/device in a daily
operational setting. They are comprised of concerns related to the ability of the system to
record read/written information appropriately and accurately. They also include other
software design and capability issues such as security, access, traceability, notification
alerts, monitoring, tracking, and labeling. The safety and critical design requirements
associated with the functionality of the iTraceTM include:
•
•
•
•
•
•

Preventing Unauthorized Entry or Override of System Data
Preventing Loss of Traceability
Preventing Packing in Improper Containers at Collection Sites
Ensuring Reconciliation of Materials from Collection Site
Ensuring Blood Product Labeling Information is Properly Captured from BECS
Preventing Unsuitable Products from Being Released to Distribution

CONSORTIUM ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES
Due to the existence of several valuable players in the RFID Blood Center Consortium, it
is important to identify the roles and responsibilities of each. This will enable a better
understanding of the project’s organization. The consortium consists of personnel from
the multiple aforementioned organizations working under the guidance of the Program
Director, Rodeina Davis. Members of the consortium make up various components of the
organizational structure including the Steering Committee, Project Management Team,
Product Manager, Project Manager, Project Coordinator, Grant Administration Team,
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Activity Team Leads, Activity Teams, and Grant Administration Team members (Figure
5).

Figure 5: RFID Consortium Organizational Chart

My role in the consortium fell under Team 4 for Quality/ 510(k). I served as the project
lead for technology hazard analysis. I identified, documented, and analyzed the hazards
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associated with the technology itself. Additionally, I participated in the analysis of the
implementation and functional hazards. Furthermore, I assisted Alfonso Gutierrez and the
UW RFID team in performing and analyzing the Wireless Communication Protocols
study. Finally, I constructed the traceability matrix, linking all of the hazards and
mitigation strategies with verification and validation procedures.

CHAPTER 3: METHODS
The hazard analysis for Phase One consisted of four primary steps: the identification,
definition, crosschecking, and ranking of hazards based on the impact the hazard has on
the system, patient, or safety of the blood product when the system fails or a design flaw
is uncovered. Verification and validation of the mitigation strategies, as well as corrective
actions, were examined through extensive use of protocol testing, unit testing, and system
testing. This was done to ensure that the functionality of the system remained continuous
and effective. A traceability matrix was also constructed to illustrate the sources,
methods, and results of the tests of each hazard mitigation strategy. Upon complete
analysis of the results of each test, complete operational understanding of the new
iTraceTM throughout the entire supply chain was achieved. Then, a subjective evaluation
was completed to determine the resultant risk and appropriate steps to be taken. There is
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no consistent or standard method for estimating this, but the severity and likelihood
matrix which will follow generally derives acceptable results for low- to medium-risk
devices.

HAZARD IDENTIFICATION
The process undertaken for identifying the hazards began with a thorough analysis of the
use of the iTraceTM in the entire blood transfusion supply chain. It entailed detailed
consideration of the system’s intended use, features, and functions throughout each stage.
The first step involved the review and gathering of potential relevant harms from a list of
known and foreseeable hazards. These hazards were found in the SysLogic Quality
Document standard. They tended to consist of implementation and functional hazards
such as those involving security, access, alerts, and notifications.
The next step consisted of the analysis of distinguishable iTraceTM characteristics using
the system design and requirements documents. Hazards identified for this group
comprised those which had an impact on the basic functionality of the system. General
system attributes and properties such as read/write failures, bad tag data, and altered tag
data were found by reviewing the possible vulnerabilities or threats associated with each
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feature or requirement. In other words, harms were diagnosed by accounting for any
inadvertent instances of system failure or deviation from intended use.
After that, additional hazards were discovered by analyzing factors presented in the
protocol studies. The Limit Testing protocol revealed hazards dealing with the effects of
13.56 MHz radio frequency (RF) magnetic field radiation on the temperature elevation
and toxicity of cellular protein structures of red blood cells (RBC), aged red blood cells
(aRBCs; near expiration of the 42 day shelf life), whole blood derived platelet products
(WBDP), plasma, and plasma coagulation factors under extreme RF exposure conditions.
This study was concerned with the potential consequence of 13.56 MHz on blood
products, and its possibility of leading to: 1) a rise in the temperature of blood products
(red cells, pooled platelets, and plasma) due to dielectric heating generated by extended
exposure to the intense RF field, or 2) cellular or protein degradation from extended
exposure to the intense RF field. Therefore, hazards were uncovered by noting the
adverse thermal or biological effects on the transfusion safety or efficacy of blood
cellular products and coagulation factors that may arise from exposure to intense RF
radiation from 13.56 MHz RFID readers.
Additionally, the Performance Testing protocol sought to determine the commercial
applicability of the RFID system solution in the blood transfusion medicine industry. As
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many aspects of the performance capability of RFID tags as possible during the most
common blood supply chain processes were evaluated. The study combined the four
different types of readers: (1) TagSys HF RFID Tunnel, (2) TagSys HF RFID Flatbed, (3)
Unitech handheld, and (4) Tracient PadL with all of the traditional containers used for
blood products – Coleman cooler, tray, two generic Styrofoam boxes and platelet boxes –
in varying groupings to determine the efficacy. The different combinations were applied
at each of the RFID-enabled checkpoints in the blood supply chain process to thoroughly
assess where and what types of hazards may occur, as well as how to combat them.
Hazards were revealed by probing the scenarios which could occur if the system did not
perform as expected with any of the above-mentioned combinations of commercial
application.
Furthermore, analysis of the RFID Tag Survivability Protocol helped to identify hazards
by investigating functional tag performance changes that could arise from exposure to
centrifugation, blast freezing, and gamma irradiation. The studies simulated operational
conditions equivalent to those a blood product would traditionally undergo. These
methods can lead to degradation in tag functionality or, ultimately, failure. As a result,
hazards were discovered by understanding the worst case effects that these processes
could have on the system and users.
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The HF RFID Application in Blood Centers Wireless Considerations Protocols
investigated the potential effects of electromagnetic interference (EMI) on existing
medical equipment and systems, as well as among High Frequency (HF) RFID entities.
Such consequences included instances in which there was an interruption or failure in
wireless, waveform data, or communication transmissions. Hazards were identified by
assessing unfavorable outcomes related to EMI effects and erroneous and/or incomplete
system communications. The culmination of all these aforesaid processes has led to the
comprehensive group of hazards identified, described, and rated in this study.
In analyzing the hazards and the procedures that may be taken to mitigate them, the
following verification and validation methods were employed.

VERIFICATION STRATEGY
For each, the team analyzed the risk of implementing the technology to avoid potential
hazards. Testing protocols were created to ensure that each technology hazard was
mitigated. It was verified that the technology used met safety and critical functionality
requirements, via the following:
a. Limit Testing Protocol – Ensured RF radiation had no adverse effects on blood
products. Limit testing in phase 1 of the RFID project indicated 13.56 MHz RF
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energy had insignificant temperature and biological effects on RBC products that
were < 11 days old and whole blood-derived platelets even at very high magnetic
field levels of 5 amperes/meter and extended exposure durations. Results of initial
limit testing were reported to the FDA on January 21, 2008, which confirmed the
safety of 13.56 MHz RF with RBC and platelets and led to the agency’s consent
to proceed with prototype testing and pilot use of the system with those products.
Aged red cells (nearing expiration of the 42 day shelf) and thawed plasma
products were also tested.
This protocol was initiated to examine the effects of 13.56 MHz radiofrequency
energy under the most extreme conditions possible in order to demonstrate the
slight likelihood that the identified potential hazards could arise. It was utilized to
evaluate the effects of RF frequency because, if the conditions established for the
study far exceeded any to which a blood product would customarily be subjected,
then the probability of the hazard occurring would be minimal. Thus, this test of
extreme conditions was highly valuable for ranking the hazards associated with it
by demonstrating the ways in which the hazard could be reduced.
All of the blood products were tested in the same manner. The only variation was
in the bag volumes and normal storage and testing temperature requirements for
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each type of product. Therefore, all of the normal processes that blood products
would experience were considered, yet with the unique requirements essential for
each.
b. Tag Survivability Protocol – This protocol was used to confirm the safety,
reliability, and performance of the 13.56 MHz RFID technology as follows:
RFID tag survivability and resiliency under centrifugation, irradiation, extreme
cold (blast freezing and thawing), as well as RFID tag security and integrity,
electromagnetic interference effects and temperature and biological effects of
13.56 MHz RF energy on plasma and aging red blood cells.
The Survivability studies were designed to either simulate operational conditions
equivalent to those a regular blood product would normally undergo or subject the
blood product to extreme exposure when encountering centrifugation, blast
freezing, and gamma irradiation. Since the solution will be commercialized in the
transfusion medicine industry, it was critical to uncover the impact of both. The
survivability tests were intended to serve as a complement to the standard systems
software test.
The protocol was selected because of its ability to account for different processes
and show the functionality of the tag in a general commercial environment. All of
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the different types of tests were run in the same manner, and the potential hazards
that arose from each process – centrifugation, blast freezing, gamma irradiation –
were identical as they could lead to similar functionality deviations and failures.
c. Performance Testing Protocol – Evaluated RFID tag read/write performance
during the most common blood supply chain processes using a defined set of
performance measure indicators. Tag performance refers to whether the coupled
system tag/reader performs satisfactorily (reading/encoding tag content) in
simulated scenarios including different bag containers, packaging materials, and
different types of readers.
This protocol was significant as it tested varying combinations of system
functionalities. It was selected to mimic traditional processes. As it was based on
the performance of the system, it was important to have protocols which would
imitate scenarios that would occur in common settings. Likewise, it was valuable
to evaluate all possible reader/container relationships to investigate all potential
situations that could take place.
d. EMI Testing Protocol – Determined whether there is potential electromagnetic
interference (EMI) from high frequency (HF)-based RFID systems on existing
medical equipment, as well as the potential EMI of HF RFID equipment on
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existing wireless devices and systems found in donation and processing centers.
The protocol also identified any potential for erroneous and/or incomplete
communication between HF RFID entities (e.g., between tag and reader or
between reader and server) due to EMI from other devices. Where applicable,
proactive measures to minimize or eliminate EMI effects were also suggested.
This protocol was essential as it demonstrated the effectiveness of the system
when placed in proximity to other similar technologies. It showed the ability of
the system to still function without impeding the capabilities of the other systems.
It also demonstrated the ability of the iTraceTM to work as intended without
leading to the harm of patients as a result of disrupting wireless, waveform, and
communication transmissions.
The capabilities of the system were tested by placing the iTraceTM at varying
proximities to a range of other medical devices. This methodology was selected in
order to determine its effects within and between technologies at different
distances. It was a worthwhile procedure as it showed the impact of the
technology on an array of different systems and from a range of distances.
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VALIDATION STRATEGY
Validation tests were used to determine whether the technological design,
implementation, and functional capabilities of the system operated as expected. The
instances in which the system was unsuccessful at achieving anticipated results served as
demonstrations of potential weaknesses, risks, and hazards to system use. The tests
consisted not only of desired outcomes, but also of unfavorable circumstances that could
potentially cause malfunctioning of the system or the reading/writing of inaccurate data.
The thoroughness of the testing was essential to the discovery of both the benefits and
hazards of employing the system.
a. System Testing – Final end-to-end test of the RFID solution conducted by the
RFID Consortium. All system functionalities of the iTraceTM were evaluated.
The system tests were conducted in accordance with the Consortium’s
software development life cycle. Successful completion of system testing was
required prior to release for user acceptance testing. During system testing, the
proper interdependency between hardware, software and interfaces was
validated. Each system capability throughout each stage of the blood
transfusion supply chain from donor to blood center distribution was
evaluated.
A total of 29 system tests were run on the iTraceTM. The common operational
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functions and systematic procedures of the iTraceTM are all referenced in one
or multiple system tests. System testing was selected as it took into account all
of the possible system functionalities and capabilities, as well as potential
hazards and hazard mitigation/correction procedures that could be applied
from the beginning to the end of Phase One.
During testing, team members validated that the functionality included in the
system operated accurately and reliably as a whole and met performance
criteria prior to user acceptance testing. Testers validated the system by:
•

Following the System Test Plan (developed using the
Consortium’s System Development Life Cycle)

•

Checking that the interface is properly designed

•

Proceeding “top down” or “bottom up” as required

Nonconformance was documented on the system testing results documentation and
summary documentation. Correction and retesting occurred as required.
b. Unit Testing – Extensive unit testing was conducted on the iTraceTM. The
principal objective of unit testing was to take individual components of
testable software and processes of the application, isolate them from the
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remaining elements, and analyze their behavior. Units were tested
independently prior to incorporating them with other processes. In other
words, each stage within the blood transfusion supply chain was tested
separately. Several hazards anticipated as a result of the implementation or
functionality of the iTraceTM, as well as some based on the technology of the
system, may be linked to one or many unit tests.
The unit tests were performed to verify that the iTraceTM and its middleware
software piece would accurately capture data relating to the Blood
Transfusion Supply Chain collection, tracking, monitoring, and processing of
products and materials. The aim of the system is not only to enable greater
traceability, but also to enhance the efficiency of key supply chain operations.
There was a total of 21 Unit Tests carried out to effectively test the
functioning of the system throughout all stages of the supply chain from donor
to blood center distribution. Various conditions that could occur within these
stages, as well as expected results, actual results, and discrepancies were
documented for each test. The test was deemed successful if the operation
concluded as anticipated. The test was considered a failure if the incident
which actually ensued was a deviation from the intended design or
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functionality of the system. These steps were taken to comprehensively
evaluate all aspects of the system from end-to-end.
c. Performance Qualification – Formal validation completed by a
user/customer in a regulated environment. The purpose is to validate use of
the system tested solution within the context of specific operations using
Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) or Quality System Designs (QSDs)
and training documentation. It further ensured that key functions perform at
acceptable speeds. Key functions are identified (e.g., remote and on-site user
access screens, system processing and data retrieval, network interfaces and
external system interfaces) and an acceptable performance standard is
achieved. This validation ensured that the system, training of users, and
SOPs/QSDs work together, as expected. Successful completion of
Performance Qualification (also referred to as user acceptance testing or beta
testing) was a precursor to allowing use of the system in the pilot phase. This
test was done to demonstrate the usefulness of the system in a real,
commercial environment.
Prior to testing, the test team received training for conducting testing. During
testing, users thoroughly tested and accepted the RFID application before it
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could be authorized for pilot use. They tested the system in the QA instance
by:
•

Following the Performance Qualification Test Plan (developed using
BCW’s QSDs relating to Performance Qualification)

•

Testing their own SOPs or QSDs

•

Validating the training received to use the system

•

Validating the user guide

Nonconformance was documented according to performance qualification QSDs in place
at BCW. Correction, retest, and validation occurred as required before placing the system
into the pilot phase. Following a successful pilot, the system was released for production
use. After the Performance Qualification Test was executed, a summary was prepared
and approved.
Thus, the methods described illustrate the foundation of a comprehensive strategy for
identifying hazards and assessing the strategies for reducing or mitigating them. There
was a detailed, thorough process for identifying the hazards, as well as an all-inclusive
approach for testing them with simulated, extreme, regulated, actual, and end-to-end
methodologies. All tactics were valuable for the overall formulation of a practical
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procedural framework for hazard identification and testing.

SEVERITY AND LIKELIHOOD ANALYSES
The hazard class was determined by the impact of the hazardous effects on the system,
other systems, or individuals. The level of injury was rated by the damage done or degree
of harm. For example, if the hazard had the potential to simply interrupt current
processes, then it was given a severity level of one. On the other hand, if the hazard led to
the complete destruction of the system, failure of the tag, or mis-transfusion to the
patient, then the severity rating was the highest at five – critical.

Severity Estimate
The severity estimate has been determined in keeping with definitions, criteria, and
guidance as defined in SysLogic’s Quality Plan. It is defined as the qualitative rating of
the possible consequences of a hazard. There are four (4) levels of severity ratings as seen
in the Guidance on Severity Levels table (Table 3):
1234-

Negligible (no injury; irritation and/or discomfort only)
Minor (recoverable minor injury; no loss of function)
Moderate (moderate injury or recoverable, non-life-threatening injury)
Critical (major/life-threatening injury, or death)
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Table 3: Guidance on Severity Levels

Severity

Level

Description

Negligible

1

No injury; irritation and/or discomfort only

Minor

2

Recoverable minor injury; no loss of function

Moderate

3

Critical

4

Moderate injury or recoverable, non-life-threatening
injury
Major/life-threatening injury, or death

Likelihood Estimate
Consideration was also given as to the likelihood that each identified hazard might occur.
As the iTraceTM is a new technology, the probability of occurrence was deemed by
assessing the number of times the hazard actually occurred during system testing and/or
by taking the opinions of consortium experts into account. The final estimate was the
weighted average of all responses. The number of outcomes that were possible were also
specified and discussed. The number of times the event may occur over a particular
period of time in relation to the number of possible outcomes is the means by which the
likelihood estimate was established.
SysLogic’s Quality System uses five (5) likelihood ratings as seen on the Guidance on
Likelihood table (Table 4):
1- Improbable (so unlikely that it is assumed it will never occur)
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2345-

Remote (unlikely but may occur over the range of users)
Occasional (once per device over its intended life, or once in 6 months)
Probable (less than once per week but greater than once per month)
Frequent (greater than once per week)

Table 4: Guidance on Likelihood Levels
Likelihood

Level

Description

Improbable

1

So unlikely that it is assumed it will never occur

Remote

2

Unlikely but may occur over the range of users

Occasional

3

Once per device over its intended life (6 months)

Probable

4

Less than once per week but greater than once per month

Frequent

5

Greater than once per week

Risk Acceptability Rating:
By weighing the severity of a risk against its likelihood of occurrence, an overall risk
acceptability rating was obtained. SysLogic’s Quality System uses the legend and matrix
below (Table 5) to assign a risk acceptability rating. The way to compute the Risk
Acceptability is shown in Table 6.
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Table 5: Legend for Determining Resultant Severity Risk of the Device
Risk/Hazard Class

No damage; inconvenience
only

Minor damage, no loss of
tag/system function, or
recoverable minor damage

Moderate damage or
recoverable non-permanent
impairment/loss of function

Major damage (permanent
impairment or total loss of
function)

Severity

1-Negligible

2-Minor

3-Moderate

4-Critical

Probability

Risk Level

1-Improbable

A-Acceptable

2-Remote

A-Acceptable

3-Occasional

B-Tolerable

4-Probable

C-Intolerable

5-Frequent

C-Intolerable

1-Improbable

A-Acceptable

2-Remote

B-Tolerable

3-Occasional

B-Tolerable

4-Probable

C-Intolerable

5-Frequent

C-Intolerable

1-Improbable

B-Tolerable

2-Remote

B-Tolerable

3-Occasional

C-Intolerable

4-Probable

C-Intolerable

5-Frequent

C-Intolerable

1-Improbable

B-Tolerable

2-Remote

C-Intolerable

3-Occasional

C-Intolerable

4-Probable

C-Intolerable

5-Frequent

C-Intolerable
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Table 6: Risk Acceptability Computation Table

Severity

Likelihood

Negligible

Minor

Moderate

Critical

1

2

3

4

Improbable

1

A

A

B

B

Remote

2

A

B

B

C

Occasional

3

B

B

C

C

Probable

4

C

C

C

C

Frequent

5

C

C

C

C

SysLogic’s Quality System defines the risk acceptability ratings as follows (Table 7):
Table 7: Definitions of Risk Acceptability Ratings
A

Acceptable Risk: The risk comes within the broadly acceptable (green) region, i.e., either the severity
of the harm or the likelihood of occurrence of an event is so slight that the risk can be neglected
compared to the risks of other hazards. There is not necessarily a need to reduce this risk.

B

Tolerable Risk: The risk comes within the ALARP (As Low As Reasonably Practicable) region
(yellow), between the broadly acceptable and unacceptable region; i.e., the risk is reduced to the lowest
reasonably practicable level. Risks in this area must be carefully weighed with regard to the efficiency
of the device and the workload/expenditure for reduction of the risk. A risk ranging near the
unacceptable region will normally be reduced even though this may involve high cost expenditure.

C

Intolerable Risk: The risk comes within the (red) unacceptable/ intolerable region, i.e., the risk of the
hazard is so severe that a system/ device involving such hazards would be intolerable. A risk within
this region has to be reduced by reducing the likelihood of occurrence of that hazard.
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Risk Assessment Process and Inter-rater Reliability
The risk assessment process involved determining the extent of the consequence as well
as the frequency with which it was expected to occur. The severity was determined by
measuring the impact to the system, staff, or patients. For example, the wireless
communication hazardous event in which unauthorized access occurs during the
communication between the transmitter and receiver was given a level three severity.
This is because the unauthorized access could lead to enough problems that it would
generate a fair amount of concern, yet not enough to cause irreparable damage to the
system or harm to the patient.
Additionally, this hazard was assigned a level one likelihood. This is primarily due to the
rigor applied to reduce it. There were several techniques performed including adhering to
provisions in air protocols and standards which make it difficult to inappropriately access
data during communication, limiting the communication range between the tag and
reader, designing the tag to ensure data integrity, neglecting to include transmission of
confidential medical data, and incorporating data encryption security on the wireless
network. The combination of these approaches minimized the potential of occurrence to
the point that it was improbable. Furthermore, the number of times the hazard was
experienced during any of the verification or validation procedures was also taken into
account. Ultimately, this hazard received a Pre-Mitigation Risk level score of B.
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Nevertheless, since this assessment took place prior to completely implementing the
device, the evaluation was obviously highly subjective. As such, inter-rater reliability was
essential. My assessment and scoring assignments were reviewed, discussed, and
approved by the teams of consortium members. The consortium met and agreed on the
risk assessment assignments for each hazard.

SUPPLEMENTAL SEVERITY ASSESSMENT
As a supplement to assessing the risk using the accepted SysLogic, Inc. technique, I
included an additional measure. Since the severity of the hazard is partially calculated by
the success of the method of control, the following scale was included to further illustrate
its impact.
I.

Prevents/Mitigates the Hazard from Occurring: This measurement reflects
the ability of the method of control to deter the risk from happening. It is the
most highly desired effect of the controls. The risk legend would extend to,
for example, AI.

II.

Corrects/Remedies the Situation Following the Occurrence of the
Hazard: This measurement reflects the ability of the method of control to
respond to the hazard post-occurrence. It includes resolution strategies and
back-up plans to account for hazards. It is not as appealing as the prevention
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methodologies, but it does provide an effective solution to dilemmas that may
unfold. The risk legend could potentially extend to AII or BII for example.
III.

No Effect on Hazard Mitigation or Correction: This measurement reflects
the total inability of the strategy to proactively inhibit or counter the risks
associated with iTraceTM use. It consists of the most undesired methodologies
due to the lack of efficiency in negating or amending processes in the face of
hazards. The risk legend could apply as CIII for example.

CHAPTER 4: TECHNOLOGY HAZARD ANALYSIS
It is evident that it is necessary to analyze the risks of implementing HF RFID (13.56
MHz) technology and system tools to avoid potential hazards. The impact a hazard would
have on the efficacy of blood products and, perhaps ultimately, on patient safety in the
event a failure occurs or a design flaw is discovered should be assessed. The technology
hazards are the potential harms that may occur from technology or system conditions, or
from human interactions with these conditions. These hazards were identified using the
methods described above. The following safety and critical design requirements will be
discussed in this chapter:
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•

Preventing Read/Write Errors or Failure.

•

Ensuring No Adverse Effects of RFID Technology on Blood Products.

•

Ensuring Performance Capability of RFID Tags During the Most Common Blood
Supply Chain Processes.

•

Ensuring RFID Tag Survivability After Experiencing the Most Demanding
Conditions in the Blood Supply Chain.

•

Ensuring No Interference of RFID High Frequency (HF) and Electromagnetic
Interference (EMI) with Other Systems.

TECHNOLOGY – SAFETY CRITICAL DESIGN REQUIREMENT: PREVENT
DATA READ/ WRITE FALIURE
There are six potential system hazards which could potentially affect the ability of the
iTraceTM to effectively read/write essential data. The first is a general read/write failure
due to any malfunction of the handheld or pad RFID reader. The consortium team rated
this as a one on the severity level and three on the likelihood level. This indicates that,
while the hazard may occur occasionally, it will not cause any significant harm to the
patient, blood products, or system. The mitigation applied to this is a simple, yet helpful
solution that is reflective of the inherent functionality of the middleware used in the
application. Each time a tag is read/written by a handheld or pad reader, an audible sound
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is heard. This notifies the user that the tag was successfully read/written. Additionally,
the handheld and/or work station display is also updated with the newly read/written
information in the instance of successful completion of the activity. If an error is, in fact,
detected, the application prevents the user from continuing the process until the current
problem is resolved. Moreover, should the RFID reader fail, the user may revert to the
standard barcode reader to read/write the same information.
The pre-mitigation risk for this hazard was rated a B. Level B signifies a tolerable risk. It
falls within the As Low as Reasonably Practicable (ALARP) region. The hazards which
fall into this category must be measured in comparison to the advantages of utilizing the
device and the methods taken to reduce the risk. In other words, the cost of minimizing
the risk must be lower than the value of using the device. The results of the analysis on
cost vs. benefit of employing the iTraceTM with regards to each hazard described will take
place in the Discussion Chapter.
Likewise, the second hazard is again an overall read/write failure, this time due to any
breakdown in the process associated with the RFID tunnel reader. The RFID tunnel
reader reconciles blood product containers and their contents as they are checked into the
Blood Center and shipped to/from the Blood Center. Reconciling refers to the system’s
role in verifying that the expected container and its contents correctly match what is
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actually presented. As with the first hazard, the consortium rated this hazard a one on the
severity scale and a three on the likelihood scale, showing that it has the potential to
happen intermittently, but will not lead to any harm when it does.
The mitigation strategy used here was the application of yet another inherent
functionality of the middleware: the software driver for the tunnel reader. The software
driver can determine whether items are missing or excess items are present in containers.
If a RFID tag is detected for a product that is not anticipated to be included in a container
during the tunnel read check-in process, the product is flagged as an “excess” item. The
operator is then required to manually inspect the container and its contents to correct the
issue.
Similarly, if the RFID tag for an expected product is not identified during the tunnel read
check-in operation, the application notifies the operator of the potentially “missing” item.
Again, the operator is instructed to manually inspect the container to determine if the
product is, in fact, missing, if the RFID tag failed, or if the tag was blocked by other
container contents. For this hazard, the operator is always charged with manually
examining the container to resolve any discrepancies. In addition, in the event of an RFID
reader failure, the user maintains the option to use the standard barcode reader to read the
same data which is barcoded on the label.
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The pre-mitigation risk for this hazard is also a Level B. The risk is tolerable, yet there is
a need to diminish it. We must assess whether the benefits of employing the device
outweigh the cost of mitigating this hazard.
The third hazard that must be lessened to meet the safety critical design requirement of
preventing data read/write errors/failures is the risk of bad data on the tag. This RFID
hazard is caused by corrupted data existing on the tag. This hazard was given a level
three severity and level one likelihood. The ratings indicate that the risk is of moderate
severity, leading to relative, though recoverable and non-permanent, damage, injury, or
loss of function; however, it is improbable, assuming it will likely never occur. This
presents the highest severity, yet least likelihood, thus far.
Bad data on the tag could hypothetically be the result of harsh conditions experienced by
the tag such as centrifugation, blast freezing, and gamma irradiation; but, formal protocol
testing was conducted on tag survivability, examining the effects of these techniques
under extreme and excessive circumstances. The study, which will be explained in more
detail subsequently, demonstrated that these methods would not significantly affect the
performance or survivability of the tag.
Furthermore, a new ISBT128 data structure was developed to enable more advanced
detection of tag memory corruption. An ISBT-128 local data identifier is used to facilitate
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the parsing of this field from other ISBT-128 data structures. Also, the ISBT-128compatible memory checksum data structure is used. The system is designed to
recalculate and rewrite the data every time the tag data changes. When the full tag data
structure is read, the reader calculates and compares its result with the data values already
stored in the memory block. If even one bit of the tag memory is corrupted, the
recalculated and stored data identifier will disagree, indicating that memory corruption
has occurred.
The pre-mitigation risk for this hazard is a Level B. As such, the hazard is determined to
be tolerable. Despite the moderate risk presented with this hazard, it is still acceptable
due to the unlikely possibility that it will occur.
The next RFID system hazard that falls into the read/write error category involves the
subsequent alteration of the donation identification number (DIN) written on the tag at
collection. This hazard may be due to the lack of enforcement of the DIN field locking on
the tag. It was rated a two on both the severity and likelihood scales, indicating a minor
severity with no loss of tag/system functionality and a remote possibility of occurrence.
The method of control involves the configurable design of the application, which allows
the organization to use the DIN locking feature at the point of collection or at labeling.
The locking process unfolds as follows:
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1. The DIN labels for the entire blood collection set are placed on individual bags
prior to collection. This includes placing an RFID tag on the RBC bag. All bags
receive both an RFID tag and DIN label during apheresis collection.
2. The handheld reads the DIN bar code label and writes the ISBT-128 DIN data
structure contained in the bar code directly into the tag without any data
transformation.
3. Every ISO 18000-3 mode 1 RFID produced has a Tag ID Number (TIN). The
TIN is a unique factory-programmed 64-bit serial number, which includes the
manufacturer ID and tag model number. Both the TIN and the DIN are recorded
in the RFID database.
4. The DIN data structure is read back into the RFID reader to verity that it was
written precisely.
5. The four 32-bit data blocks containing the DIN on the tag are then permanently
locked by the RFID reader, inhibiting the threat of the data ever being modified or
overwritten.
6. The lock bits can be read back by the reader to confirm that locking did actually
take place.
In the rare instance in which the tag failed to physically lock the DIN memory blocks,
and the DIN was altered, the DIN and TIN are associated in the RFID database.

63

Therefore, if the DIN on the tag changes, the next time the tag is read, an error will be
displayed to alert the operator that the DIN and TIN do not match.
The pre-mitigation risk for this hazard was rated a Level B by the consortium. Here, the
risk is highly tolerable because it is both minor and rare. Nevertheless, as with all
tolerable risks, the value in relation to the reduction of the risk must be assessed.
The next hazard to be evaluated was the potential for the DIN created at final labeling to
be altered. As with the last hazard, this hazard may be the result of the DIN field locking
not being enforced. Additionally, this hazard also receives a severity and likelihood rating
of two and two.
The method of control executed to mitigate this was as follows. If there was no RFID tag
present at final labeling, a blank RFID tag was affixed to the product bag. The process of
printing, applying, and verifying the barcoded final label occurred as normal. The
labeling operator then began the process of programing the ISBT 128 label data structure
by placing the product on an RFID pad reader which is connected to the RFID server.
The server had an application titled “Label Product,” which the operator launched. The
operator then scanned the DIN and Product Code barcodes from the blood bag, and
selected the “Label” button. The data was then uploaded to the RFID server, which
gathered all other required information from the BECS. The pad RFID reader wrote all
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the required ISBT-128 data structures including the ISBT-128 DIN Data Structure into
assigned memory blocks. All memory fields on the tag were then read again to confirm
that the data was successfully written to the RFID tag’s memory, and coincided with data
received from the BECS’ master file. The tag’s TIN was read by the RFID server and
permanently associated with the DIN and product code in the database. Finally, the two
32-bit blocks containing the ISBT-128 ABO data structure and the four 32-bit blocks
containing the ISBT-128 DIN data structure were locked, rendering them unalterable.
Here, again, the Pre-Mitigation Risk was a Level B. It fell in the middle of the tolerable
risk category, putting it at the exact midway point between the acceptable and intolerable
region. Consequently, it was likely that it could be reduced without a great deal of cost
expenditure.
The final risk falling into the category of read/write RFID system errors was the potential
hazard of the ABO being rewritten on the tag. The severity and likelihood ratings of this
hazard were three and one respectively. This indicates a moderate severity with an
improbable chance of occurrence. The method of control applied here dealt with the
placement of the ABO label for the blood bag on the individual bags during final
labeling. It included placing an RFID tag on products that did not already carry one. The
process of printing, applying, and verifying the barcodes on the final label remained
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unchanged. As with the hazard of the alteration of the DIN at final labeling, this
procedure for programing data structures was applied, ultimately rendering the ABO data
structure unchangeable. The Pre-Mitigation Risk was a B for this hazard. The risk
remained tolerable, yet needed to be mitigated or decreased.

TECHNOLOGY – SAFETY CRITICAL DESIGN REQUIREMENT: ENSURE NO
ADVERSE EFFECTS OF RFID TECHNOLOGY ON BLOOD PRODUCTS
The five hazards that could impact the safety and critical design requirements necessary
to ensure no adverse effects of RFID technology on blood products were examined
through the use of a formal protocol and testing procedures. The Limit Test Protocol for
Radio Frequency Exposure Testing was performed. The background for the protocol
testing was as follows. 13.56 MHz is the global standard frequency recommended for
blood transfusion medicine by the International Society for Blood Transfusion (ISBT)
working party. There were several criteria for selection of this operating frequency,
including: 1) 13.56 MHz is a global standard frequency for RFID usage, supporting the
ISBT’s global mandate, and 2) at this frequency, the RF signal contains only a magnetic
field component and the electric field is suppressed, thereby minimizing the possibility of
biological interaction.
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In order to prevent adverse occurrences resulting from the use of RFID in the transfusion
medicine supply chain, the objective was to outline test protocols and success criteria for
evaluating the worst-case effects of 13.56 MHz RF magnetic field radiation on the
temperature elevation and toxicity of cellular protein structures of red blood cell (RBC),
whole blood derived platelet products (WBDP), plasma and plasma coagulation factors
under extreme RF exposure conditions.
The RFID Consortium, under the guidance of the FDA, developed and undertook this
protocol testing regimen to ensure that the proper methods of control for mitigating the
potential hazards were established. The RBCs, WBDPs and plasma products followed
identical RF testing protocols. The only difference was in the bag volumes and normal
storage and testing temperature requirements for each type of product.
The testing methodology for these protocols included three iterations of identical
exposure conditions to CONTROL and TEST bags appropriate to the product being
tested under exposure guidelines provided by Center for Devices and Radiological Health
(CDRH). The testing was designed to focus results in two primary areas of interest to
CDRH and Center for Biologics Evaluation and Research (CBER) respectively:
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•

Any rise in temperature of blood products (red cells, pooled platelets, and plasma)
due to dielectric heating generated by extended exposure to the intense RF field,
and

•

Cellular or protein degradation from extended exposure to the intense RF field.

The potential hazards included:
1. High Frequency RF radiation could increase the temperature of RBCs and
platelets beyond acceptable level of 1.5 °C due to Joule heating.
2. High Frequency RF radiation could lead to increased degradation of RBC cellular
and protein structures beyond acceptable level of hemolysis of ≤1%.
3. High Frequency RF radiation could lead to increased degradation of WBDP
cellular and protein structures, such that the pH decreases beyond acceptable level
of ≥6.2.
4. High Frequency RF radiation could increase the temperature of plasma types
(FFP, FP24, and TP) beyond acceptable level of 4 °C due to Joule heating.
5. High frequency RF could degrade the activity of the coagulation factors (PT,
aPTT, Antithrombin Activity, Factor V, Factor VIII, Factor XI, Protein C, Protein

68

S, VWF: RCo) levels of three types (FFP, FP24, and TP) of thawed plasma
products beyond an acceptable level of 20%.
The joint mitigation strategy for all of these hazards was associated with this protocol.
The RFID Consortium study team chose to enlist the involvement of the FDA CBER at
an early stage to determine its level of interest or uncover any concerns related to the use
of RFID in transfusion medicine. The FDA emphasized the necessity of identifying and
assessing the total impact, if any, that radio frequency energy may have on the safety and
efficacy of blood products. The FDA also prohibited the use and transfusion of blood
products in an RFID-enabled pilot study until they had reviewed the in vitro test results
of an accepted protocol.
As a result of the testing conducted at the CDRH (54, 55), the FDA CBER and CDRH
proposed the execution of a more specific and exhaustive protocol consisting of a limit
test that would simulate worst-case scenarios. These organizations, along with the
consortium, collaborated to develop the Limit Test Protocol, including the parameters to
be studied, the length of time the products would be exposed to RF energy, the RF
magnetic field strength, the type and number of products to be studied, and the
acceptance criteria. A single RF Limit Test Protocol would be performed for all products.

69

The intent of the Limit Test was to expose blood components to extraordinarily higher
RF power levels and for longer durations than would ever be seen in practice, and
compare those results with an unexposed control group. The Limit Test in question would
test for both thermal (Joule Heating) effects on the blood products, as well as assay
changes in cellular and chemical parameters.
The consortium estimated that the average exposure of a blood bag over its entire useful
life would be at a RF magnetic field strength of 1 Ampere/meter for a discontinuous
period of less than 21 minutes. The Limit Test simulated a 13.56 MHz RF magnetic field
strength of 5 Amperes/meter for a continuous exposure period of 23-25 hours (56). In
other words, the blood products were tested at hundreds of times the exposure they were
anticipated to experience during normal use.
Because there was no known apparatus that was of the size and capability to hold a blood
bag in a uniform, intense 13.56 MHz RF magnetic field of 5 Amperes/meter field
strength, Hohberger and Tsirline of Zebra Technologies designed and constructed a
segmented 86cm Helmholtz coil with 90 Watts RF input (56). This simulated a constant
repeating RFID reader interrogation. Zebra Technologies donated the entire apparatus to
the University of Wisconsin RFID Lab.
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Each test used identical test and control bags, with only the test bags experiencing the full
RF exposure. The control bags were placed outside of the RF field. Product samples were
collected from each bag prior to the start of the test, after 7 hours, and at the end of the
test period of 24 hours. In vitro chemical, morphological, and biological assays on both
control and test bags were performed. The temperature at each bag’s surface and core
were measured every minute. The detailed testing and results have been documented and
published (19, 57).
There were two rounds of Limit Tests. The first round included tests performed on young
red blood cells (RBCs) and whole blood-derived platelets (WBDPs) at the BloodCenter
of Wisconsin. Personnel from the University of Wisconsin RFID Lab, under the direction
of Alfonso Gutierrez, and from the BloodCenter of Wisconsin under the direction of
Graminske, conducted the Limit Testing on both AS-1 packed RBC products at 4◦C that
were six to nine days old and fresh WBDP at 22-24◦C. These Limit tests were performed
at RF magnetic field levels of 5A/m and extended exposure durations for 24 hours. Three
pairs of bags were tested, with each pair consisting of a control bag (placed 2m outside of
the coil center) and a test bag (placed at the center of the Helmholtz coil). Due to the
extension of the magnetic field beyond the Helmholtz coil, the control unit was exposed
to only 0.64% of the RF magnetic field strength generated at the location of the test
product (56). This exposure was deemed acceptable and negligible in the protocol review.
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The study results demonstrated that RBC and WBDP products had no increased
cellular/protein degradation after extended exposure to RF. Joule heating by the RF field
had acceptable effects on the temperature rise of RBC and WBDP (35). More
specifically, the findings were as follows (19):
•

Hemolysis of young (6-9 days old) RBCs after 23-25 hours of RF energy
exposure was <0.2% for all TEST and CONTROL RBC units, well within the ≤
1% limit of the FDA-approved acceptance criterion.

•

While there was minimal RBC TEST versus CONTROL bag center temperature
rise due to Joule heating, the average 0.14 ± 0.35 °C relative temperature increase
measured at the end of the test between TEST and CONTROL units never
exceeded the 1.5 ºC acceptance criterion.

•

No clinically significant changes were observed in RBC, Hb, Hct, MBC, RBC
morphology and potassium in the RBC TEST versus CONTROL group.

•

For WBDP, the mean pH of the measured TEST group pH was 7.27; CONTROL
group pH was 7.19, exceeding the minimum pH criterion ≥ 6.2.

•

The maximum temperature increase of the WBDP TEST unit relative to the
CONTROL was 0.30 ± 0.27°C, not exceeding the 1.5° C criterion.
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For the second round of testing, the FDA expressed concern that aged red blood cells
(aRBCs) – those near expiration of the 42-day shelf life) might be more susceptible to the
effects of radio frequency than young RBCs and should be tested. This study utilized the
same testing protocol as the first, and allowed measurement of peak transient
temperatures in the aRBC and plasma bags prior to their achieving thermal equilibrium
(57).
Pairs of aRBC control and test bags of the same age and blood type from no later than
day 41 of storage were used so that testing was completed by the 42-day product
expiration. For the plasma tests, the objective was to show that long-term RF exposure
did not impact the coagulation factor levels of thawed plasma products. All plasma
products were donated by females of blood group O. The Applied Research Lab at
BloodCenter of Wisconsin (BCW) thawed the frozen plasmas at 30-37◦C. Nine pairs of
aged frozen plasma products, three each of three types, were randomly selected by the
BCW’s Component Department. Nine pairs of aged frozen plasma products, three each of
three types, were randomly selected by the BloodCenter of Wisconsin’s Component
Department. The three types of plasma units selected for testing were:
1)

FFP (plasma frozen within 8 hours from collection) was freshly thawed and
stored at 1°C - 6°C for up to 24 hours. Testing started on the day of thaw.
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2)

FP24 (plasma frozen within 24 hours of collection) was freshly thawed and
stored at 1°C - 6°C for up to 24 hours. Testing started on the day of thaw.

3)

Thawed plasma (TP) (plasma frozen within 8 hours from collection) was
thawed 4 days prior to testing and stored at 1°C - 6°C for up to 5 days. Testing
started on day 4 of thawed storage.

Plasma testing always began on the day prior to shelf life expiration so that the end of the
testing was on the same day the product expired. Prior to any Limit Testing, the thawed
plasma pairs were each aseptically pooled together, mixed and then equally divided into
test and control bags.
The RF exposure protocol for all plasma pairs was identical to that used in the aged RBC
trials. All plasma products were assayed at zero, seven, and 23-25 hours for Prothrombin
Time (PT), activated Partial Thromboplastin (aPTT), Antithrombin III, Factor V, Factor
VIII, Factor XI, Protein C, Protein S, and von Willebrand factor ristocetin cofactor
(VWF:RCo) activities.
The results for the second round of testing for aRBCs were consistent with earlier tests on
young RBCs (19). The results were as follows:
•

Hemolysis after 23-25 hours of RF energy exposure was < 0.3% for all TEST and
CONTROL aRBC units and well within the ≤ 1% acceptance criterion.
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•

No notable changes were observed in red blood cell count, hemoglobin,
hematocrit, mean cell volume (MCV), RBC morphology score, free hemoglobin,
and potassium or percent hemolysis in the TEST versus CONTROL group.

•

The maximum transient relative center temperature increase between TEST and
CONTROL units of 0.77 ± 0.17 °C due to Joule heating. The highest peak
recorded of 1.00 °C never exceeded the 1.5 °C criterion.

•

Biological test results were within acceptance criteria and consistent with earlier
tests on 6-9 day RBCs.

•

There was no detectable acceleration in cellular degradation of aRBCs over young
RBCs.

Similarly, the 3x3 sets of thawed FFP, FP24 and TP paired plasma units had comparable
results between test and control bags, demonstrating that long-term RF exposure does not
impact the coagulation factor levels of thawed plasma products (57). The results of the
plasma testing were as follows:
•

All three groups of plasma products (FFP, FP24, TP) with one exception met the
FDA limit test acceptance criterion of<20% difference between TEST and
CONTROL parameters assayed before and after RF exposure for Antithrombin
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activity, Factors VIII and IX; PT and aPTT; Proteins C and S; Fibrinogen and
VWF:RCo. (There was a single exception in TP pair #1. For that pair, the
CONTROL product VWF:RCo inexplicably dropped much lower than the TEST
product. Since, however, the CONTROL sample had negligible RF exposure, the
anomalous result is not likely due to any RF exposure process).
•

While Joule heating was present in the TEST bag, the average relative
temperature increase between TEST and CONTROL units’ centers was 1.36 ±
0.68 °C. The highest peak temperature recorded of 2.30 °C never exceeded the 4
°C criterion for plasma.

Overall, the results demonstrated that 13.56 MHz-based RFID technology is unlikely to
have any significant temperature or biological effects on RBC and WBDP units under
normal RFID operating conditions. More specifically:
•

Both young RBCs and aRBC products do not have any increased cellular/protein
degradation after high levels of extended exposure to RF energy. All results on
aged RBCs were consistent with the earlier tests on young RBCs (57).

•

WBDP products do not have any increased cellular/protein degradation after high
levels of extended exposure to RF energy (19).
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•

All tested plasma products (FFP, FP24, TP) with one explainable exception met
the FDA limit test acceptance criterion of<20% difference between TEST and
CONTROL parameters assayed before and after RF exposure for all test
coagulation factors.

•

The RF field emitted by the Helmholtz coil had no significant effect on the
temperature of RBC and WBDP blood products, and an acceptable effect on
plasma products. The relative temperature increase of the exposed blood products
did not exceed at any time their acceptance criteria.

Consequently, in review of the five hazards which could affect the safety and critical
design requirements of ensuring there were no adverse effects of RFID technology on
blood products, the methods demonstrated in the Limit Test Protocol and Results show
that this will not likely occur during application of the technology. For these five hazards,
the entity at risk of the RFID radiation hazard was the product or patient. Furthermore, all
were given the same severity and likelihood measurements of two and one respectively,
indicating that, even in the very unlikely incidence that the hazards will occur, they will
only lead to minor, recoverable injury. Moreover, the results of the aforesaid method of
control described in the Limit Test protocol can be applied to all.

77

The first hazard involves the event in which the maximum temperature increase of the
RBCs and Platelets exceeds the acceptable levels of 1.5◦C. The results demonstrated that,
for RBCs, the maximum average transient temperature increase of test versus control
units due to Joule heating was 0.77 ± 0.17°C. There was no transient increase of greater
than 1.00°C. For platelets, the maximum average transient temperature increase of test
versus control units due to Joule heating was 0.30 ± 0.27◦C.
The second hazard was the potential of the cellular and protein structures of RBCs
(complete blood counts including sample weight, RBC count, Hb, Hct, MCV; potassium,
aluminum; free hemoglobin; level of blood gases) being degraded or altered beyond the
acceptable level of ≤1% hemolysis. Test results demonstrated that, for young RBCs,
Hemolysis was < 0.2% for both test and control RBC units. Additionally, for aRBCs, hemolysis

was < 0.2% for both test and control RBC units.
The third potential hazard was the possibility of the cellular and protein structures
(Lactate, Aluminum, P-Selectin, and complete blood counts including sample weight,
WBDP count, Plt, and MPV) of WBDPs being degraded such that the pH decreases
beyond the acceptable level of ≥6.2. The results of the Limit Test Protocol showed that
the average pH of the test bags was 7.27. The average pH of the control bags was 7.19.
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The next hazard involves the potential for the maximum temperature increase of plasma
types (FFP, FP24, and TP) to exceed the acceptable level of 4 °C. The study showed that
the maximum average transient temperature of the test vs. control bag was 1.36 ± 0.68
°C. Also, there was no transient temperature increase that exceeded 2.30 °C.
Finally, the last hazard in this group deals with the potential activity of coagulation factor
(PT, aPTT, Antithrombin Activity, Factor V, Factor VIII, Factor XI, Protein C, Protein S,
VWF: RCo) in all types (FFP, FP24, and TP) of thawed plasma products being altered
beyond an acceptable level of 20%. The protocol results revealed that all three groups of
plasma products (FFP, FP24, TP) with one exception met the FDA limit test acceptance
criterion of <20% difference between test and control parameters assayed before and after
RF exposure for PT, aPTT, Antithrombin activity, Factors V, VIII and IX; Proteins C
and S; Fibrinogen and VWF:RCo. There was a single exception in TP pair #1. For that
pair, in the control product VWF:RCo inexplicably dropped much lower than the test
product. Since, however, the control sample had negligible RF exposure, the anomalous
result was deemed unlikely to be due to any RF exposure process.
The Pre-Mitigation Risk of all five hazards in this category was determined to be at Level
A. Level A is indicative of acceptable risk. This means that either the severity of the harm
or the likelihood of occurrence of the event is so small the risk can be considered
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negligible compared to the risks of other hazards. As a result, there is not a great need to
reduce this risk.

TECHNOLOGY – SAFETY AND CRITICAL DESIGN REQUIREMENT:
ENSURE THE PERFORMANCE CAPABILITY OF RFID TAGS DURING THE
MOST COMMON BLOOD SUPPLY CHAIN PROCESSES
Similar to the hazards potentially impacting the previous safety and critical requirement
of ensuring no adverse effects of RFID on blood products, the hazards which threaten this
requirement of ensuring the performance capability of RFID tags during the most
common blood supply chain processes were all tested under the same protocol. The
Performance Test for RFID Tags in Blood Products Protocol was conducted.
In order to best understand the iTraceTM and the Performance Test for RFID Tags in
Blood Products Protocol, it is important to be aware of the type of tag used, as well as the
reason for why this particular tag was selected. Standard ISO/IEC 18000-3 mode 1
passive RFID tags, which are also compliant with the ISO 15693 standard, were selected
for use at 13.56 MHz frequency. These tags were chosen for several reasons: 1) ISO
18000-3 is the international standard for passive RFID tags and describes the parameters,
which are specifically optimized for healthcare applications, for use at 13.56 MHz, 2)
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The tags are read/write capable, 3) The tags have the ability to store up to 3 kilobit of
memory, some of which would be locked on the tag, and 4) The tags are unaffected by
water and are able to withstand harsh environments. Avery Dennison AD-730 HF RFID
tags with an operating temperature range of -40 to +85◦C were placed underneath the
DIN barcode on the 0.9N saline filled blood bags. The tags operate using the 1 kilobit
NXP|*Code SLI integrated circuit, consist of aluminum antenna external dimensions
measuring 14x31 mm, and has an average free air resonance tuning of 14.0 MHz.
To determine the commercial applicability of the RFID system solution in the blood
transfusion medicine industry, this protocol was designed to develop procedures and
success criteria for evaluating the performance capability of RFID tags during the most
common blood supply chain processes. The protocol used a defined set of performance
measurement indicators. Tag performance was measured according to whether the
tag/reader system performed satisfactorily when dealing with tag content in simulated
scenarios including: different bag containers, varying types of readers, and packaging
materials.
The UW RFID lab attached the RFID tags to simulated blood bags (actual blood bags
filled with saline-based liquid content). The protocol considered all typical containers
used for blood products at the BloodCenter of WI: Coleman cooler, tray, two generic
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Styrofoam boxes, and platelet boxes. The performance of each tag was measured by
reading the containers with four different RFID specified readers (tunnel reader, flatbed
reader, dual barcode-HF handheld, and HF paddle reader). Acceptance thresholds were
set for each test metric after analyzing the results from pre-testing and practicality
considerations for real world application. Furthermore, the thresholds were established
prior to fine tuning, thereby reflecting the worst case acceptable operation conditions.
The testing methodology for this protocol included 41 test scenarios and 23 separately
analyzed experiments of container-reader combinations that have been documented by
the BloodCenter of Wisconsin. The instances which involve reading all blocks with the
handheld or the paddle were executed one blood bag at a time. The handheld devices
cannot read more than one at a time since having multiple tags in the reading field creates
reading problems for these readers. Therefore, the application will limit the use of these
devices to reading one bag at a time.
The testing was designed to focus results in three primary areas of interest:
•

Time to read (header) – Time in milliseconds to the point when the tag was seen
for the first time after start of test,
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•

Time to read (memory blocks) – Time in milliseconds to read the predefined
number of memory blocks from the tag memory, and

•

Time to write (only done with single bag scenarios) – Time in milliseconds to the
point when the tag acknowledges encoding completion; which includes reader
header, reading the current data in the tag, erasing the tag by writing all zeros,
writing a random pattern and finally verifying that the data was written correctly.
All operations would be done to a predetermined number of blocks in the tag
memory after start of test. If the written operation is not completed the trial is
ignored and repeated.

The three potential hazards that may be experienced are as follows:
1. The time to read the headers of 20-bags-equivalent exceeds the maximum
threshold established for specific container/reader combinations.
2. The time to read/write all memory blocks of 20-bags-equivalent exceeds the
maximum threshold established for specific container/reader combinations.
3. The time to write all blocks exceeds the maximum threshold established for
specific container/reader combinations.
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The RFID Consortium is seeking to implement the RFID systems solution into
commercial applications of the transfusion medicine industry. In doing so, a series of
tests were planned to complement the standard software systems test. These included two
phases of testing: tag survivability and tag performance testing. This portion of the
document discusses the tag performance testing protocol execution and results. The
survivability testing aspect will be discussed later.
The consortium developed this protocol based on the most common scenarios where
RFID tags would be utilized in the blood supply chain. The goal was to evaluate as many
aspects of the performance of RFID tags as possible in order to determine its full
potential. The method was to combine the four different types of readers: (1) TagSys HF
RFID Tunnel, (2) TagSys HF RFID Flatbed, (3) Unitech handheld, and (4) Tracient PadL
with all of the traditional containers used for blood products at the BloodCenter of
Wisconsin – Coleman cooler, tray, two generic Styrofoam boxes and platelet boxes – in
varying groupings to determine the efficacy. The different combinations were applied at
each of the RFID-enabled checkpoints in the blood supply chain process.
The UW RFID lab used a factorial design to formulate a total of 41 test scenarios. The
combination of scenarios generated 23 experiments. The factors or variables that were
manipulated during each experiment were the amount of data processed and the number
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of units in the container. There were also two test levels for each variable: the two
extreme values for the number of bags and the number of memory blocks. For the
number of bags variable, the 60 bags were randomly grouped into the corresponding
number of bags per container and tests were run until all 60 bags were read in each
scenario.
The testing team worked closely with the software developer (S3Edge) and the tunnel
manufacturer (TagSys) to ensure the tunnel configuration was appropriately attuned for
the test purpose. Since tags were read individually using the handheld and paddle reader,
it was found that the packaging type did not matter and the only variable that had an
effect was the number of tagged units. The units were tested in groups of 2, 4, 10, 17, and
30, and the only difference was the absence of the container.
Using two level factor analysis on preliminary data collected on the variables’ effect
between the different levels, it was estimated that a minimum of 60 test units was
required as a sample size to ensure 95% confidence of results applying two replications
per run.
The acceptance thresholds were set for each test metric after analyzing results from pretesting the most difficult scenarios of the blood supply chain. The time to read/write was
taken as the average value of all data obtained for the scenario. If the average time to read
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or write exceeded the threshold by a statistically significant amount at α=0.05, the test
failed.
All measurements were converted to 20-bags-equivalent and compared with its
corresponding 20-bags-equivalent threshold.
The results of this protocol show that RFID tags demonstrate acceptable levels of
performance in all scenarios of real world application. More specifically, the results were
as follows:
•

All scenarios passed the statistical t-test with a confidence level of 95% when
compared to the pre-determined threshold.

•

Some scenarios, such as the tray with the flatbed were dependent upon the
operator because the flatbed reader only used a single antenna that had
dimensions smaller than the length of the tray.

•

The system can be fine-tuned to improve performance over the results obtained
through this study.

•

The handheld and paddle reader need to have exactly one tag in the reading field,
making it difficult to read all blocks within packaged containers where there is
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interference from neighboring tags – each bag must be read individually with
these devices.
•

When reading headers with handheld and paddle readers, the type of packaging
did not significantly affect the performance.

Thus, all scenarios passed the performance thresholds that were set based on actual pretest data and practicality considerations for real-world applications. The tunnel reader
was found to perform the best with the fastest read times in its applicable scenarios. Next
was the flatbed, then handheld, and the last was the paddle reader. Other tests showed
that the paddle antenna had the highest Q, thereby reducing its sensitivity to RFID tags
which are detuned form the 13.56 MHz reader interrogation frequency. Consequently,
this increased the number of retries needed to read these tags and boosted the average
reading time.
Additionally, when using the handheld and paddle readers, bags had to be read
individually. As a result, the performance of the system in some of these scenarios
depended on the user’s ability to properly employ the device and the software user
interface.
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Furthermore, when comparing the time to read barcodes on individual bags with the
results obtained from the RFID tags, a marked improvement in performance is shown.
The improvement can be highlighted by the read time for the tunnel where one can read
at a rate of less than a second per bag without having to open or unpack the container.
This compares with approximately 0.5-1 minute per tag for unpacking and reading the
barcodes on each bag individually, depending on the operator’s skill level, as measured
by the check-in process in other studies. RFID considerably improves the time it would
take to read barcodes from each bag, serving as a major source of return on investment in
the blood center.
Even with the poorest performing reader, the paddle reader, it is possible to read a tag
every 2 seconds. Moreover, through additional fine-tuning of the tunnel reader’s
parameters, the possibility of greater performance improvement is feasible. This
enhancement will take place in tandem with the fine-tuning of the final user application
development.
As a result, the evaluation of the three hazards which could affect the safety and critical
design requirement of ensuring performance capability of RFID tags during the most
common blood supply chain processes could be attributed to the Performance Test
Protocol and Results. For these three hazards, the entity at risk of the RFID hazard is the
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system itself. In addition, the hazards are all caused by system capability. Furthermore,
all were given the same severity and likelihood measurements of one and two
respectively. This means that, even in the remote chance that the hazards will occur, they
will only lead to negligible injury. What is more, the results of the abovementioned
mitigation strategy for the Performance Testing Protocol can be applied to all three
hazards for their methods of control.
The first hazard refers to the potential scenario in which the time to read headers of 20bags-equivalent exceeds maximum threshold established for specific container/reader
combinations. The results of the Performance Test Protocol demonstrated the following:
Tunnel Reader:
1. Maximum threshold = 15-25 seconds for the 20-bags-equivalent, depending on
container.
2. Maximum average time to read only headers was 6.19 seconds.
3. Mean time to read the header of any one tag was 0.26 seconds.

Flatbed Reader:

89

1. Maximum threshold = 20-40 seconds for the 20-bags-equivalent, depending on
container.
2. Maximum average time to read only headers was 23.7 seconds.
3. Mean time to read the header of any one tag was 0.87 seconds.
Handheld Reader:
1. Maximum threshold = 35-45 seconds for the 20-bags-equivalent, depending on
container.
2. Maximum average time to read only headers was 37.7 seconds.
3. Mean time to read the header of any one tag was 1.27 seconds.
Paddle Reader:
1. Maximum threshold = 70, 75, & 80 seconds for the 20-bags-equivalent,
depending on container.
2. Maximum average time to read only headers was 68.9 seconds.
3. Mean time to read the header of any one tag was 1.95 seconds.
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The second hazard deals with the possibility in which the time to read/write all 28
memory blocks of 20-bags-equivalent exceeds maximum threshold established for
specific container/reader combinations. The results of the Performance Test Protocol
were as follows:
Tunnel Reader:
1. Maximum threshold = 25-40 seconds for the 20-bags-equivalent, depending on
the container.
2. Maximum average time to read all blocks was 26.5 seconds.
3. Mean time to read all blocks on any one tag was 0.89 seconds.
Flatbed Reader:
1. Maximum threshold = 30, 50, & 60 seconds for the 20-bags-equivalent,
depending on the container.
2. Maximum average time to read all blocks was 45.6 seconds.
3. Mean time to read all blocks on any one tag was 1.23 seconds.
Handheld Reader:
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1. Maximum threshold =80 & 60 seconds for the 20-bags-equivalent, depending on
the container.
2. Maximum average time to read all blocks was 25.0 seconds.
3. Mean time to read all blocks on any one tag was 1.27 seconds.
Paddle Reader:
1. Maximum threshold =130, 140, & 150 seconds for the 20-bags-equivalent,
depending on the container.
2. Maximum average time to read all blocks was 102.4 seconds.
3. Mean time to read all blocks on any one tag was 4.4 seconds.
The third and final hazard of this category involves the potential situation in which the
time to write all blocks exceeds the maximum threshold established for specific
container/reader combinations. The protocol test results showed the following:
Flatbed Reader (Write): Tag read and written twice:
1. Maximum threshold =70 seconds.
2. Mean time to write one tag was 50.7 seconds.
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Handheld Reader: Tag read and written twice:
1. Maximum threshold = 130 seconds.
2. Mean to write one tag was 120.5 seconds.
All three of the hazards described in this section received a Pre-Mitigation Risk Level of
A. Again, a level of A indicates acceptable risk. It denotes that there is not necessarily a
need to reduce the risk.

TECHNOLOGY – SAFETY AND CRITICAL DESIGN REQUIREMENT:
ENSURE RFID TAG SURVIVABILITY AFTER EXPERIENCING THE MOST
DEMANDING CONDITIONS IN THE BLOOD SUPPLY CHAIN
There are several hazards that could impact the safety and critical design requirement of
ensuring the RFID tag survivability after experiencing the most demanding conditions in
the blood supply chain. In order to investigate these hazards, a formal protocol study
entitled “RFID Tag Survivability Testing Protocols: Centrifugation, Blast Freezing, and
Gamma Irradiation” was conducted. As the RFID Consortium is seeking to implement
the RFID systems solution into commercial applications of the transfusion medicine
industry, this protocol represented the survivability portion of a series of tests that were
designed to complement the standard software systems test.
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The general objective of this protocol was to evaluate RFID tag survivability and changes
in functional performance as a result of exposure to the effects of centrifugation, blast
freezing, and gamma irradiation. Whereas centrifugation and blast freezing generally take
place during processing at the blood center, gamma irradiation may be performed in
either the blood center and/or prior to transfusion in the hospital. The studies were
designed to simulate operational conditions equivalent to those a regular blood product
would normally undergo since the solution will be commercialized in the transfusion
medicine industry. Basic scenarios were devised to observe the behavior of the functional
RFID tags before and after the simulated units experienced the demanding conditions.
The survivability tests were intended to serve as a complement to the standard systems
software test.
The first condition measured was centrifugation. The objective of the centrifugation
protocol was to test the applicability of the use of RFID technology in the transfusion
medicine supply chain. It was performed in order to evaluate the RFID tag survivability
and resiliency when exposed to the effects of centrifugation under high levels of exposure
conditions (higher number of processes than typically expected with three centrifugation
cycles approximately 10 minutes long at a speed of 4,200 RPM (4750g), rather than the
expected maximum of two centrifugation cycles for approximately 10 minutes in
duration at a speed of 4,200 RPM (4750g). The duration and speed of the centrifugation
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cycles were consistent with the maximum values normally used in standard
manufacturing processes. Sixty operable RFID tags were sampled testing their post-test
operability at each distance of 0cm, 5cm, and 10cm. The tags were tested for read/no read
and write/no write capabilities, as well as the time to read (header), time to read (all
blocks), time to write, and data integrity. The RFID Blood Center Consortium developed
and undertook this testing regimen to ensure that the proper methods of control for
mitigating the potential hazards were established.
The potential hazards that could result from centrifugation were the following:
1. RFID tag may not survive the exposure to centrifugation process. Evidence of
survivability should be proven by complying with the acceptable performance
criteria laid out by the other potential hazards described below.
2. Increased exposure to centrifugation processes may decrease the ability of the
RFID tag to read tag data within 30 seconds of the start.
3. Increased exposure to centrifugation processes may decrease the ability of the
RFID tag to write information within 30 seconds of the start.
4. Increased exposure to centrifugation processes may increase the time it takes to
read the tag after it was seen for the first time (header) by greater than 20 seconds.
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5. Increased exposure to centrifugation processes may increase the time it takes to
read all blocks of tag memory by greater than 45 seconds.
6. Increased exposure to centrifugation processes may increase the time it takes to
write information after the tag acknowledges encoding completion of all blocks
by greater than 75 seconds.
The next condition investigated was blast freezing. The objective of the blast freezing
protocol was to determine the applicability of using RFID technology in the transfusion
medicine supply chain. It was performed in order to evaluate RFID tag survivability and
resiliency when exposed to the effects of blast freezing under high levels of exposure
conditions. Sixty operable RFID tags were sampled testing their post-test operability at
each distance of 0cm, 5cm, and 10cm. The tags were tested for read/no read and write/no
write capabilities, as well as the time to read (header), time to read (all blocks), time to
write, and data integrity. The tags were affixed to plasma bags and subjected to blast
freezing for approximately 50 minutes, and then placed in a walk-in freezer set to -30°C.
After being stored in a frozen state for about 72 hours, the bags were thawed in a water
bath using standard plasma thawing procedure. The RFID Blood Center Consortium
developed and undertook this testing regimen to ensure that the proper methods of
control for mitigating the potential hazards were established.
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The potential hazards that could result from blast freezing include the following:
1. RFID tag may not survive the exposure to blast freezing techniques. Evidence of
survivability should be proven by complying with the acceptable performance
criteria laid out by the other potential hazards described below.
2. Exposure to blast freezing techniques may decrease the ability of the RFID tag to
read tag data within 30 seconds of the start.
3. Increased exposure to blast freezing techniques may decrease the ability of the
RFID tag to write information within 30 seconds of the start.
4. Exposure to blast freezing techniques may increase the time it takes to read the
tag after it was seen for the first time (header) by greater than 20 seconds.
5. Exposure to blast freezing techniques may increase the time it takes to read all
blocks of tag memory by greater than 45 seconds.
6. Exposure to blast freezing techniques may increase the time it takes to write
information after the tag acknowledges encoding completion of all blocks by
greater than 75 seconds.
7. Exposure to blast freezing techniques may affect the integrity of the written data.
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The final condition examined under this protocol was gamma irradiation. The objective
of this study was to determine the applicability of the use of RFID technology in the
transfusion medicine supply chain. It was performed in order to evaluate the RFID tag
survivability and resiliency when exposed to the worst-case effects of gamma irradiation
under high levels of exposure conditions. Sixty operable RFID tags were sampled testing
their post-test operability at each distance of 0cm, 5cm, and 10cm. The tags were tested
for read/no read and write/no write capabilities, as well as the time to read (header), time
to read (all blocks), time to write, and data integrity. The tags were affixed to blood
product bags and subjected to a higher number of process cycles of Cs137 gamma
irradiation than normal. In standard manufacturing processes, exposure to gamma
irradiation will be limited to a total of approximately 3.8 minutes to reach the desired
dose of 25 Gy. Under typical circumstances, an RFID tag is expected to be exposed to a
maximum of two gamma irradiation cycles. The test units in the study were exposed to
that maximum level of two 25 Gy doses of gamma irradiation exposure. The RFID Blood
Center Consortium developed and undertook this testing regimen to ensure that the
proper methods of control for mitigating the potential hazards were established.
The potential hazards associated with blast freezing include:
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1. RFID tag may not survive the exposure to gamma irradiation processes. Evidence
of survivability should be proven by complying with the acceptable performance
criteria laid out by the other potential hazards described below.
2. Increased exposure to gamma irradiation processes may decrease the ability of the
RFID tag to read tag data within 30 seconds of the start.
3. Increased exposure to gamma irradiation processes may decrease the ability of the
RFID tag to write information within 30 seconds of the start.
4. Increased exposure to gamma irradiation processes may increase the time it takes
to read the tag after it was seen for the first time (header) by greater than 20
seconds.
5. Increased exposure to gamma irradiation processes may increase the time it takes
to read all blocks of tag memory by greater than 45 seconds.
6. Increased exposure to gamma irradiation processes may increase the time it takes
to write information after the tag acknowledges encoding completion of all blocks
by greater than 75 seconds.
7. Increased exposure to gamma irradiation processes may decrease the integrity of
the written data.
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Thus, although the harsh conditions may differ (i.e. centrifugation, blast freezing, gamma
irradiation), the hazards that may ensue from exposure to these conditions are the same.
The testing methodology for these protocols included a simulation of operational
conditions equivalent to those to which a regular blood product would be subjected under
normal operating conditions. The basic scenarios were designed to observe RFID tag
behavior before and after the simulated units underwent the demanding operational
conditions of centrifugation, blast freezing, and gamma irradiation.
A total of 180 RFID tags were sampled. Prior to affixing the tags to the test units, each
sample tag was validated to ensure only operable tags were tested. Different test
parameters were measured for each tag before and after each survivability scenario, and
were collected at three different distances from the reader antenna – 0cm, 5cm, and
10cm. The parameters measured included read success, write success, as well as time to
read, time to write, data integrity, read rate, and signal strength.
The mitigation strategy followed for all of these hazards were related to the tags. The
RFID tags used for the RFID Blood Center Solution are compliant with the ISO 15693
and ISO 18000-3 standards, and are specifically optimized for healthcare applications.
Durable Avery Dennison AD-730 HF RFID tags were used and placed underneath the
DIN barcode.
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The risk mitigation strategy is three fold:
1. RFID tag suppliers will be required to certify the readability of tags supplied by
implementing internal controls to statistically sample production batches and
eliminating defective tags prior to shipping tags to the blood center. The blood
centers should establish a procedure to periodically verify the certification levels
established in the purchasing contract.
2. In case of an eventual tag failure, the operator must follow the general procedure
established for proceeding when an inoperable tag is detected in any blood center
process: The unit must be clearly identified as a “BAR CODE ONLY” unit and all
subsequent operations with such unit must be performed thru the back up operating
procedures (barcode scanning).
3. Failed tags will be reported documenting the potential cause for failure (when
apparent). If failure rates surpasses the threshold established by the quality control
department, a joint investigation with the manufacturer will be conducted to establish
root causes.
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The resulting performance levels observed for all of the survivability tests –
centrifugation, blast freezing, and gamma irradiation – at least 92% of the tags survived
with 95% confidence.
•

Centrifugation secondary analyses: There was a statistically significant increase in
time to read/write and read rate performance mainly after the third centrifugation
cycle. Some degradation was expected because the tags were exposed to the high
levels of centrifugation (4750g) conditions twice in succession. However, despite
the statistically significant difference, the resulting performance level observed
was well within the acceptable operational ranges expected for a normal tag.

•

Blast freezing secondary analyses: There was no significant degradation in read
rate or signal strength observed after the freezing and thawing cycles (Note that
the tags rated operating temperature range is -40 to +85°C). Statistically
significant degradation was observed for mean time to read and write all blocks
mainly after thawing. However, despite the statistically significant difference, the
resulting performance level observed is well within the acceptable operational
ranges expected for a normal tag.

•

Gamma irradiation secondary analyses: There was no significant degradation in
read rate observed. However, there was a significant downward trend in signal
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strength when measured at 10cm distance after each irradiation cycle. Signal
strength was not a hazard in itself but one of the measurements used to explain
poor performance. In all cases except the time to read all blocks, there was not a
statistically significant deterioration in tag functionality. The resulting
performance levels observed were well within the acceptable operational ranges
expected for a normal tag.
Overall, although there was some degradation in tag functionality after the last exposure
cycles, the degree of degradation observed was not considered critical in practical terms
as the post-test measurements were still deemed appropriate for acceptable tag operating
performance.
The seven hazards which could impact the survivability of the RFID Tag subsequent to
experiencing the most demanding conditions in the blood supply chain were all tested in
the above Survivability Testing Protocol. All seven hazards are RFID-based, and they
may affect the ability of the system to perform as desired. Additionally, the same method
of control may be applied for all. This mitigation strategy is based on the tag itself. The
durable Avery Dennison AD-730 HF RFID tags, which are compliant with the ISO
15693 and ISO 18000-3 standards and specifically optimized for healthcare applications,
were used and placed underneath the DIN barcode.
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Survivability tests were conducted in which tags were exposed to higher numbers of
process cycles of centrifugation, blast freezing, or gamma irradiation than those regularly
applied during normal operations. After the tests, the tags behaved within acceptable
performance levels.
RFID tag suppliers will be required to certify the readability of tags supplied by
implementing internal controls to statistically sample production batches and eliminating
defective tags prior to shipping tags to the blood center. The blood centers should
establish a procedure to periodically verify the certification levels established in the
purchasing contract.
In case of an eventual tag failure, the operator must follow the general procedure
established for when an inoperable tag is detected in any blood center process: The unit
must be clearly identified as a “BAR CODE ONLY” unit and all subsequent operations
with such unit must be performed following back up operating procedures (barcode
scanning).
Failed tags will be reported by documenting the potential cause for failure. If failure
rates surpass the threshold established, a joint investigation with the manufacturer will be
conducted to establish root causes.
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Furthermore, with the exception of the first hazard, which was given a severity and
likelihood score of three and two respectively, the remaining hazards were given severity
and likelihood scores of two and two respectively. The first hazard described the general
risk that the tag failed to survive the process. Understandably, it is essential for the tag to
maintain functionality throughout the entire process in order to achieve the objectives of
the iTraceTM. The severity rating illustrated the remote chance that moderate damage or
loss of function could occur.
Thus far in the analysis, this hazard has presented the greatest risk. While the PreMitigation Risk was still a B, the risk range was near the unacceptable region.
Consequently, even though this hazard could be mitigated and the severity reduced, it
may involve high cost expenditure.
The remaining hazards all had severity and likelihood levels of two and two, but they all
presented a Pre-Mitigation Risk of B. Although they had the same rating as the previous
hazard, these hazards all fell within the middle of the tolerable risk range. Therefore, the
cost expenditure or efforts that must be taken to mitigate the hazard were lower for these
hazards than the former.
The list of remaining hazards that fell in this category included:
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•

The ability of the RFID tag to read data within 30 seconds of the start is
damaged.

•

The ability of the RFID tag to write information within 30 seconds of the start is
damaged.

•

The time it takes to read the tag after it was seen for the first time (header)
increases greater than 20 seconds.

•

The time it takes to read all blocks of tag memory increases by more than 45
seconds.

•

The time it takes to write information after the tag acknowledges encoding
completion of all blocks increases by greater than 75 seconds.

•

The integrity of the written data is compromised.

TECHNOLOGY – SAFETY CRITICAL DESIGN REQUIRMENT: ENSURE NO
INTEREFERENCE OF RFID HIGH FREQUENCY (HF) AND
ELECTROMAGNETIC INTERFERENCE (EMI) WITH OTHER SYSTEMS
There were 11 potential hazards identified that could impact the safety critical design
requirement to ensure no interference of RFID High (HF) and electromagnetic
interference (EMI) with other systems. Like the previous technology hazards described,
these hazards were all tested through the use of a formal protocol. The protocol was
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entitled: “Wireless Considerations Test – HF RFID Application in Blood Centers
Wireless Considerations.”
The objective of this protocol was to outline testing methods and success criteria for
evaluating the potential effects of electromagnetic interference (EMI) on existing medical
equipment and systems, as well on and between High Frequency (HF) RFID entities. The
RFID Consortium developed and undertook this systematic and repeatable protocol
testing regimen based on the recommendation of the American National Standards
Institute (ANSI) to ensure that the proper methods of control for mitigating the potential
hazards were established.
There were four main goals of the study:
1. Identify potential electromagnetic interference (EMI) effects from High
Frequency (HF)-based RFID systems on existing medical equipment found in
donation and processing centers.
2. Identify potential EMI effects of HF RFID equipment on existing wireless devices
and systems found in donation and processing centers.
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3. Identify any potential for erroneous and/or incomplete communication between
HF RFID entities (e.g. between tag and reader or between reader and server) due
to EMI from other devices.
4. Suggest proactive measures to minimize or eliminate EMI effects.
A major prerequisite to understanding the possible effects that high frequency and
electromagnetic energy from the iTraceTM could have on interfacing and communications
transmission was learning how the iTraceTM itself operates. The implementation of the
RFID blood center solution iTraceTM consists of RFID devices securely interfacing
through servers to the Blood Establishment Computing System (BECS). The servers run
the application iTraceTM that is built on a middleware developed by S3Edge that is based
on the Microsoft BizTalk RFID platform.
Wireless considerations for interfacing and communication transmissions were taken into
account for the iTraceTM. The two types of wireless technologies that were applicable to
this project were High Frequency (HF) RFID and Wi-Fi. HF RFID operating at 13.56
MHz is the recommended technology for use in the blood supply chain under the ISBT
Guidelines. It utilizes near-field magnetic induction coupling and the electric field is
suppressed. The tag types – ISO/IEC 18000-3 mode 1 and downward compatible
ISO/IEC 15693 – use the ISO/IEC 15693 wireless communications protocol. Wi-Fi,
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which is already used in blood centers and at mobile donation sites, consists of
technologies using wireless local area network (WLAN) based on the IEEE 802.11
family of standards, device to device wireless connectivity. The coverage of one or more
interconnected access points (hotspots) comprises an area the size of a few rooms
depending on the number of access points with overlapping coverage. Both wired
Ethernet LAN-based RFID readers and wireless battery-operated RFID readers interface
to the iTraceTM server over the existing T-100 LAN, 802.11b/g wireless LANs.
Prior research has shown that RFID systems, because of their wireless communication
transmitters, may have the potential to both generate and fall victim to electromagnetic
interference (EMI). In order for successful adoption and deployment of RFID technology
in blood centers, key areas of concern such as quality of service, data corruption, security,
and electromagnetic compatibility must be properly addressed, examined, and approved.
The testing methodology for this protocol included three sub-protocols. The first was the
HF Electromagnetic Compatibility (EMC) Test Protocol (Protocol ID 1). For this
protocol, medical devices at the blood center were set up to operate in normal working
conditions with relevant measurements taken from each device and compared against the
expected range of values. Operations of the RFID system were also monitored to assess
successful completion of blood center software transactions. Two types of outcomes were
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used in a binary pass/fail measurement – normal (i.e. no deviation from the expected
range of operating values) and abnormal (i.e. deviation from outside the normal expected
range of operating values). The acceptance criteria for this sub-protocol were as follows:
•

Blood center routine must be successfully completed in all the test locations.
Failure is indicated by the following situations: 1) The reader is unable to
complete the operation and/or emit error beeps, and 2) The routine is completed
but the data in the server database has some mismatch with what is expected or is
corrupted.

•

No medical device should show abnormal measurement pre-, in-, or post-test.

The second sub-protocol was the Wi-Fi EMI/EMC Test Protocol (Protocol ID 2). The
goal of this test was to verify the wireless functioning of the Unitech RFID handheld
reader, as well as multiple medical and blood product handling and processing devices.
The acceptance criteria for this sub-protocol were as follows:
•

The fraction of packets lost when running a ping command from the handheld
must not exceed 10% in any location.

•

The blood center software routine must be successfully completed in all the test
locations within the protocol. Transaction failure was indicated by the following

110

situations: 1) an error message appeared on the handheld indicating that the
process was terminated prematurely for any reason whatsoever, and 2) the routine
was completed but the data in the backend database had some mismatch with
what was expected or was corrupted.
•

No medical device should show abnormal measurements pre-, in-, or post-test.

The third sub-protocol was the Failure Recovery Test Protocol (Protocol ID 3). This
protocol was designed to examine the behavior of the RFID blood center solution in the
event of a sudden failure in Wi-Fi signal connectivity and to analyze the recovery
mechanisms of the system. The acceptance criteria here were as follows:
•

There should be a clear indication on the device itself that informs the user about
an interruption in wireless connectivity.

•

The handheld should clearly indicate that the transaction must be repeated in the
instance of a failed attempt to store information to the central database field.

•

The central database should not contain erroneous or misleading information
about the intermittently stopped transaction. It should notify the user of an
incomplete entry.
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•

The handheld should complete the transaction when the wireless connection is
resumed.

•

If applicable, entries created in the database after completion of the handheld
routine should match up with the information on the RFID tag.

Finally, the HF RFID tag write failure recovery application was examined. The purpose
was to perform a write-read-verify cycle to confirm proper tag commissioning. If an error
was indicated during the process, the solution used a configurable number of automatic
retries to ensure the tag was correctly commissioned. The acceptance criteria here was an
assessment of functionality, examining whether the software first detected a verified
write, then a failed write, then another verified write to demonstrate the capability of the
automatic retry.
The potential hazards investigated under this protocol and sub-protocols included the
following:
1. Electromagnetic interference (EMI) effects could cause connections to be lost
without warning.
2. EMI effects could cause a failure to establish connections.
3. EMI effects could lead to degradation of service.
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4. EMI effects could produce delays and packet loss in the transmission of
information to and from a handheld reader or a netbook/laptop.
5. EMI effects could negatively impact the wireless transmission of critical medical
device alarms.
6. EMI effects could impede the transmission of physiological waveform data.
7. EMI effects could prevent the real-time control of therapeutic medical devices.
8. EMI effects could hinder the transmission of time-critical medical telemetry.
9. EMI effects could obstruct the wireless control of therapeutic devices.
10. EMI effects could lead to data corruption and/or errors.
11. Communication between the transmitter and receiver could lead to unauthorized
access.
The mitigation strategy applied for these hazards was extensive. Several considerations
were taken into account in the creation of the RFID blood center solution application.
The first was RFID interference with wireless devices. This posed minimal concern
because, aside from the extensive frequency separation between 13.56 MHz RFID and
2.4 GHz for wireless communication that enables excellent signal filtering, the signal
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propagation characteristics of RFID make interference with wireless communications
unlikely.
Next, the near-field magnetic propagation of the application reduced the potential for
electromagnetic interference in all but the closest objects. The RFID reader operated at
13.56 MHz and 22m wavelength with the electric field suppressed. Additionally, the
magnetic field strength was largely limited to the antenna and the propagated field
strength was inversely proportional to the cube of the distance from the antenna.
Although the maximum operational range varied by reader power and antenna size, this
generally remained less than 50cm. Consequentially, the magnetic field strength at λ/2 =
11m made far field electromagnetic propagation essentially non-existent.
Furthermore, the 2.4 GHz wireless antennas of the application lacked a metallic loopshaped device. This structure eliminates the possibility of EMI because the RFID
magnetic field in the air cannot be induced without a complete loop.
In general, EMI may be avoided in three ways: suppressing the source, breaking the
interference path, or shielding the device at risk. The potential hazards depended on the
severity of the EMI, which was determined by the power of both the electromagnetic
leakage and channels. The two general guidelines applicable to reduction in all types of
EMI are diminishing electromagnetic leakage and suppressing electromagnetic channels.
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Electromagnetic radiation leakage is a consequence of most electronic devices operating
with digital signals that have sharp temporal transitions. As a result, these devices serve
as sources for EMI. As performance requirements increase, the speed of digital signals
and the strength of radiation and leakage increase. Higher electromagnetic output power
boosts the risk for EMI. Agencies such as the FCC regulate the amount of radiated and
leaked electromagnetic power. EMI can be reduced by modifying the internal circuit
design of the device. Two of the most commonly used methods to achieve this are the
filtering and the spread spectrum techniques. The filtering technique blocks the frequency
bands while the spread spectrum technique spreads the energy over a wider frequency
range. With proper design following these principles, electromagnetic leakage from
devices can be greatly reduced. Nevertheless, the operational frequency bands of HF
RFID readers and Wi-Fi devices are restricted to specific regions of the electromagnetic
spectrum, and most medical devices fail to generate electromagnetic fields at these
frequencies.
The next guideline, suppressing electromagnetic channels, consisted of three different
types of electromagnetic channels that warrant consideration: electro-coupling, magneticcoupling, and electromagnetic radiation. Among them, magnetic-coupling may play a
primary role in producing EMI between HF RFID readers and medical devices. Yet,
electromagnetic radiation is the dominating factor of the EMI in Wi-Fi devices. For HF
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RFID readers, suppressing the magnetic-coupling between devices can be implemented
by providing electromagnetic shielding or pulling devices away from potential sources of
EMI. Electromagnetic shielding blocks electromagnetic fields and is typically achieved
by surrounding the susceptible device with a good conductor such as a metal film or foil
cover.
Another strategy was to pull HF RFID readers away from all medical devices as much as
possible to significantly lessen electromagnetic channels which are constrained to within
a few centimeters of the HF RFID antennas. The strength of the channels drops
dramatically with distance. Most HF RFID readers that operate as per FCC regulations
for maximum power have magnetic fields spreading less than 20 cm from the antenna.
Electromagnetic shielding or spreading the distance between devices are valid measures
for Wi-Fi as well. Even a thin sheet of metal is sufficient to provide significant
electromagnetic shielding. As well, increasing distances between medical devices and
Wi-Fi devices can reduce the efficiency of the channels since the radiation energy density
is inversely proportional to the square of the distance.
Furthermore, there are two EMI-related hazard mitigation strategies that blood centers
and hospitals may need to implement. The first is to incorporate EMI test requirements
into the new medical device/equipment sourcing policy. Device sourcing involves several
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practices which are geared towards finding, evaluating, and engaging suppliers of goods
and services. The first EMI-test related step entails defining the specific electromagnetic
frequencies and wireless communication protocols utilized in blood centers and hospitals.
This will facilitate effective communication and reduce damaging interference between
devices. The next EMI-test related step is to communicate those specifications in Request
for Proposal (RFP) and Request for Quotation (RFQ) documents that are customized to
particular use cases in order to record business requirements for and competitively price
potential solutions. The final step in the sourcing strategy is to ensure that manufacturers
provide evidence of EMI shielding specifications or methodology and testing of their
products to confirm the safety of their use.
The second strategy is to incorporate EMI test requirements into the procurement of new
medical device/equipment or existing medical device/equipment upgrades policy. For
implementing this policy, it is necessary to first define the appropriate EMI test protocols
applicable for the device in question. It is also essential to consider the operating
environment where the device will be employed. This will enable a comprehensive
analysis of the effects of utilizing the device. The policy should then require the
performance and documentation of the applicable EMI testing protocol prior to installing
the device.
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The results of the testing showed that all hazards successfully passed acceptance criteria,
and that EMI and wireless communication issues will only be minor risks in the
implementation of the iTraceTM.
The 11 hazards tested with this protocol were all RFID hazards caused by EMI/Wireless
communication and were capable of impacting the system. Two of the hazards: 1)
Connections/communication links are lost without warning and, 2) Degradation of
service/ transmission of information share the same method of control. The method of
control involved the HF RFID 13.56 MHz radio communication protocols as dictated by
the ISO/IEC 15693 standard, as well as the ISO/IEC 18000-3 mode 1 standard, which are
used in the RFID readers for this application. The 16-bit cyclic redundancy check
(CCITT CRC-16) is run on the message bits right from the start of the flags to the end of
data and the CRC-16 accompanies the message as it is sent. This is used for
communication both from the reader to the tag as well as from the tag to the reader, and
is capable of detecting 99.998% of all possible bit errors. When an error is detected, a
complete bit sequence must be retransmitted. Furthermore, the CCITT 16-bit CRC on the
data stored in the tag memory serves as a second layer of protection against the remaining
0.002% cases of bit stream corruption not caught by the original transmission CRC.
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Another hazard in this category was the possibility that the systems will experience a
failure to establish communication. Here, the strategy was to revert to the current
standard. The key information for safe transfusion is carried in ISBT-128 barcodes, as
well as in human readable form, on the bag itself. In the event of any communication
failure of the RFID system, bar code data will be used.
The next five hazards utilize the same method of control. The hazards which comprise
this group are the following:
1. The wireless transmission of critical medical device alarms is disabled.
2. The transmission of physiological waveform data is impeded.
3. The real-time control of therapeutic medical devices is prevented.
4. The transmission of time-critical medical telemetry is hindered.
5. The wireless control of therapeutic devices is obstructed.
The method of control was reflective of the strategies as previously described for this
protocol. All wireless communication and EMI interference tests in this protocol
successfully passed acceptance criteria for the existing key devices operating in the Blood
Center. EMI and wireless communications issues will involve minor risks in the
implementation of the RFID blood center solution.

119

There are two steps for effective control for preventing these hazards from occurring for
future acquisition or upgrading of key equipment. The first is at the new medical
device/equipment sourcing stage. The EMI study protocol described above defined the
specific electromagnetic frequencies and wireless communication protocols utilized in
blood centers. The specifications were documented and tested. These specifications are to
be used as templates for defining EMI-related specification for new/upgraded equipment
The second step is at the procurement of new or upgrading of existing medical
device/equipment stage. Here, the appropriate EMI test protocols applicable for this
device will be executed. The test results will be documented.
Going a step further than the general practice described with the former hazards, the
method of control for the next hazard – delays and packet loss in the transmission of
information to and from a handheld reader or a netbook/laptop – took into account formal
standards useful for WLAN communication. The WLAN communication used for the
iTraceTM adhered to the IEEE 802.11b and 802.11g standards which define one Medium
Access Control (MAC) layer and multiple physical layers (PHY). Various error detection
and corrections steps were employed at both layers including Reed-Solomon codes (that
can detect up to 8 byte errors) and 32-bit CRC that can detect more errors than a 16-bit
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CRC in ISO 15693. The error detection and correction steps were achieved by appending
a frame check sequence (FCS) at the end of each packet.
All of the nine aforementioned hazards in this category were rated at a level two severity
and a level one likelihood. That means that these hazards all represented improbable
instances which would only lead to minor loss of function or impairment if they did
actually come to pass. As such, they were all assigned a Pre-Mitigation Risk Level A.
They were all acceptable risks that can be disregarded in comparison to other risks.
However, the remaining two risks which threaten the fulfillment of the safety critical
design requirement to ensure no interference of RFID HF and EMI with other systems
both received severity and likelihood scores of three and one respectively. This moderate
severity in conjunction with an improbable likelihood resulted in a Pre-Mitigation Risk of
B. These risks were considered tolerable, yet the effort to mitigate the hazards may be
greater.
One of these hazards – data corruption and/or errors are produced – utilized the combined
mitigation strategies of a few of those described above. The HF RFID 13.56 MHz radio
communication protocols as dictated by the ISO/IEC 15693 standard, the ISO/IEC
18000-3 mode 1 standard, the 16-bit cyclic redundancy check (CCITT CRC-16), the tag
data encoding procedure, and the WLAN communication error detection and correction
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(i.e. IEEE 802.11b and 802.11g) standards demonstrated a comprehensive mitigation and
correction strategy for preventing and rectifying this hazard.
The second of these hazards was the event in which unauthorized access during the
communication between the transmitter and receiver transpired. The method of control
engaged formal guidelines concerning access, encryption, and data manipulation security.
There were particular provisions in the air protocols and standards that made it difficult to
inappropriately access data while the transmitter and receiver were communicating.
Furthermore, the RFID reader operates at 13.56 MHz and 22m wavelength with the
electric field suppressed. Additionally, although the maximum operational range varied
by reader power and antenna size, this generally remained less than 50cm. Because the
communications range is limited to within a few centimeters around the RF tag and
reader, it is almost impossible for an unauthorized individual to access or steal
information. Also, the tag structure design included data bits stored on the tag with an
associated CCITT 16-bit CRC stored in the tag memory to ensure data integrity and
making malicious alteration difficult.
Moreover, the key information for safe transfusion is carried in ISBT-128 barcodes and
human readable form on the bag itself. The application does not and will not involve
storage or transmission of confidential medical data, and all key information. Finally, the
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wireless network included data encryption security that prevented hackers from
connecting to protected networks and stealing information. The application utilizes the
WPA2 AES security key as well as wireless intrusion prevention systems as an added
layer of security.

CHAPTER 5: IMPLEMENTATION HAZARD ANALYSIS
SysLogic, Inc. maintains a list of recognized or foreseeable hazards associated with
medical devices under both normal and abnormal conditions. Previously identified
hazards were also taken into account. The implementation hazards encompass the broad
range of issues related to the realization or execution of the device specifications. They
include matters involving the database, interface, processing, data corruption or loss, and
audit trail items. The safety critical design requirements associated with the
implementation hazards include the following:
•

Prevent Sequencing Timing Error

•

Prevent Data Loss/Corruption

•

Prevent External Interface Errors
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IMPLEMENTATION – SAFETY CRITICAL DESIGN REQUIREMENT:
PREVENT SEQUENCING TIMING ERROR
There were three implementation hazards found to have the potential to jeopardize the
realization of the safety critical design requirement to prevent sequencing timing errors.
The first was that processing steps did not occur in the sequence expected. This system
hazard may be caused by user error. The feature of the iTraceTM which served as the
method of control included the RFID tracking system. This system employed a finite
state machine, which only enabled valid state transitions for each business object. The
finite state machine also indicated the acceptable and anticipated series of events for
given objects. Furthermore, the iTraceTM is made up of wizard-like user interfaces that
are used to guide users through the sequence of steps necessary to accomplish tasks.
Additionally, each component form contained validation logic preventing users from
proceeding through the process unless the prior step was successfully completed. This
method guaranteed that the correct sequence of events was followed, and that any errors
were reported.
This hazard received a severity score of two and likelihood score of one. As a result of its
minor gravity and highly unlikely threat of occurrence, this hazard was given a Pre-
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Mitigation Risk level of A. The risk of this technology was acceptable due to the slight
risk this hazard may pose.
The second hazard described the event in which multiple users were provided with access
to update the same record. This system hazard was a consequence of software design or
unavailable software capability. The features and functions of the iTraceTM included a
variety of techniques that were applied to mitigate this hazard. Included in this were
relational database and transaction processing procedures that were incorporated
throughout the tool’s software to allow for atomic, consistent, isolated, and durable
(ACID) properties. The database transactions were designed to allow precise failure
recovery, supply reliable units of work, and maintain consistency within the database, as
well as inhibit multiple users from accessing the database simultaneously.
Furthermore, the transactions used also apply “all-or-nothing” semantics, meaning that
the transaction is either completed entirely or not at all. Additionally, in order to sustain
the integrity of the database and make certain that data is successfully written into it,
transactions that were initiated concurrently by multiple users were isolated from one
another. These functions of the tool had been shown to be effective strategies for hazard
mitigation of electronic devices.
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The level of severity for this hazard was two. The level of likelihood for this hazard was
three. As a result of its believed propensity to transpire occasionally and lead to minor
injury in its occurrence, this hazard was given a Pre-Mitigation Risk of B. Although it
made the cutoff, it still lies on the borderline of tolerable and intolerable risks.
The next potentially hazardous event involved the system failure to receive timely data
from an external application. There were two primary features of the design notable in
this instance. The first was that external interface data remained parallel to database
updates except in the case of dependencies. When data is not received, the omission is
recorded in the log file. The second is reflective of the Blood Establishment Computing
System (BECS). The interface of the BECS is defined based on Web services that
produce definitions for error messages and information exchanged between applications.
If an error were to arise that is outside of one of the definitions provided, a system-level
assertion would appear forcing the operation to roll back.
This hazard was given a level two severity and level one likelihood. Due to its minor
severity and improbable likelihood of occurrence, it received a Pre-Mitigation Risk level
of A. Thus, this risk was deemed acceptable.
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IMPLEMENTATION – SAFETY CRITICAL DESIGN REQUIREMENT:
PREVENT DATA LOSS/CORRUPTION
There were five hazards which could potentially impact the requirement to prevent data
loss and corruption. The first hazard in this category dealt with the instance in which user
error caused the data to be corrupted. This system error caused by the user was deemed
likely to occur occasionally (three) but with a negligible severity (one). The function
utilized to mitigate this hazard was again validation logic. Validation logic is
incorporated in all forms – Web and handheld – in which the user enters information into
the system. Additionally, before data is recorded in the database, the BECS may also be
interrogated to verify the validity of the information. When invalid data is entered, the
user will receive an error message and further action will be inhibited until the error is
corrected.
The second hazardous event in this set was the scenario in which data was lost or
corrupted due to a hardware disk crash or other hardware or power failure. This was a
borderline tolerable hazard, receiving a moderate severity score of three and remote
likelihood of occurrence score of two. This hazard was tackled and mitigated as a result
of the aforesaid ACID properties and all-or-nothing semantics. Additionally, it was
recommended that multiple disks be used so that a back-up would be available to avert
the potential loss of data. Finally, SQL can supply a warehouse for database backup and
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recovery. The database may undergo refreshing and back-up procedures daily, and all
data entered after the back-up took place would be restored from the SQL log-file.
The third hazard referred to the situation in which data was lost or corrupted due to the
malfunction of the program routine. This system hazard was caused by incomplete
transactions. The seriousness of the event was deemed negligible (one) and there was an
occasional probability of it happening (three). As with many of the above-mentioned
hazards, the functions employed to mitigate this hazard were the ACID properties and allor-nothing semantics. Moreover, the iTraceTM itself, as well as the system’s middleware
and the related relational database technology have all been constructed to work in
conjunction with various fault tolerant hardware configurations. These included support
for the redundant array of independent disks (RAID) subsystems, SQL server clusters,
and completely redundant configurations with fail over support.
The next hazardous event was the instance in which data encountered was outside the
range of expected values. This system hazard was the result of an undetected anomaly or
user error. Here, again, the seriousness of the hazard was negligible (one) and the chance
of occurrence (three) was occasional. As described previously for other hazards, the
hazard mitigation features relevant in this case included validation logic and BECS
interrogation. Furthermore, all system critical data is stored in reference tables. Because
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users must choose from drop-down lists, all selected values are valid. Other data was
scanned via barcodes. Also, in the case of invalid data entry, the user was alerted with an
error message and prohibited from proceeding until the error was corrected.
Finally, the last hazard in this set was the event in which duplicate data entered the
system. This system hazard was the result of user error. It fell on the borderline of
tolerable/intolerable risks with a severity score of two and likelihood score of three. This
indicated that it will produce minor injury/loss of function in the occasional instance that
it does happen. The method used to mitigate this hazard involved the unique ID assigned
to all products and business subjects within the RFID blood supply chain tracking system.
The presence of the unique ID inhibited the user from creating or entering duplicate
information. Also, here the BECS may again undergo interrogation to confirm the
validity of the data being entered into the system.
All five of the hazards described were assigned a Pre-Mitigation Risk of B. All are
tolerable risks, although some appear on the borderline of tolerable and intolerable in the
matrix. This simply means that greater effort or higher cost may be associated with the
mitigation of these hazards than those in the middle or closer to the acceptable risk level.
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IMPLEMENTATION – SAFETY CRITICAL DESIGN REQUIREMENT:
PREVENT EXTERNAL INTERFACE ERRORS
There were five hazards discovered which may present a threat to the safety critical
design requirement of preventing external interface errors. The first was the event in
which the system fails to receive accurate data from the RFID reader interface. This was
a system hazard caused by hardware failure. It received level two severity (minor) and
level three (occasional) likelihood scores. The method of control to mitigate this hazard
involves the large number of technologies integrated into the system design to ensure
detection in case of a failure in an RFID read point. The technologies consisted of reader
self-test diagnostics, inactivity timers, periodic heart beat signals, and positioning sentinel
tags to verify the accurate operation of the readers.
The second hazardous event described the instance in which the tag and barcode were
both unreadable. This system hazard was caused by physical damage from handling the
product. It was assessed as very unlikely to occur (one) yet with moderate severity (three)
when it does transpire. The mitigation strategy applied was quite simple. If both the RFID
tag and barcode become unreadable, the user is instructed to proceed with standard
operating procedures in which the blood product is disposed of appropriately due to the
inability to reliably determine, track, and monitor the unique unit ID and related
information.
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The next hazardous event was the inability to read or write the RFID tag data due to a tag
failure. This event was also a system hazard that resulted from the physical damage of
improperly handling the product. This hazard presented a minor severity (two) which
occurred on an occasional (three) basis. The mitigation procedure employed for this
technology involved the RFID tracking system applications that write information to the
user data portion of the RFID tags. These applications include:
1. Collection (handheld reader).
2.

Label Product (pad reader).

3. Check-in Imports (pad or handheld reader).
4. Check-in Returns (pad or handheld reader).
For these applications, the software writes blood bag information into the RFID tag. The
software then immediately rereads the tag to confirm that the data was successfully
written and, if the write/read cycle failed, then an error message is delivered.
Additionally, because none of these applications depend on information read from the
user data portion for subsequent processing, there is no risk of misreading the tag
information. Furthermore, the TIN is read at numerous times throughout the supply
chain. The hardware and air-protocols used for communication between the reader and
the tag ensure that tag IDs are properly read and written to the application.
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The fourth hazardous event in this set was the situation in which data received from
BECS does not pass correct data structure. This system hazard was due to unrecognized
data being received from the BECS. It is a fairly serious hazard, receiving a moderate
severity score (three) and remote likelihood of occurrence score (two). The function
responsible for mitigating this hazard was related to the interface definition and
communication between the iTraceTM and the BECS. The definition of the BECS
interface to iTraceTM is based on a set of web services and consists of error messages and
information exchanged between the applications. Also, a system-level assertion is raised
and the operation rolled back in the instance that an error outside of the definition
appears.
The final hazard that fell under this category was the event in which errors detected in the
BECS were not handled properly. Like the previous hazard, this hazard was caused by
unrecognized data from the BECS. This hazard was perhaps the least impactful of all
potential hazards described thus far, receiving severity and likelihood scores of one and
one. Here, again, the mitigation method involved the way in which the BECS is defined.
Furthermore, the BECS executes different procedures when dealing with critical vs. noncritical data. For critical data, the BECS will deliver an error message to the user. For
non-critical data, the BECS will not update the data, but will log the exception using
normal BECS functionality.
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While this hazard received a Pre-Mitigation Risk score of A, the other four hazards
described in this set were given a score of B. Therefore, the risk of the BECS not
handling errors appropriately can be deemed negligible in comparison to the others
described in this category. It is believed to have the least impact on the safety critical
design requirement of preventing external interface errors.

CHAPTER 6: FUNCTIONAL HAZARD ANALYSIS
The functional hazards identified and tested are also components of SysLogic, Inc.’s
known and foreseeable list of risks associated with medical devices. Functional hazards
consist of any known risks to the performance of the system or device in an operational
setting. They are comprised of concerns related to the ability of the system to record read
and written information appropriately and accurately. They also include other software
design and capability issues such as security, access, traceability, notification, alerts,
monitoring, tracking, and labeling. The following safety and critical design requirements
will be addressed in this chapter:
•

Preventing Unauthorized Entry or Override of System Data

•

Preventing Loss of Traceability
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•

Preventing Packing in Improper Containers at Collection Sites

•

Ensuring Reconciliation of Materials from Collection Site

•

Ensuring Blood Product Labeling Information is Properly Captured from BECS

•

Preventing Unsuitable Products from Being Released to Distribution

FUNCTIONAL – SAFETY CRITICAL DESIGN REQUIREMENT: PREVENT
UNAUTHORIZED ENTRY OR OVERRIDE OF SYSTEM DATA
There were three system security hazards that could potentially impact the safety critical
design requirement of preventing unauthorized entry or override of system data. The first
and second hazards described situations in which the system was accessed by
unauthorized and untrained users respectively, and the third hazard went a step further in
that the unauthorized personnel was able to actually modify records. All instances were
due to security failures in which the system failed to prevent entry of undesignated users
into the system. The middleware application of the iTraceTM was based on Microsoft
Windows.Net authentication and authorization services. This application employs a rolebased security subsystem that is designed to prohibit and regulate access as desired.
Moreover, standard operating procedures are in place that give the system administrator
control over who may obtain access as well as the process by which to do so.
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All three hazards were given a Severity score of two and a Likelihood score of one. As a
result, the Pre-Mitigation Risk for all were A. Due to the controls in place, it is
improbable that these hazards will take place and, if they were to occur, would have only
a minor effect.

FUNCTIONAL – SAFETY CRITICAL DESIGN REQUIREMENT: PREVENT
LOSS OF TRACEABILITY
Six hazards were found to be capable of affecting the system’s ability to prevent loss of
traceability. The first was the circumstance in which someone other than a responsible
user enters or modifies the data. This hazard may be caused by a system failure to track
those responsible for making database modifications. As with the hazardous events
described above, this hazard can be controlled by the design features of the middleware
and the standard operating procedures in place. Additionally, activity logs and audit trails
were created and maintained for each business object in the iTraceTM RFID tracking
system. The activity logs, which may be viewed, extracted, and reported from the
application, detail what the activity was, when the activity occurred, and who initiated the
activity.
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The Severity and Likelihood scores assigned to this hazard were two and one
respectively. Hence, the Pre-Mitigation Risk was A. This shows that the hazard is an
acceptable risk for the implementation of the iTraceTM.
The remaining five hazards within this category dealt with the incorrect recording of
blood unit information. These hazards may be caused by the failure of the system to
record data for whole blood collection, the breakdown of the system in capturing data for
apheresis collection, and the malfunctioning of the system in distinguishing between
autologous and therapeutic donation types. All can be mitigated by the validation logic
incorporated into the system. Furthermore, before information is submitted to the
database for further processing, the BECS may also be subject to interrogation to verify
that this information being input is valid. When invalid data is entered as a result of user
errors, the user receives an error message and is prevented from proceeding until the error
is resolved.
Moreover, the application requires that collection data is entered in sequential order and
designated format. The user is prohibited from varying from the process order. Data
capture must be complete in order for the acceptance of the donation. The user would
have to revert to manual procedures in this circumstance.
What is more, the procedural methods further enabled the correct identification of
donation type by mandating that autologous donations were tie tagged with a label to
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identify them as a donation to fill physician orders. Therapeutic donations were given
discarded labels which were attached to collection bags to identify them as unacceptable
donations. BECS functionality may be used in this instance as well to correct the
donation type.
These five hazardous events were rated a three and one respectively on the Severity and
Likelihood scales. In the very unlikely instance that they would occur, they could have a
moderate impact. Blood unit information must be accurate to enable the most precise
collection of data and reduce the potential transfusion errors that could arise. The PreMitigation Risk given is a level B. As such, the hazard is tolerable, yet mitigation may
lead to some costs.

FUNCTIONAL – SAFETY CRITICAL DESIGN REQUIREMENT: PREVENT
PACKING IN IMPROPER CONTAINER AT COLLECTION SITE
Three system hazards were identified as being able to possibly affect the need for packing
products in appropriate containers at collection sites. All of these hazards were due to
software design or unavailable software capability. The first hazardous event was the
general case in which the system fails to ensure that product is packed in the correct
container. The method of control initiated in this case primarily involved assigning a
specification for the type of shipping container required for each product to each product
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code. There are four types of containers utilized by this system: 1) Blood Donation
Record (BDR) pouches, 2) blood bag coolers, 3) platelet containers, and 4) test tube
coolers. The secondary method of control was the five properties by which each container
was further distinguished. The five properties included: 1) container type (including rated
description), 2) label prefix, 3) ISBT bar code, 4) capacity, and 5) RFID TIN.
Consequently, when a user attempts to pack products in inappropriate or unsuitable
containers, an error message is displayed.
The next hazard in this group described the situation when the system fails to maintain
appropriate container capacity for packed product. Similar to the mitigation method
provided for the aforementioned hazard, the strategy here also relied on type of
containers and their properties thereof. One of these properties is capacity. On the
occasion when a user exceeds the capacity suitable for packing a particular container, the
user will receive an error message.
The two hazards discussed thus far received severity and likelihood scores of two and
two, as well as Pre-Mitigation Risks of level B. These hazards were believed to have a
minor impact in the rare instances that they occur. As such, they were deemed tolerable
hazards.
The last hazard in this category was a bit more acceptable than the two previously
mentioned. The event in which the system fails to notify the user when attempting to
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pack an already packed item was given a Pre-Mitigation Risk level of A. The severity
score was a one, indicating a negligible risk, and the likelihood score was a two,
signifying a rare occurrence. The mitigation strategy for this hazard involved the unique
Tag ID (TID) attached to each product. The tracking mechanisms of the iTraceTM, in
conjunction with the TID, reduce the potential of multiple records existing for DIN/bag
type combinations. As a result, the user receives an error message when trying to pack a
product multiple times.

FUNCTIONAL – SAFETY CRITICAL DESIGN REQUIREMENT: ENSURE
RECONCILIATION OF MATERIALS FROM COLLECTION SITE
Two key hazardous events threatened to impede the accuracy of the material
reconciliation process from collection sites. These system hazards were also due to
software design or unavailable software capacity. The first was the situation in which a
container is left at the collection site. The system employs a thoroughly defined pick-up
operation as the method of control for this hazard. As characterized in the system, a pickup entails the identification and loading of all containers holding collection materials.
The system will not enable the release of a pick-up unless and until all packed containers
have been loaded.
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This was a tolerable hazard. It was assigned severity and likelihood scores of two for
each, and a Pre-Mitigation Risk level of B. Therefore, it was considered to be a minor
hazard that will transpire only under rare circumstances.
The second hazard was slightly less significant, receiving a Pre-Mitigation Risk level of
A. This risk was acceptable as it was given severity and likelihood scores of one and two
respectively. It described the incident when the system failed to generate a manifest. This
hazard will have only a negligible impact during the rare times that it will actually take
place. This is because the mitigation strategy involving the manifest data consisted of two
components. The first is that database is updated with manifest data whenever containers
are added to pick-up. The second is that the system generates a manifest report listing all
containers included in the pick-up process. Thus, even if the manifest report is not
obtained at the production facility, the manifest can be viewed online. Materials from the
pick-up are then reconciled using the database.

FUNCTIONAL – SAFETY CRITICAL DESIGN REQUIREMENT: ENSURE
BLOOD PRODUCT LABELING INFORMATION IS PROPERLY CAPTURED
FROM BECS
Two system hazards may impact the appropriate capturing of blood product labeling
information from the BECS. The first – system fails to receive labeling data from BECS
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– may be mitigated by features of the BECS interface design. The BECS interface
consists of web services which include a definition of the error messages and information
exchanged between applications. When an error takes place outside of this definition,
three events will transpire: 1) an error message will be sent to the user, 2) a system-level
assertion will be raised, and 3) the operation will be rolled back.
Consequently, in the instance that this occurs, the severity was rated only minor (two)
and the likelihood only rare (two). A Pre-Mitigation Risk of level B was assigned to this
hazard, as it was a tolerable risk. The costs were not expected to be high in reducing this
hazard.
The second hazard had an even lower cost expectation in reducing the hazard with a PreMitigation Risk of level A. It denoted the incident in which the system failed to verify
data received from BECS was written to the RFID tag. This hazard possessed a
likelihood factor score of one and a severity of two, meaning that, in the improbable
instance that it does actually occur, it will only have a minor impact.
The method of control for this hazard began with the use of ISBT standards to physically
label all blood products. The ISBT label serves as a system of record label that is used
throughout the lifecycle of the product as a form of identification. The system uses web
services to request label information from the BECS. The information was then written to
the iTraceTM database and subsequently to the RFID tag. Finally, the tag was read again
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to confirm that the data was written correctly. As with the previous hazard, when an error
arises, a message is sent to the user, a system-level assertion is raised, and the operation
is rolled back.

FUNCTIONAL – SAFETY CRITICAL DESIGN REQUIREMENT: PREVENT
UNSUITABLE PRODUCT FROM BEING RELEASED TO DISTRIBUTION
The only hazard found that may impact the ability of the system to prevent an unsuitable
product from being released to distribution was the event in which an unsuitable product
was released into inventory. This hazard may be prevented with inherent functionality of
the BECS. The BECS may perform multiple checks to ensure the appropriateness of all
products prior to their being checked into inventory, packed, or released. If the product is
unsuitable for any reason, the user is notified via an error message and the state of the
product remains the same.
This hazard represented an extremely low risk. It was given a one on the severity scale
showing that it is of negligible consequence. It was also given a one on the likelihood
scale, indicating that its occurrence is highly unlikely. In other words, in the implausible
instance that this hazard does transpire, it will induce only a trivial effect. Hence, the PreMitigation Risk level was A, as this was deemed an acceptable risk.
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CHAPTER 7: RESULTS
This chapter summarizes the findings obtained during the protocol, unit, and system
testing approaches.

PROTOCOL TESTING RESULTS
The results of the protocol testing are all discussed in the technology hazard analysis
above. Worst-case scenarios, traditional performance expectations, survivability tests,
and EMI/communications investigations, accompanied by methods of control either in
the features, design, or functioning of the technology, confirmed the benefits of utilizing
the iTraceTM. All of the study results fell under the threshold and within the acceptance
criteria designated. The outcomes essentially showed that the technological design and
capabilities of the iTraceTM may be relied upon to perform as expected without any
significant impact to the safety and critical design requirements of applying the device to
everyday operations.

UNIT TESTING RESULTS
The results of the unit tests were all favorable. The operations all performed as expected,
and there were no discrepancies or deviations from the anticipated scenarios. Hence, the
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potential hazards had no significant effect on the safety critical design requirements. The
system was highly functional and effective throughout all of the processes tested from
donor to Blood Center of the Blood Transfusion Supply Chain.

SYSTEM TESTING RESULTS
As with the results of the unit testing, the outcomes of the system testing proved to be
very promising. The system testing results also displayed a great deal of usability and
efficiency in the system. The potential hazards had no significant impact on operations.
There was, however, one minor discrepancy in the system testing. During test case six
(ST6), in which the processing of multiple donations and procedure types in the
collection techniques, as well as the attributes and interdictions triggered based on
donation and procedure types were all tested, there was an error in the transmission to the
BECS. The autologous type of donation should have a CUE passed as “S.” Instead, the
CUE was passed as “Y.” This incorrect read/write or transmission of information of
information would have a minor impact. Nevertheless, this error was retested in ST22.
This time, the outcome was successful. Therefore, the appropriate fix was applied and
this hazard appeared to be reduced. The results may be viewed in the Traceability Matrix
tables (Appendix A).
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CHAPTER 8: TRACEABILITY MATRIX
The RFID Transfusion Consortium recruited my assistance in creating a traceability
matrix for the hazards and their associated verification/validation tests. The goal of
constructing a traceability matrix is to achieve the following:
•

Ensure that identified hazards may be traced to either an approved protocol/study
or to the software requirements specification (SRS) for each function and/or
various third-party tools.

•

Validate that the appropriate methods of control and acceptable results were
achieved to mitigate or eliminate hazards.

The importance of the traceability matrix underscores the need for documenting all
possible hazards, and ultimately making them known and accessible in central
repositories. The potential hazards evaluated for the application of the iTraceTM are all
accounted for in the system requirements specifications, through study exploration, or
through unit (UT) and/or system testing (ST). Appendix A displays the connection of the
hazards to one or more of these aforesaid sources.
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CHAPTER 9: DISCUSSION
This chapter contains thorough analyses of each research question evaluated in this study.
The following inquiries were answered:
RQ 1: How do the benefits of using the iTraceTM outweigh the potential RFID-related
hazards?
RQ 2: How sufficient are the mitigation and correction strategies for managing RFIDrelated hazards in the blood transfusion medicine supply chain from the donation to blood
center distribution?
RQ3: How can the methods utilized in this paper effectively qualify and quantify the
associated hazards into standard categories which may be transferable to other newly
deployed RFID-based healthcare technologies?

BENEFITS VS. RISKS
The benefits of implementing the iTraceTM have been referenced comprehensively
throughout this document. This novel RFID-enabled solution has been shown to possess
valuable abilities and functionalities which can significantly revamp the processes of the
blood transfusion supply chain. These processes include: labeling, tracking, monitoring,
packing, and documenting, leading to improved traceability and increased productivity of
workflow operations.
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On the other hand, the risks of employing the system have also been illustrated. There
were a total of 62 possible hazards identified throughout the analysis of the iTraceTM. In
order to compare the advantages vs. disadvantages of utilizing the system, the level of the
risks must be weighed and measured in relation to the benefits.
As described above, a Pre-Mitigation Risk of Level A is indicative of an acceptable risk.
The likelihood of these risks tends to be rare, while the severity is minor at most. This
score suggests that the risk is so slight that it can be neglected compared to the risks of
other hazards, and there may not be a need to reduce the risk.
Of the 62 hazards discovered, 28 received Pre-Mitigation Risk Levels of A. The hazards
which fall into this category are illustrated in Appendix B.
The architecture of the system, as well as the procedures designed for its use, play a role
in the low risk rating of these hazards. It is important to note that the hazards listed in this
category include those which essentially define the iTraceTM application. They may
potentially impact what the system was created to do. This group contains the hazards
identified as adversely impacting the safety and usability of blood products, the
performance of the tags, the security of the system, the appropriate packing and labeling
of items, and ultimately the release of damaged products into inventory. Since the
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hazards which may, arguably, best characterize the application appear to be trivial, it
appears that the cost of employing the iTraceTM is outweighed by the benefits.
In contrast, the next set of hazards fall into the Pre-Mitigation Risk level of B. A risk
level of B signifies tolerable hazards. Tolerable hazards are not detrimental to the
employment of the application, but can have a meaningful impact. Consequently, they
must be reduced, mitigated, or corrected to ensure the best and safest use of the system.
The strategies undertaken to do so may lead to significant resource and labor costs.
There were 34 hazards that attained the rating of Pre-Mitigation Risk Level B, as shown
in Appendix C.
As opposed to the defining traits encompassed by the Level A hazards, the Level B
hazards represent the utility attributes of the iTraceTM. The Level B hazards consist of
those involved in read/write failures, data loss/corruption, tag survivability, external
interface errors, product and information traceability, and interference and
communication transmission disruptions. These hazards embody the risks to the system’s
functional efficacy. They could possibly impact how the system performs and sustains
operational integrity. Therefore, these hazards are substantial as well.
The methods of control associated with these hazards were either incorporated into the
system design, or were thoroughly assessed via system, unit, and protocol testing. The
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positive results of all tests demonstrated the low cost that would need to be expelled in
order to mitigate the hazards. Thus, the resource and labor cost for employing the system
appears to be lower than the benefits.
In addition to the resource and labor cost, there is the necessity for economic justification.
Briggs et al (2009) assessed the economic cost for RFID-enablement. They noted the
quality gains which could be earned by eliminating the number of damaged products and
facilitating increased traceability by reducing the number of misplaced products.
Additionally, quality gains can be viewed through better reconciliation and tracking of
products. Furthermore, they evaluated efficiency gains. These benefits were illustrated
through faster reconciliation, enhanced productivity, and decreased labor. Ultimately, this
would lead to a return on investment by a blood center of approximately three years.
Hence, the advantages of implementing the iTraceTM significantly offset the costs. The
technology will serve as a valuable means of improving the blood transfusion supply
chain processes.
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EVALUATING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF MITIGATION AND CORRECTION
STRATEGIES
The method of control listed for each hazard included strategies to prevent the hazard
from happening, resolving the hazard post-occurrence, or a combination of both. There
are three categories under which each approach may fall. They are the following:
•

I. Prevents/Mitigates the Hazard from Occurring: This measurement reflects the
ability of the method of control to deter the risk from happening. It is the most
highly desired effect of the controls.

•

II. Corrects/Remedies the Situation Following the Occurrence of the Hazard: This
measurement reflects the ability of the method of control to respond to the hazard
post-occurrence. It includes resolution strategies and back-up plans to account for
hazards. It is not as appealing as the prevention methodologies, but it does
provide an effective solution to dilemmas that may unfold.

•

III. No Effect on Hazard Mitigation or Correction: This measurement reflects the
total inability of the strategy to proactively inhibit or counter the risks associated
with iTraceTM use. It consists of the most undesired methodologies due to the
lack of efficiency in negating or amending processes in the face of hazards.
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Each hazard’s method of control was placed into one of these categories. If the strategy
consisted of a combination of both prevention and correction measures, then it was given
a I rating, as it demonstrated the reduction and resolution of the hazard.
There were 58 hazard strategies that received an I rating. Included in this group were
those which apply aversion or resolution design features and procedures for each
hazardous event. The great amount of strategies belonging to the I category confirm their
efficacy.
The remaining four hazards fell into the II category. They are shown in Table 8.
Table 8: Hazards in Risk Mitigation Category II

Hazard
ID

Hazardous Event

Hazard Type

Safety
Critical
Design
Requirement

Pre-Mitigation
Risk Level
(A - Acceptable
B - Tolerable
C - Intolerable)

Risk
Mitigation
Category (I,
II, III)

B

II

T.1.2.

RFID Read/Write Fails

RFID Technology

Prevent Data
Read/Write
Error/Failure

T.1.5.

DIN number on tags
created at final labeling is
altered

RFID
Technology/System

Prevent Data
Read/Write
Error/Failure

B

II

ABO rewritten on tag

RFID
Technology/System

Prevent Data
Read/Write
Error/Failure

B

II

T.1.6.
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Hazard
ID

I.3.2.

Hazardous Event

Tag and barcode are both
unreadable

Hazard Type

System

Safety
Critical
Design
Requirement

Prevent
External
Interface
Errors

Pre-Mitigation
Risk Level
(A - Acceptable
B - Tolerable
C - Intolerable)

Risk
Mitigation
Category (I,
II, III)

B

II

Ultimately, since the majority of methods fall in the I category, the design elements and
processes instituted to mitigate the hazards appear to be highly effective. Even the
hazards that require resolution only after the hazard has transpired have pre-mitigation
risk levels of B, indicating they are tolerable hazards. Moreover, none of the hazards had
a risk level of III. This means that all of the approaches taken to reduce the threat of the
hazard have some positive impact. Hence, the strategies are successful. Therefore, the
mitigation and correction strategies for managing RFID-related hazards in the blood
transfusion medicine supply chain from the donor to blood center distribution are
effective.
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EVALUTATING THE EFFECTIVNESS OF THE METHODS UTILIZED IN
THIS PAPER TO QUALIFY AND QUANTIFY HAZARDS INTO STANDARD,
TRANSFERABLE, AND GENERALIZABLE CATEGORIES
The process described in this paper consisted of several tactical steps. It began with the
research and recognition of previously discovered hazards that are applicable to similar
medical devices. These hazards were related to the use of RFID technology in clinical
settings. Additionally, due to the familiarity with some of these comparable devices, the
FDA CBER and CDRH governing bodies were able to provide guidance on particular
protocols to perform. The devised protocols were examined to uncover potential harms
which could be caused through application of the system and the technology itself. RFID
technology, functions, and the use of the system in both traditional and extreme settings
were analyzed to discover the effects of implementing and verify the usability of the
system.
The system design, requirements, and standard operating procedures were then evaluated.
These documents were used to determine what other hazards could occur from utilizing
the iTraceTM. They were also assessed to reveal both the system features which could be
employed and/or measures which could be taken to avoid and/or correct each hazard.
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After that, further validation tests were performed. These tests examined the likelihood of
the hazard existence and the strategies for mitigating and correcting them. I included an
additional measure to account for the distinction between when the strategy prevents or
resolves the hazard to provide a further calculation of its efficiency. The validation tests
also assessed the use of the iTraceTM in its normal setting. Unit and system tests were
performed for all functions and applications of the iTraceTM along the blood transfusion
supply chain to ensure that the system executed all desired capabilities as expected.
Next, a traceability matrix was created to record and track the hazards and tests. The
matrix served as a record of the specific design component and/or test performed to
evaluate each hazard, establishing an important link between each hazard and its means
of evaluation. As a result, if the same hazards were to be identified in other similar
devices, the characteristics and tests associated with them would be evident, and the
knowledge would be readily available for those evaluating them. Thus, the necessity for
documenting each hazard and its associated tests so that they may be recognizable and
accessible was highlighted with the formation of the traceability matrix.
The next steps consisted of several analyses. The first was weighing the benefits versus
the risks of employing the device based on the existence of the identified hazards, their
severity, likelihood, and the ability to mitigate and correct them. Then, the effectiveness
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of these strategies was assessed to gauge whether these methods were suitable and
efficient enough to reduce the threat of the hazard. Finally, standard risk assessment
measures to quantify the hazards into categories of severity and likelihood, as well as a
novel measure to group the strategies based on their ability to either prevent the hazard
from occurring or resolve it post-occurrence were employed. The process for building the
framework for iTraceTM-related hazards in the blood transfusion supply chain –
identifying, measuring, and analyzing the risks – was very thorough and may be used for
the deployment of other similar medical devices using RFID technology. Therefore, the
methods utilized in this paper effectively quality and quantify the associated hazards into
standard categories which may be transferable to other newly-deployed RFID-based
healthcare technologies.

CHAPTER 10: CONCLUSION
The RFID Blood Center Consortium is implementing the first ever RFID-enabled
solution for the tracking and maintaining of blood products throughout the entire blood
transfusion supply chain. The iTraceTM will serve as a purposeful approach towards
reducing medical errors originated in the blood transfusion supply chain and, ultimately,
transforming the delivery of care. There are numerous benefits of the iTraceTM, but there
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are also several hazards. The costs for implementing the device are offset by the benefits.
The hazards may be successfully mitigated via valuable design features and operating
procedures.
The RFID Transfusion Consortium needed help in identifying possible RFID technology
hazards and analyzing all of the potential hazards that could come about from using the
iTraceTM. The comprehensive analysis presented in this paper, which focused on the
blood transfusion supply chain from the donor to blood center distribution, is a valuable
starting point for RFID hazard management in the blood supply chain. The 62 hazards
identified include those associated with the technology, implementation, and
functionality of the device. All of these hazards were accompanied by successful methods
of control, demonstrating the effectiveness of the strategies and the tool itself. All new
medical devices must undergo detailed examination of the potential benefits and harms it
may cause. Due to the extensiveness of the research presented through my work and in
this paper, the iTraceTM was shown to be useful and worthwhile. Ultimately, this study
showed that the benefits of the iTraceTM outweighed the costs and that the correction and
mitigation strategies were effective. Thus, the answers to research questions 1 and 2 were
derived.
As a result, the foundation for establishing a systematic framework for RFID hazard
mitigation in the blood transfusion supply chain from donation to distribution at the blood

156

center was set for this system as well as for future use with other similar technologies.
The methods revealed the overall approach of identifying the hazards, validating and
verifying the hazards, determining the means of mitigating and correcting the hazards,
qualitatively and quantitatively ranking their level of severity, and assessing the
effectiveness of the correction strategies. As the project lead for the technology hazard
analysis component, I identified the technology hazards, evaluated all of the hazard types,
investigated the mitigation and correction methods for all of the hazards, assisted in
protocol tests, and prepared valuable documentation for all of these steps. My work,
which significantly bridged the gaps in RFID technology hazard identification and
overall system hazard analysis, is considered an important step towards the
commercialization and implementation of the iTraceTM. Since this evaluation of the
possible hazards that could occur from utilization of this novel medical device is allencompassing, it is possible to apply the aforementioned methodology to other medical
devices and technologies. Additionally, as technology continues to advance, this
methodology will become increasingly practical and important. The strategies discussed
and hazards identified may be generalizable and usable for other RFID-enabled medical
devices. Therefore, the answer to research question 3 was received as well.
Moreover, the hazard identification, analysis, and mitigation processes discussed in this
paper may also be effective for Phase Two of this device analysis: blood center
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distribution to patient. The means used take into account technology hazards and
mitigation strategies will not change. For example, verification strategies such as the
Wireless Considerations Protocol evaluated the interference of HF RFID on wireless and
communication systems. The methods and results of this study may be applicable in a
hospital setting as well, where there are several such potential instances for disturbance.
In addition, the functional and implementation identification and analysis processes are
similar in some areas as well. For instance, validation strategies such as system and unit
testing, as well as pilot and performance qualification studies will be essential towards
determining whether the iTraceTM is fully applicable in a hospital environment. Even in
the many areas where differences do exist, the need for identification, validation,
verification, and analysis will remain.
Nevertheless, there are several additional hazards that may potentially occur from the use
of this system in the different environment examined during Phase Two. This phase
represents the remaining steps of supply chain. For example, safety hazards – hazards
affecting the patient receiving the actual transfusion and staff involved in the blood
supply chain – may also occur. The effects of interaction with other hospital systems and
safety hazards that may come about during the actual transfusion portion of the blood
supply chain may lead to other complex hazards and, consequently, additional analysis
techniques. Yet, the framework established in this paper may certainly be used as a

158

foundation. Upon completion of the hazard analysis throughout this portion of the
process, a wholly conclusive framework for RFID hazard management may be
formulated.
Future research may consist of a Post-Mitigation Risk study. Although this study
included references to several protocols and tests utilized to assess the efficacy of the
mitigation strategies, it will be valuable to fully assess the methods after the system has
been put to use daily. Similar tactics may be used at this stage to verify the risk levels
assigned.
Future research may also investigate any potential hazards that may be triggered by the
mitigation strategies themselves. For instance, it may be possible that the data locking
feature applied to the memory fields could malfunction and render the RFID tags
incapable of being reused. It would be valuable to ensure that no further hazards
transpired as a result of the methods employed to reduce the originally-discovered
hazards.
Nevertheless, the approach taken in this paper to evaluate the tool and its potential
hazards are effective. The groundwork of the strategic framework for managing RFIDenabled hazards in the blood transfusion supply chain has been laid. As such, an
important step on the road towards the elimination of avoidable medical errors has been
taken with the development of the iTraceTM.
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APPENDIX A: TRACEABILITY MATRIX
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Hazard
ID

Hazardous
Event

T.1.1.

RFID
Read/Write
Fails

T.1.2.

RFID
Read/Write
Fails

Cause

Handhel
d or pad
RFID
reader
fails to
read/writ
e the tag
for any
number
of
reasons.
Tunnel
reader
fails to
read the
tag for
any
number
of
reasons.

PreMitigation
Risk Level

Method
of
Control
Type

Method of Control
Description

Protocol Test
Document

Protocol
Results
Document

B

Design

Audible sound signaled
each time tag is
read/written; handheld
and/or work station
display is updated; error
detection software
included.

N/A

N/A

Software
Requirements
Specification
(SRS)
Number
3.1.

B

Design/
Direction
for Use

Tunnel reader
reconciles items,
flagging them as excess
or missing. The
operator then manually
inspects contents to
correct issue.

N/A

N/A

4.2.1.

Unit/ System
Test Number

N/A

N/A
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Hazard
ID

Hazardous
Event

Cause

PreMitigation
Risk Level

T.1.3.

Bad data on the
tag

Data is
corrupte
d on the
tag

B

T.1.4.

DIN number
written on tag at
collection is
subsequently
altered

T.1.5.

DIN number on
tags created at
final labeling is
altered

DIN
field
locking
on the
tag not
enforced
DIN
field
locking
on the
tag not
the tag
not
enforced

Method
of
Control
Type

Method of Control
Description

Protocol Test
Document

Protocol
Results
Document

Software
Requirements
Specification
(SRS)
Number
3.2.
Appendix B

Unit/ System
Test Number

Design

A new ISBT128 data
structure was developed
to facilitate detection of
tag memory corruption.

Survivability
Testing
Protocol Centrifugation;
Survivability
Testing
Protocol - Blast
Freezing;
Survivability
Testing
Protocol Gamma
Irradiation

Survivabilit
y Testing
Results

B

Design

N/A

N/A

Appendix B
3.2.

N/A

B

Design/
Direction
for Use

The application is
configurable to allow
the organization to use
the DIN locking feature
at the point of collection
or at labeling.
Programming the
ISBT128 label data
structure and launching
the application

N/A

N/A

4.2.2.
Appendix B

N/A

N/A
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Hazard
ID

Hazardous
Event

Cause

PreMitigation
Risk Level

Method
of
Control
Type

Method of Control
Description

Programming the
ISBT128 ABO data
structure and launching
the appl9cation
Tested using Limit Test
Protocol which
confirmed lack of
significant effect RF
Radiation had on blood
products.

T.1.6.

ABO rewritten
on tag

---

B

Design/
Direction
for Use

T.2.1.

The maximum
temperature
increase of the
RBCs and
Platelets exceed
acceptable level
of 1.5 °C

RF
Radiatio
n

A

Direction
for Use

Protocol Test
Document

Protocol
Results
Document

N/A

N/A

Limit Testing Part One Protocol RBCs/Platelets
; Limit Testing
- Part Two (Continuation)
- Protocol Aged
RBCs/Plasma

Limit
Testing Part One Results RBCs/Plate
lets
(Temperatu
re Impact);
Limit
Testing Part Two Results Aged
RBCs/Plas
ma
(Temperatu
re Impact)

Software
Requirements
Specification
(SRS)
Number
4.2.2.
Appendix B

N/A

Unit/ System
Test Number

N/A

N/A
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Hazard
ID

T.2.2.

T.2.3.

Hazardous
Event

Cause

The cellular and
protein
structures of
RBCs (complete
blood counts
including
sample weight,
RBC count, Hb,
Hct, MCV;
potassium,
aluminum; free
hemoglobin;
level of blood
gases) are
degraded or
altered beyond
the acceptable
level of ≤1%
hemolysis.
The cellular and
protein
structures
(Lactate,
Aluminum, PSelectin, and
complete blood
counts including
sample weight,
WBDP count,
Plt, and MPV)
of WBDPs are
degraded such

RF
Radiatio
n

RF
Radiatio
n

PreMitigation
Risk Level

Method
of
Control
Type

Method of Control
Description

Protocol Test
Document

Protocol
Results
Document

A

Direction
for Use

Tested using Limit Test
Protocol which
confirmed lack of
significant effect RF
Radiation had on blood
products.

Limit Testing Part One Protocol RBCs/Platelets
; Limit Testing
- Part Two (Continuation)
- Protocol Aged
RBCs/Plasma

Limit
Testing –
Part One –
Results –
RBCs/Plate
lets
(Cellular
and Protein
Impact);
Limit
Testing –
Part Two –
Results –
Aged
RBCs/Plas
ma
(Biological
Impact)

A

Direction
for Use

Tested using Limit Test
Protocol which
confirmed lack of
significant effect RF
Radiation had on blood
products.

Limit Testing –
Part One –
Protocol –
RBCs/
Platelets.

Limit
Testing –
Part One –
Results –
RBCs/Plate
lets
(Cellular
and Protein
Impact)

Software
Requirements
Specification
(SRS)
Number
N/A

Unit/ System
Test Number

N/A

N/A

N/A
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Hazard
ID

Hazardous
Event

Cause

PreMitigation
Risk Level

Method
of
Control
Type

Method of Control
Description

Protocol Test
Document

Protocol
Results
Document

Software
Requirements
Specification
(SRS)
Number

Unit/ System
Test Number

Limit
Testing –
Part Two –
Results –
Aged
RBCs/Plas
ma
(Temperatu
re Impact)
Limit
Testing –
Part Two –
Results –
Aged
RBCs/Plas
ma
(Biological
Impact)

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

that the pH
decreases
beyond
acceptable level
of ≥6.2

T.2.4.

The maximum
temperature
increase of
plasma types
(FFP, FP24, and
TP) exceeds
acceptable level
of 4 °C.

RF
Radiatio
n

A

Direction
for Use

Tested using Limit Test
Protocol which
confirmed lack of
significant effect RF
Radiation had on blood
products.

Limit Testing –
Part Two
(Continuation)
– Protocol –
Aged
RBCs/Plasma

T.2.5.

The activity of
coagulation
factors (PT,
aPTT,
Antithrombin
Activity, Factor
V, Factor VIII,
Factor XI,
Protein C,
Protein S,
VWF: RCo)

RF
Radiatio
n

A

Direction
for Use

Tested using Limit Test
Protocol which
confirmed lack of
significant effect RF
Radiation had on blood
products.

Limit Testing –
Part Two
(Continuation)
– Protocol –
Aged
RBCs/Plasma
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Hazard
ID

T.3.1.

T.3.2.

Hazardous
Event

levels of all
types (FFP,
FP24, and TP)
of thawed
plasma products
are altered
beyond an
acceptable level
of 20%
The time to read
headers of 20bags-equivalent
exceeds
maximum
threshold
established for
specific
container/reader
combinations.
The time to
read/write all 28
memory blocks
of 20-bagsequivalent
exceeds
maximum
threshold
established for
specific
container/reader
combinations.

Cause

PreMitigation
Risk Level

Method
of
Control
Type

Method of Control
Description

Protocol Test
Document

Protocol
Results
Document

Software
Requirements
Specification
(SRS)
Number

Unit/ System
Test Number

System
Capabilit
y

A

Direction
for Use

Tested using
Performance Test
Protocol which
confirmed ability of
device to sustain
operational efficiency
under different
circumstances

RFID
Performance
Testing

RFID
Performanc
e Testing

N/A

N/A

System
Capabilit
y

A

Direction
for Use

Tested using
Performance Test
Protocol which
confirmed ability of
device to sustain
operational efficiency
under different
circumstances

RFID
Performance
Testing

RFID
Performanc
e Testing

N/A

N/A
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Hazard
ID

Hazardous
Event

Cause

T.3.3.

The time to
write all blocks
exceeds
maximum
threshold
established for
specific
container/reader
combinations

System
Capabilit
y

T.4.1.

The tag does not
survive the
process

Centrifu
gation,
Blast
Freezing,
or
Gamma
Irradiatio
n Effects

PreMitigation
Risk Level

Method
of
Control
Type

Method of Control
Description

Protocol Test
Document

Protocol
Results
Document

A

Direction
for Use

Tested using
Performance Test
Protocol which
confirmed ability of
device to sustain
operational efficiency
under different
circumstances

RFID
Performance
Testing

RFID
Performanc
e Testing

B

Design/
Direction
for Use

Tag design, tag supplier
certification, and
reversion to barcode
only procedure in the
event of tag failure.

Survivability
Testing
Protocol Centrifugation;
Survivability
Testing
Protocol - Blast
Freezing;
Survivability
Testing
Protocol Gamma
Irradiation

Survivabilit
y Testing
Results

Software
Requirements
Specification
(SRS)
Number
N/A

3.2.
Appendix B

Unit/ System
Test Number

N/A

N/A
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Hazard
ID

Hazardous
Event

Cause

T.4.2.

The ability of
the RFID tag to
read data within
30 seconds of
the start is
damaged

Centrifu
gation,
Blast
Freezing,
or
Gamma
Irradiatio
n Effects

T.4.3.

The ability of
the RFID tag to
write
information
within 30
seconds of the
start is damaged.

Centrifu
gation,
Blast
Freezing,
or
Gamma
Irradiatio
n Effects

PreMitigation
Risk Level

Method
of
Control
Type

Method of Control
Description

Protocol Test
Document

Protocol
Results
Document

B

Design/
Direction
for Use

Tag design, tag supplier
certification, and
reversion to barcode
only procedure in the
event of tag failure.

Survivability
Testing
Protocol Centrifugation;
Survivability
Testing
Protocol - Blast
Freezing;
Survivability
Testing
Protocol Gamma
Irradiation

Survivabilit
y Testing
Results

B

Design/
Direction
for Use

Tag design, tag supplier
certification, and
reversion to barcode
only procedure in the
event of tag failure.

Survivability
Testing
Protocol Centrifugation;
Survivability
Testing
Protocol - Blast
Freezing;
Survivability
Testing
Protocol Gamma
Irradiation

Survivabilit
y Testing
Results

Software
Requirements
Specification
(SRS)
Number
N/A

Unit/ System
Test Number

N/A

N/A

N/A
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Hazard
ID

Hazardous
Event

Cause

T.4.4.

The time it takes
to read the tag
after it was seen
for the first time
(header)
increases greater
than 20 seconds.

Centrifu
gation,
Blast
Freezing,
or
Gamma
Irradiatio
n Effects

T.4.5.

The time it takes
to read all
blocks of tag
memory
increases by
more than 45
seconds

Centrifu
gation,
Blast
Freezing,
or
Gamma
Irradiatio
n Effects

PreMitigation
Risk Level

Method
of
Control
Type

Method of Control
Description

Protocol Test
Document

Protocol
Results
Document

B

Design/
Direction
for Use

Tag design, tag supplier
certification, and
reversion to barcode
only procedure in the
event of tag failure.

Survivabilit
y Testing
Results

B

Design/
Direction
for Use

Tag design, tag supplier
certification, and
reversion to barcode
only procedure in the
event of tag failure.

Survivability
Testing
Protocol Centrifugation;
Survivability
Testing
Protocol - Blast
Freezing;
Survivability
Testing
Protocol Gamma
Irradiation
Survivability
Testing
Protocol Centrifugation;
Survivability
Testing
Protocol - Blast
Freezing;
Survivability
Testing
Protocol Gamma
Irradiation

Survivabilit
y Testing
Results

Software
Requirements
Specification
(SRS)
Number
3.2.
Appendix B

3.2.
Appendix B

Unit/ System
Test Number

N/A

N/A
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Hazard
ID

Hazardous
Event

Cause

T.4.6.

The time it takes
to write
information
after the tag
acknowledges
encoding
completion of
all blocks
increases by
greater than 75
seconds

Centrifu
gation,
Blast
Freezing,
or
Gamma
Irradiatio
n Effects

T.4.7.

The integrity of
the written data
is compromised

Centrifu
gation,
Blast
Freezing,
or
Gamma
Irradiatio
n Effects

PreMitigation
Risk Level

Method
of
Control
Type

Method of Control
Description

Protocol Test
Document

Protocol
Results
Document

B

Design/
Direction
for Use

Tag design, tag supplier
certification, and
reversion to barcode
only procedure in the
event of tag failure.

Survivabilit
y Testing
Results

B

Design/
Direction
for Use

Tag design, tag supplier
certification, and
reversion to barcode
only procedure in the
event of tag failure.

Survivability
Testing
Protocol Centrifugation;
Survivability
Testing
Protocol - Blast
Freezing;
Survivability
Testing
Protocol Gamma
Irradiation
Survivability
Testing
Protocol Centrifugation;
Survivability
Testing
Protocol - Blast
Freezing;
Survivability
Testing
Protocol Gamma
Irradiation

Survivabilit
y Testing
Results

Software
Requirements
Specification
(SRS)
Number
3.2.
Appendix B

Unit/ System
Test Number

3.7. and
Appendix B
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Hazard
ID

T.5.1.

Hazardous
Event

Cause

Connections/co
mmunication
links are lost
without warning

EMI/Wir
eless
Commun
ication

PreMitigation
Risk Level

A

Method
of
Control
Type

Method of Control
Description

Design/
Direction
for Use

The HF RFID 13.56
MHz radio
communication
protocols as dictated by
the ISO/IEC 15693
standard, as well as the
ISO/IEC 18000-3 mode
1 standard, are used in
the RFID readers for
this application. The 16bit cyclic redundancy
check (CCITT CRC-16)
is run on the message
bits right from the start
of the flags to the end of
data and the CRC-16
accompanies the
message as it is sent.
Furthermore, additional
protection is provided
via the tag data
encoding procedure.

Protocol Test
Document

Wireless Test
Protocol

Protocol
Results
Document

Wireless
Test
Summary

Software
Requirements
Specification
(SRS)
Number
2.1.

Unit/ System
Test Number

N/A

176

Hazard
ID

Hazardous
Event

Cause

T.5.2.

Systems
experience a
failure to
establish
communication

EMI/Wir
eless
Commun
ication

T.5.3.

Degradation of
service/transmis
sion of
information

EMI/Wir
eless
Commun
ication

PreMitigation
Risk Level

Method
of
Control
Type

Method of Control
Description

Protocol Test
Document

Protocol
Results
Document

A

Design/
Direction
for Use

The key information for
safe transfusion is
carried in ISBT-128
barcodes, as well as in
human readable form,
on the bag itself. In the
event of any
communication failure
of the RFID system, bar
code data will be used.

Wireless Test
Protocol

Wireless
Test
Summary

A

Design/
Direction
for Use

The HF RFID 13.56
MHz radio
communication
protocols as dictated by
the ISO/IEC 15693
standard, as well as the
ISO/IEC 18000-3 mode
1 standard, are used in
the RFID readers for
this application. The 16bit cyclic redundancy
check (CCITT CRC-16)
is run on the message
bits right from the start
of the flags to the end of
data and the CRC-16
accompanies the
message as it is sent.
Furthermore, additional
protection is provided

Wireless Test
Protocol

Wireless
Test
Summary

Software
Requirements
Specification
(SRS)
Number
2.1. and
Appendix B

2.1. and
Appendix B

Unit/ System
Test Number

N/A

N/A
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Hazard
ID

Hazardous
Event

Cause

PreMitigation
Risk Level

Method
of
Control
Type

Method of Control
Description

Protocol Test
Document

Protocol
Results
Document

Software
Requirements
Specification
(SRS)
Number

Unit/ System
Test Number

via the tag data
encoding procedure.

T.5.4.

Delays and
packet loss in
the transmission
of information
to and from a
handheld reader
or a netbook/
laptop

EMI/Wir
eless
Commun
ication

A

Design

The WLAN
communication used
adheres to the IEEE
802.11b and 802.11g
standards which define
one Medium Access
Control (MAC) layer
and multiple physical
layers (PHY).

Wireless Test
Protocol

Wireless
Test
Summary

3.7.3.

N/A

T.5.5.

The wireless
transmission of
critical medical
device alarms is
disabled

EMI/Wir
eless
Commun
ication

A

Design/
Direction
for Use

There are two steps for
effective control for
preventing this hazard
from occurring for
future acquisition or
upgrading of key
equipment: sourcing
and procurement.

Wireless Test
Protocol

Wireless
Test
Summary

N/A

N/A
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Hazard
ID

Hazardous
Event

Cause

PreMitigation
Risk Level

Method
of
Control
Type

Method of Control
Description

There are two steps for
effective control for
preventing this hazard
from occurring for
future acquisition or
upgrading of key
equipment: sourcing
and procurement.
There are two steps for
effective control for
preventing this hazard
from occurring for
future acquisition or
upgrading of key
equipment: sourcing
and procurement.

Wireless Test
Protocol

Wireless
Test
Summary

Wireless Test
Protocol

There are two steps for
effective control for
preventing this hazard
from occurring for
future acquisition or
upgrading of key
equipment: sourcing
and procurement.

Wireless Test
Protocol

T.5.6.

The
transmission of
physiological
waveform data
is impeded

EMI/Wir
eless
Commun
ication

A

Design/
Direction
for Use

T.5.7.

The real-time
control of
therapeutic
medical devices
is prevented

EMI/Wir
eless
Commun
ication

A

Design/
Direction
for Use

T.5.8.

The
transmission of
time-critical
medical
telemetry is
hindered

EMI/Wir
eless
Commun
ication

A

Design/
Direction
for Use

Protocol Test
Document

Protocol
Results
Document

Software
Requirements
Specification
(SRS)
Number
N/A

Unit/ System
Test Number

N/A

Wireless
Test
Summary

N/A

N/A

Wireless
Test
Summary

N/A

N/A
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Hazard
ID

Hazardous
Event

Cause

PreMitigation
Risk Level

Method
of
Control
Type

Method of Control
Description

There are two steps for
effective control for
preventing this hazard
from occurring for
future acquisition or
upgrading of key
equipment: sourcing
and procurement.
The HF RFID 13.56
MHz radio
communication
protocols as dictated by
the ISO/IEC 15693
standard, as well as the
ISO/IEC 18000-3 mode
1 standard, are used in
the RFID readers for
this application. The 16bit cyclic redundancy
check (CCITT CRC-16)
is run on the message
bits right from the start
of the flags to the end of
data and the CRC-16
accompanies the
message as it is sent.
Furthermore, additional
protection is provided
via the tag data
encoding procedure.
The WLAN
communication used

T.5.9.

The wireless
control of
therapeutic
devices is
obstructed

EMI/Wir
eless
Commun
ication

A

Design/
Direction
for Use

T.5.10.

Data corruption
and/or errors are
produced

EMI/Wir
eless
Commun
ication

B

Design/
Direction
for Use

Protocol Test
Document

Protocol
Results
Document

Wireless Test
Protocol

Wireless
Test
Summary

Wireless Test
Protocol

Wireless
Test
Summary

Software
Requirements
Specification
(SRS)
Number
N/A

Unit/ System
Test Number

N/A

3.2.

N/A
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Hazard
ID

T.5.11.

Hazardous
Event

Unauthorized
access during
the
communication
between the
transmitter and
receiver

Cause

EMI/Wir
eless
Commun
ication

PreMitigation
Risk Level

B

Method
of
Control
Type

Design/
Direction
for Use

Method of Control
Description

adheres to the IEEE
802.11b and 802.11g
standards which define
one Medium Access
Control (MAC) layer
and multiple physical
layers (PHY).
Provisions in the air
protocols and standards
that make it difficult to
inappropriately access
data while the
transmitter and receiver
are communicating.
Also, the tag structure
design includes data
bits stored on the tag
that have an associated
CCITT 16-bit CRC
stored in the tag
memory. Moreover, the
key information for
same transfusion is
carried in ISBT-128
barcodes and human
readable form on the
bag itself. Finally, the
wireless network
includes data encryption
security that prevents
hackers from
connecting to protected

Protocol Test
Document

Wireless Test
Protocol

Protocol
Results
Document

Software
Requirements
Specification
(SRS)
Number

Unit/ System
Test Number

Wireless
Test
Summary

3.2.

N/A
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Hazard
ID

I.1.1.

I.1.2.

Hazardous
Event

Processing steps
do not occur in
sequence
expected
Multiple users
are allowed
access to update
the same record

I.1.3.

System fails to
receive timely
data from an
external
application

I.2.1.

User error
causes data to be
corrupted

I.2.2.

Data is lost or
corrupted due to
hardware disk
crash, other
hardware or
power failure

Cause

PreMitigation
Risk Level

Method
of
Control
Type

Method of Control
Description

networks and stealing
information.
Finite state machine,
wizard-like interfaces,
and validation logic

Protocol Test
Document

Protocol
Results
Document

Software
Requirements
Specification
(SRS)
Number

Unit/ System
Test Number

N/A

N/A

3.7., 4.1.1.,
5.0., 5.1., 5.2.,
7.0.

N/A

User
Error

A

Design

Software
design or
unavaila
ble
software
capabilit
y
Software
design or
unavaila
ble
software
capabilit
y
User
Error

B

Design

Relational Database and
Transaction Processing
Techniques, ACID
Properties, "All-orNothing" Semantics

N/A

N/A

3.7.

N/A

A

Design

BECS interface,
definition of error
messages, system-level
assertion, rolled back
operations

N/A

N/A

7.0.

N/A

B

Design

Validation logic; BECS
interrogation

N/A

N/A

3.7., 7.0.

N/A

Disk
crash,
other
hardware
or power
failure

B

Design/
Direction
for Use

Relational Database and
Transaction Processing
Techniques, ACID
Properties, "All-orNothing" Semantics;
Best Practice Back-Up
Techniques; SQL

N/A

N/A

3.7., 7.0.

N/A
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Hazard
ID

Hazardous
Event

Cause

I.2.3.

Data is lost or
corrupted due to
malfunction of
program routine

Incomple
te
transacti
on

B

Design

I.2.4.

Data
encountered is
outside the
range of
expected values
Duplicate data
enters the
system

Undetect
ed
anomaly
or user
error
User
Error

B

Design

B

I.3.1.

System fails to
receive accurate
data from the
RFID reader
interface

Hardwar
e failure

I.3.2.

Tag and barcode
are both
unreadable

Physical
damage
from
handling
product

I.2.5.

PreMitigation
Risk Level

Method
of
Control
Type

Method of Control
Description

Protocol Test
Document

Protocol
Results
Document

Relational Database and
Transaction Processing
Techniques, ACID
Properties, "All-orNothing" Semantics;
Spotlight middleware
and related relational
database technology
Validation logic; BECS
interrogation; reference
tables; drop-down lists;
error messages

N/A

N/A

Software
Requirements
Specification
(SRS)
Number
2, 3.7., 7.0.

Unit/ System
Test Number

N/A

N/A

3.7., 7.0.

N/A

Design

Validation logic; DIN;
BECS interrogation

N/A

N/A

1.2., 3.1., 3.7.,
4.1.1., 7.0.

N/A

B

Design

N/A

N/A

3.2.

N/A

B

Direction
for Use

Technologies such as
reader self-test
diagnostics, inactivity
timers, periodic heart
beat signals, and
positioning sentinel tags
to confirm correct endto-end operation of
readers
Product disposal

N/A

N/A

3.2.
Appendix B

N/A

N/A
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Hazard
ID

I.3.3.

I.3.4.

Hazardous
Event

Cause

Unable to read
or write the
RFID tag data
due to a tag
failure
Data received
from BECS does
not pass correct
data structure

Physical
damage
from
handling
product
Unrecog
nized
data is
received
from
BECS
Unrecog
nized
data is
received
from
BECS
Security
failure

B

Design

Read/Write
applications; RFID TIN

N/A

N/A

B

Design

BECS interface,
definition of error
messages, system-level
assertion, rolled back
operations

N/A

N/A

7.0.

N/A

A

Design

BECS interface,
definition of error
messages, system-level
assertion, rolled back
operations

N/A

N/A

7.0.

N/A

A

Design/
Direction
for Use

System Administration
of user access; Spotlight
Microsoft Windows.Net
Authentication and
Authorization

N/A

N/A

3.7.

N/A

System
fails to
prevent
untrained
user
access

A

Design/
Direction
for Use

System Administration
of user access; Spotlight
Microsoft Windows.Net
Authentication and
Authorization

N/A

N/A

3.7.

N/A

I.3.5.

Errors detected
in BECS are not
handled
properly

F.1.1.

The system is
accessed by an
unauthorized
person

F.1.2.

An untrained
user accesses the
system

PreMitigation
Risk Level

Method
of
Control
Type

Method of Control
Description

Protocol Test
Document

Protocol
Results
Document

Software
Requirements
Specification
(SRS)
Number
3.2.
Appendix B

Unit/ System
Test Number

N/A
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Hazard
ID

Hazardous
Event

F.1.3.

Unauthorized
personnel
modify
computer
records

F.2.1.

Someone other
than a
responsible user
enters or
modifies data

F.2.2.

Blood unit
information is
recorded
incorrectly

F.2.3.

Blood unit
information is
recorded
incorrectly

Cause

System
fails to
restrict
access to
computer
records
System
fails to
track
persons
responsi
ble for
database
modifica
tions
System
fails to
record
data for
whole
blood
collectio
n
System
fails to
capture
data for
apheresis
collectio
n

PreMitigation
Risk Level

Method
of
Control
Type

Method of Control
Description

Protocol Test
Document

A

Design/
Direction
for Use

System Administration
of user access; Spotlight
Microsoft Windows.Net
Authentication and
Authorization

N/A

A

Design/
Direction
for Use

System Administration
of user access; Spotlight
Microsoft Windows.Net
Authentication and
Authorization; Activity
Logs/Audit Trails

B

Design/
Direction
for Use

B

Design/
Direction
for Use

Protocol
Results
Document

N/A

Software
Requirements
Specification
(SRS)
Number
3.7.

Unit/ System
Test Number

N/A

N/A

N/A

3.7.

N/A

Validation logic; error
messages and disabled
proceeding; application
requirements of data
entry in specific order
and format for
particular collections

N/A

N/A

3.7., 4.1.1.,
5.0., 5.1., 5.2.,
7.0.

UT1, UT2,
ST1, ST4,
ST5, ST7,
ST8, ST12,
ST13

Validation logic; error
messages and disabled
proceeding; application
requirements of data
entry in specific order
and format for
particular collections

N/A

N/A

3.7., 4.1.1.,
5.0., 5.1., 5.2.,
7.0.

UT3, ST2,
ST3, ST4,
ST5, ST9,
ST10, ST12,
ST13, ST15,
ST16
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Hazard
ID

Hazardous
Event

Cause

PreMitigation
Risk Level

Method
of
Control
Type

Method of Control
Description

Protocol Test
Document

Protocol
Results
Document

Software
Requirements
Specification
(SRS)
Number
3.7., 4.1.1.,
5.0., 5.1., 5.2.,
7.0.

Unit/ System
Test Number

F.2.4.

Blood unit
information is
recorded
incorrectly

System
fails to
identify
donation
type

B

Design/
Direction
for Use

Validation logic; error
messages and disabled
proceeding; application
requirements of data
entry in specific order
and format for
particular collections

N/A

N/A

F.2.5.

Blood unit
information is
recorded
incorrectly

System
fails to
identify
autologo
us
donation

B

Design/
Direction
for Use

N/A

N/A

3.7., 4.1.1.,
5.0., 5.1., 5.2.,
7.0.

F.2.6.

Blood unit
information is
recorded
incorrectly

System
fails to
identify
therapeut
ic
donation

B

Design/
Direction
for Use

Validation logic; error
messages and disabled
proceeding; application
requirements of data
entry in specific order
and format for
particular collections
Validation logic; error
messages and disabled
proceeding; application
requirements of data
entry in specific order
and format for
particular collections

UT1, UT2,
UT3, UT4,
UT6, UT7,
UT8, UT9,
UT11, UT12,
ST1, ST2,
ST3, ST4,
ST5, ST6,
ST7, ST8,
ST9, ST10,
ST11, ST12,
ST13, ST15,
ST16, ST19,
ST22, ST24,
ST28
UT4, ST6,
ST11, ST22,
ST24, ST28

N/A

N/A

3.7., 4.1.1.,
5.0., 5.1., 5.2.,
7.0.

UT4, ST6,
ST11, ST22,
ST24, ST28
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Hazard
ID

Hazardous
Event

Cause

PreMitigation
Risk Level

Method
of
Control
Type

Method of Control
Description

Protocol Test
Document

Protocol
Results
Document

F.3.1.

System fails to
ensure that
product is
packed in the
correct container

Software
design or
unavaila
ble
software
capabilit
y

B

Design/
Direction
for Use

Product code/product
reference table;
container properties;
user packing

N/A

N/A

Software
Requirements
Specification
(SRS)
Number
4.1.2.

F.3.2.

System fails to
maintain
appropriate
container
capacity for
packed product

Software
design or
unavaila
ble
software
capabilit
y

B

Design/
Direction
for Use

Container properties;
user packing

N/A

N/A

4.1.2.

Unit/ System
Test Number

UT5, UT6,
UT7, UT8,
UT9, UT11,
UT12, ST1,
ST2, ST3,
ST4, ST5,
ST6, ST7,
ST8, ST9,
ST10, ST11,
ST12, ST13,
ST15, ST16,
ST19, ST22,
ST24, ST28
UT5, UT6,
UT7, UT8,
UT9, UT11,
UT12, ST1,
ST2, ST3,
ST4, ST5,
ST6, ST7,
ST8, ST9,
ST10, ST11,
ST12, ST13,
ST15, ST16,
ST19, ST22,
ST24, ST28
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Hazard
ID

Hazardous
Event

Cause

F.3.3.

System fails to
notify user when
trying to pack an
item already
packed

Software
design or
unavaila
ble
software
capabilit
y

F.4.1.

A container is
left at the
collection site

Software
design or
unavaila
ble
software
capabilit
y

PreMitigation
Risk Level

Method
of
Control
Type

Method of Control
Description

Protocol Test
Document

Protocol
Results
Document

A

Design/
Direction
for Use

TID assignments; user
packing

N/A

N/A

Software
Requirements
Specification
(SRS)
Number
4.1.2.

B

Design/
Direction
for Use

Numerous pick-up
states; disabled release
until loading complete;
user standard operating
procedures

N/A

N/A

4.1.3., 4.1.4.

Unit/ System
Test Number

UT5, UT6,
UT7, UT8,
UT9, UT11,
UT12, ST1,
ST2, ST3,
ST4, ST5,
ST6, ST7,
ST8, ST9,
ST10, ST11,
ST12, ST13,
ST15, ST16,
ST19, ST22,
ST24, ST28
UT7, UT8,
UT9, UT10,
UT11, UT12,
ST1, ST2,
ST3, ST4,
ST5, ST6,
ST7, ST8,
ST9, ST10,
ST11, ST12,
ST13, ST15,
ST16, ST19,
ST22, ST24,
ST28
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Hazard
ID

Hazardous
Event

Cause

PreMitigation
Risk Level

Method
of
Control
Type

Method of Control
Description

Protocol Test
Document

Protocol
Results
Document

F.4.2.

System fails to
generate a
manifest

Software
design or
unavaila
ble
software
capabilit
y

A

Design/
Direction
for Use

Manifest report
generation & database
updating; user standard
operating procedures.

N/A

N/A

Software
Requirements
Specification
(SRS)
Number
4.1.3., 4.1.4.

Unit/ System
Test Number

F.5.1.

System fails to
receive labeling
data from BECS

B

Design

BECS interface,
definition of error
messages, system-level
assertion, rolled back
operations

N/A

N/A

4.2.2., 7.0.

F.5.2.

System fails to
verify data
received from
BECS is written
to RFID tag

Software
design or
unavaila
ble
software
capabilit
y
Software
design or
unavaila
ble
software
capabilit
y

A

Design/
Direction
for Use

N/A

N/A

4.2.2., 7.0.

UT13, ST15,
ST16, ST17,
ST18, ST19,
ST20, ST21,
ST22, ST23,
ST28

F.6.1.

Unsuitable
product is
released into
inventory

Software
design or
unavaila
ble

A

Design

ISBT labeling; BECS
interrogation; BECS
interface, definition of
error messages, systemlevel assertion, rolled
back operations; user
standard operating
procedures
BECS interface,
definition of error
messages, system-level
assertion, rolled back

N/A

N/A

4.2.3., 7.0.

UT5, UT6,
UT7, UT8,
UT9, UT11,
UT12, UT14,

UT7, UT8,
UT9, UT10,
UT11, UT12,
ST1, ST2,
ST3, ST4,
ST5, ST6,
ST7, ST8,
ST9, ST10,
ST11, ST12,
ST13, ST15,
ST16, ST19,
ST22, ST24,
ST28
UT13, ST15,
ST16, ST17,
ST18, ST19,
ST20, ST21,
ST22, ST23,
ST28
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Hazard
ID

Hazardous
Event

Cause

software
capabilit
y

PreMitigation
Risk Level

Method
of
Control
Type

Method of Control
Description

operations; final
verification

Protocol Test
Document

Protocol
Results
Document

Software
Requirements
Specification
(SRS)
Number

Unit/ System
Test Number

ST1, ST2,
ST3, ST4,
ST5, ST6,
ST7, ST8,
ST9, ST10,
ST11, ST12,
ST13, ST15,
ST16, ST17,
ST18, ST19,
ST20, ST21,
ST22, ST23,
ST24, ST26,
ST28
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APPENDIX B: PRE-MITIGATION RISK LEVEL A HAZARDS
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Hazard
ID

Hazardous
Event

Safety Critical
Design
Requirement

Entity at
Risk

Cause

Severity
(1 Negligible
2 - Minor
3Moderate
4Critical)

T.2.1.

The maximum
temperature
increase of the
RBCs and
Platelets exceed
acceptable level
of 1.5 °C

Ensure No
Adverse
Effects of
RFID
Technology on
Blood Products

Product/
Patient

RF Radiation

2

Likelihood
(1 Improbable
2 - Remote
3Occasional
4 - Probable
5Frequent)
1

T.2.2.

The cellular and
protein structures
of RBCs
(complete blood
counts including
sample weight,
RBC count, Hb,
Hct, MCV;
potassium,
aluminum; free
hemoglobin;
level of blood
gases) are
degraded or
altered beyond
the acceptable
level of ≤1%
hemolysis.

Ensure No
Adverse
Effects of
RFID
Technology on
Blood Products

Product/
Patient

RF Radiation

2

1

PreMitigation
Risk Level
(A Acceptable
BTolerable
CIntolerable)
A

A

Method of Control Description

Tested using Limit Test Protocol which
confirmed lack of significant effect RF
Radiation had on blood products.

Tested using Limit Test Protocol which
confirmed lack of significant effect RF
Radiation had on blood products.
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Hazard
ID

T.2.3.

T.2.4.

Hazardous
Event

Safety Critical
Design
Requirement

Entity at
Risk

Cause

The cellular and
protein structures
(Lactate,
Aluminum, PSelectin, and
complete blood
counts including
sample weight,
WBDP count,
Plt, and MPV) of
WBDPs are
degraded such
that the pH
decreases beyond
acceptable level
of ≥6.2
The maximum
temperature
increase of
plasma types
(FFP, FP24, and
TP) exceeds
acceptable level
of 4 °C.

Ensure No
Adverse
Effects of
RFID
Technology on
Blood Products

Product/
Patient

RF Radiation

Ensure No
Adverse
Effects of
RFID
Technology on
Blood Products

Product/
Patient

RF Radiation

Severity
(1 Negligible
2 - Minor
3Moderate
4Critical)
2

Likelihood
(1 Improbable
2 - Remote
3Occasional
4 - Probable
5Frequent)
1

PreMitigation
Risk Level
(A Acceptable
BTolerable
CIntolerable)
A

2

1

A

Method of Control Description

Tested using Limit Test Protocol which
confirmed lack of significant effect RF
Radiation had on blood products.

Tested using Limit Test Protocol which
confirmed lack of significant effect RF
Radiation had on blood products.
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Hazard
ID

T.2.5.

T.3.1.

Hazardous
Event

Safety Critical
Design
Requirement

Entity at
Risk

Cause

The activity of
coagulation
factors (PT,
aPTT,
Antithrombin
Activity, Factor
V, Factor VIII,
Factor XI,
Protein C,
Protein S, VWF:
RCo) levels of
all types (FFP,
FP24, and TP) of
thawed plasma
products are
altered beyond
an acceptable
level of 20%
The time to read
headers of 20bags-equivalent
exceeds
maximum
threshold
established for
specific
container/reader
combinations.

Ensure No
Adverse
Effects of
RFID
Technology on
Blood Products

Product/
Patient

RF Radiation

Ensure
Performance
Capability of
RFID Tags
During the
Most Common
Blood Supply
Chain
Processes

System

System
Capability

Severity
(1 Negligible
2 - Minor
3Moderate
4Critical)
2

Likelihood
(1 Improbable
2 - Remote
3Occasional
4 - Probable
5Frequent)
1

PreMitigation
Risk Level
(A Acceptable
BTolerable
CIntolerable)
A

1

2

A

Method of Control Description

Tested using Limit Test Protocol which
confirmed lack of significant effect RF
Radiation had on blood products.

Tested using Performance Test
Protocol which confirmed ability of
device to sustain operational efficiency
under different circumstances
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Hazard
ID

T.3.2.

T.3.3.

Hazardous
Event

Safety Critical
Design
Requirement

Entity at
Risk

Cause

The time to
read/write all 28
memory blocks
of 20-bagsequivalent
exceeds
maximum
threshold
established for
specific
container/reader
combinations.
The time to write
all blocks
exceeds
maximum
threshold
established for
specific
container/reader
combinations

Ensure
Performance
Capability of
RFID Tags
During the
Most Common
Blood Supply
Chain
Processes

System

System
Capability

Ensure
Performance
Capability of
RFID Tags
During the
Most Common
Blood Supply
Chain
Processes

System

System
Capability

Severity
(1 Negligible
2 - Minor
3Moderate
4Critical)
1

Likelihood
(1 Improbable
2 - Remote
3Occasional
4 - Probable
5Frequent)
2

PreMitigation
Risk Level
(A Acceptable
BTolerable
CIntolerable)
A

1

2

A

Method of Control Description

Tested using Performance Test
Protocol which confirmed ability of
device to sustain operational efficiency
under different circumstances

Tested using Performance Test
Protocol which confirmed ability of
device to sustain operational efficiency
under different circumstances
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Hazard
ID

Hazardous
Event

Safety Critical
Design
Requirement

Entity at
Risk

Cause

T.5.1.

Connections/com
munication links
are lost without
warning

Ensure No
Interference of
RFID High
Frequency
(HF) and
Electromagneti
c Interference
(EMI) with
other systems

System

EMI/Wireless
Communicati
on

T.5.2.

Systems
experience a
failure to
establish
communication

Ensure No
Interference of
RFID High
Frequency
(HF) and
Electromagneti
c Interference
(EMI) with
other systems

System

EMI/Wireless
Communicati
on

Severity
(1 Negligible
2 - Minor
3Moderate
4Critical)
2

Likelihood
(1 Improbable
2 - Remote
3Occasional
4 - Probable
5Frequent)
1

PreMitigation
Risk Level
(A Acceptable
BTolerable
CIntolerable)
A

2

1

A

Method of Control Description

The HF RFID 13.56 MHz radio
communication protocols as dictated
by the ISO/IEC 15693 standard, as
well as the ISO/IEC 18000-3 mode 1
standard, are used in the RFID readers
for this application. The 16-bit cyclic
redundancy check (CCITT CRC-16) is
run on the message bits right from the
start of the flags to the end of data and
the CRC-16 accompanies the message
as it is sent. Furthermore, additional
protection is provided via the tag data
encoding procedure.
The key information for safe
transfusion is carried in ISBT-128
barcodes, as well as in human readable
form, on the bag itself. In the event of
any communication failure of the RFID
system, bar code data will be used.
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Hazard
ID

Hazardous
Event

Safety Critical
Design
Requirement

Entity at
Risk

Cause

T.5.3.

Degradation of
service/transmiss
ion of
information

Ensure No
Interference of
RFID High
Frequency
(HF) and
Electromagneti
c Interference
(EMI) with
other systems

System

EMI/Wireless
Communicati
on

T.5.4.

Delays and
packet loss in the
transmission of
information to
and from a
handheld reader
or a netbook/
laptop

Ensure No
Interference of
RFID High
Frequency
(HF) and
Electromagneti
c Interference
(EMI) with
other systems

System

EMI/Wireless
Communicati
on

Severity
(1 Negligible
2 - Minor
3Moderate
4Critical)
2

Likelihood
(1 Improbable
2 - Remote
3Occasional
4 - Probable
5Frequent)
1

PreMitigation
Risk Level
(A Acceptable
BTolerable
CIntolerable)
A

2

1

A

Method of Control Description

The HF RFID 13.56 MHz radio
communication protocols as dictated
by the ISO/IEC 15693 standard, as
well as the ISO/IEC 18000-3 mode 1
standard, are used in the RFID readers
for this application. The 16-bit cyclic
redundancy check (CCITT CRC-16) is
run on the message bits right from the
start of the flags to the end of data and
the CRC-16 accompanies the message
as it is sent. Furthermore, additional
protection is provided via the tag data
encoding procedure.
The WLAN communication used
adheres to the IEEE 802.11b and
802.11g standards which define one
Medium Access Control (MAC) layer
and multiple physical layers (PHY).
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Hazard
ID

Hazardous
Event

Safety Critical
Design
Requirement

Entity at
Risk

Cause

Severity
(1 Negligible
2 - Minor
3Moderate
4Critical)

T.5.5.

The wireless
transmission of
critical medical
device alarms is
disabled

Ensure No
Interference of
RFID High
Frequency
(HF) and
Electromagneti
c Interference
(EMI) with
other systems

System

EMI/Wireless
Communicati
on

2

Likelihood
(1 Improbable
2 - Remote
3Occasional
4 - Probable
5Frequent)
1

PreMitigation
Risk Level
(A Acceptable
BTolerable
CIntolerable)
A

Method of Control Description

T.5.6.

The transmission
of physiological
waveform data is
impeded

Ensure No
Interference of
RFID High
Frequency
(HF) and
Electromagneti
c Interference
(EMI) with
other systems

System

EMI/Wireless
Communicati
on

2

1

A

There are two steps for effective
control for preventing this hazard from
occurring for future acquisition or
upgrading of key equipment: sourcing
and procurement.

T.5.7.

The real-time
control of
therapeutic
medical devices
is prevented

Ensure No
Interference of
RFID High
Frequency
(HF) and
Electromagneti
c Interference
(EMI) with
other systems

System

EMI/Wireless
Communicati
on

2

1

A

There are two steps for effective
control for preventing this hazard from
occurring for future acquisition or
upgrading of key equipment: sourcing
and procurement.

There are two steps for effective
control for preventing this hazard from
occurring for future acquisition or
upgrading of key equipment: sourcing
and procurement.
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Hazard
ID

Hazardous
Event

Safety Critical
Design
Requirement

Entity at
Risk

Cause

T.5.8.

The transmission
of time-critical
medical
telemetry is
hindered

Ensure No
Interference of
RFID High
Frequency
(HF) and
Electromagneti
c Interference
(EMI) with
other systems

System

EMI/Wireless
Communicati
on

T.5.9.

The wireless
control of
therapeutic
devices is
obstructed

Ensure No
Interference of
RFID High
Frequency
(HF) and
Electromagneti
c Interference
(EMI) with
other systems

System

I.1.1.

Processing steps
do not occur in
sequence
expected

Prevent
Sequencing
Timing Error

System

Severity
(1 Negligible
2 - Minor
3Moderate
4Critical)
2

Likelihood
(1 Improbable
2 - Remote
3Occasional
4 - Probable
5Frequent)
1

PreMitigation
Risk Level
(A Acceptable
BTolerable
CIntolerable)
A

Method of Control Description

EMI/Wireless
Communicati
on

2

1

A

There are two steps for effective
control for preventing this hazard from
occurring for future acquisition or
upgrading of key equipment: sourcing
and procurement.

User Error

2

1

A

Finite state machine, wizard-like
interfaces, and validation logic

There are two steps for effective
control for preventing this hazard from
occurring for future acquisition or
upgrading of key equipment: sourcing
and procurement.
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Hazard
ID

Hazardous
Event

Safety Critical
Design
Requirement

Entity at
Risk

Cause

Severity
(1 Negligible
2 - Minor
3Moderate
4Critical)

I.1.3.

System fails to
receive timely
data from an
external
application

Prevent
Sequencing
Timing Error

System

Software
design or
unavailable
software
capability

2

Likelihood
(1 Improbable
2 - Remote
3Occasional
4 - Probable
5Frequent)
1

PreMitigation
Risk Level
(A Acceptable
BTolerable
CIntolerable)
A

Method of Control Description

I.3.5.

Errors detected
in BECS are not
handled properly

Prevent
External
Interface
Errors

System

Unrecognized
data is
received from
BECS

1

1

A

BECS interface, definition of error
messages, system-level assertion,
rolled back operations

F.1.1.

The system is
accessed by an
unauthorized
person

Prevent
Unauthorized
Entry or
Override of
System Data

System

Security
failure

2

1

A

System Administration of user access;
Spotlight Microsoft Windows.Net
Authentication and Authorization

F.1.2.

An untrained
user accesses the
system

Prevent
Unauthorized
Entry or
Override of
System Data

System

System fails
to prevent
untrained user
access

2

1

A

System Administration of user access;
Spotlight Microsoft Windows.Net
Authentication and Authorization

F.1.3.

Unauthorized
personnel modify
computer records

Prevent
Unauthorized
Entry or
Override of
System Data

System

System fails
to restrict
access to
computer
records

2

1

A

System Administration of user access;
Spotlight Microsoft Windows.Net
Authentication and Authorization

BECS interface, definition of error
messages, system-level assertion,
rolled back operations
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Hazard
ID

Hazardous
Event

Safety Critical
Design
Requirement

Entity at
Risk

Cause

F.2.1.

Someone other
than a
responsible user
enters or
modifies data

Prevent Loss of
Traceability

System

System fails
to track
persons
responsible
for database
modifications

F.3.3.

System fails to
notify user when
trying to pack an
item already
packed

Prevent
Packing in
Improper
Container at
Collection Site

System

F.4.2.

System fails to
generate a
manifest

Ensure
Reconciliation
of Materials
from
Collection Site

F.5.2.

System fails to
verify data
received from
BECS is written
to RFID tag

Ensure Blood
Product
Labeling as
Data is
Properly
Received from
BECS

Severity
(1 Negligible
2 - Minor
3Moderate
4Critical)
2

Likelihood
(1 Improbable
2 - Remote
3Occasional
4 - Probable
5Frequent)
1

PreMitigation
Risk Level
(A Acceptable
BTolerable
CIntolerable)
A

Method of Control Description

Software
design or
unavailable
software
capability

1

2

A

TID assignments; user packing

System

Software
design or
unavailable
software
capability

1

2

A

Manifest report generation & database
updating; user standard operating
procedures.

System

Software
design or
unavailable
software
capability

1

2

A

ISBT labeling; BECS interrogation;
BECS interface, definition of error
messages, system-level assertion,
rolled back operations; user standard
operating procedures

System Administration of user access;
Spotlight Microsoft Windows.Net
Authentication and Authorization;
Activity Logs/Audit Trails
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Hazard
ID

F.6.1.

Hazardous
Event

Unsuitable
product is
released into
inventory

Safety Critical
Design
Requirement

Entity at
Risk

Prevent
Unsuitable
Product from
Being Released
to Distribution

System

Cause

Software
design or
unavailable
software
capability

Severity
(1 Negligible
2 - Minor
3Moderate
4Critical)
1

Likelihood
(1 Improbable
2 - Remote
3Occasional
4 - Probable
5Frequent)
1

PreMitigation
Risk Level
(A Acceptable
BTolerable
CIntolerable)
A

Method of Control Description

BECS interface, definition of error
messages, system-level assertion,
rolled back operations; final
verification
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APPENDIX C: PRE-MITIGATION RISK LEVEL B HAZARDS
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Hazard ID

Hazardous Event

Safety Critical
Design
Requirement

Entity
at Risk

Cause

Handheld or pad
RFID reader fails
to read/write the
tag for any
number of
reasons.
Tunnel reader
fails to read the
tag for any
number of
reasons.
Data is corrupted
on the tag

Severity
(1 Negligible
2 - Minor
3- Moderate
4 - Critical)
1

Likelihood
(1 Improbable
2 - Remote
3 - Occasional
4 - Probable
5 - Frequent)
3

Pre-Mitigation
Risk Level
(A Acceptable
B - Tolerable
CIntolerable)
B

1

3

B

3

1

B

T.1.1.

RFID Read/Write
Fails

Prevent Data
Read/Write
Error/Failure

System

T.1.2.

RFID Read/Write
Fails

Prevent Data
Read/Write
Error/Failure

System

T.1.3.

Bad data on the tag

Prevent Data
Read/Write
Error/Failure

System

T.1.4.

DIN number
written on tag at
collection is
subsequently
altered
DIN number on
tags created at final
labeling is altered
ABO rewritten on
tag

Prevent Data
Read/Write
Error/Failure

System

DIN field locking
on the tag not
enforced

2

2

B

Prevent Data
Read/Write
Error/Failure
Prevent Data
Read/Write
Error/Failure
Ensure RFID Tag
Survivability after
Experiencing the
Most Demanding

System

DIN field locking
on the tag not the
tag not enforced
---

2

2

B

3

1

B

Centrifugation,
Blast Freezing, or
Gamma
Irradiation Effects

3

2

B

T.1.5.

T.1.6.

T.4.1.

The tag does not
survive the process

System

System

Method of Control
Description

Audible sound signaled each
time tag is read/written;
handheld and/or work station
display is updated; error
detection software included.
Tunnel reader reconciles items,
flagging them as excess or
missing. The operator then
manually inspects contents to
correct issue.
A new ISBT128 data structure
was developed to facilitate
detection of tag memory
corruption.
The application is configurable
to allow the organization to use
the DIN locking feature at the
point of collection or at
labeling.
Programming the ISBT128
label data structure and
launching the application
Programming the ISBT128
ABO data structure and
launching the application
Tag design, tag supplier
certification, and reversion to
barcode only procedure in the
event of tag failure.
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Hazard ID

Hazardous Event

T.4.2.

The ability of the
RFID tag to read
data within 30
seconds of the start
is damaged

T.4.3.

The ability of the
RFID tag to write
information within
30 seconds of the
start is damaged.

T.4.4.

The time it takes to
read the tag after it
was seen for the
first time (header)
increases greater
than 20 seconds.

T.4.5.

The time it takes to
read all blocks of
tag memory
increases by more
than 45 seconds

Safety Critical
Design
Requirement

Conditions in the
Blood Supply
Chain
Ensure RFID Tag
Survivability after
Experiencing the
Most Demanding
Conditions in the
Blood Supply
Chain
Ensure RFID Tag
Survivability after
Experiencing the
Most Demanding
Conditions in the
Blood Supply
Chain
Ensure RFID Tag
Survivability after
Experiencing the
Most Demanding
Conditions in the
Blood Supply
Chain
Ensure RFID Tag
Survivability after
Experiencing the
Most Demanding
Conditions in the
Blood Supply

Entity
at Risk

Cause

Severity
(1 Negligible
2 - Minor
3- Moderate
4 - Critical)

Likelihood
(1 Improbable
2 - Remote
3 - Occasional
4 - Probable
5 - Frequent)

Pre-Mitigation
Risk Level
(A Acceptable
B - Tolerable
CIntolerable)

System

Method of Control
Description

Centrifugation,
Blast Freezing, or
Gamma
Irradiation Effects

2

2

B

Tag design, tag supplier
certification, and reversion to
barcode only procedure in the
event of tag failure.

System

Centrifugation,
Blast Freezing, or
Gamma
Irradiation Effects

2

2

B

Tag design, tag supplier
certification, and reversion to
barcode only procedure in the
event of tag failure.

System

Centrifugation,
Blast Freezing, or
Gamma
Irradiation Effects

2

2

B

Tag design, tag supplier
certification, and reversion to
barcode only procedure in the
event of tag failure.

System

Centrifugation,
Blast Freezing, or
Gamma
Irradiation Effects

2

2

B

Tag design, tag supplier
certification, and reversion to
barcode only procedure in the
event of tag failure.
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Hazard ID

T.4.6.

T.4.7.

T.5.10.

Hazardous Event

The time it takes to
write information
after the tag
acknowledges
encoding
completion of all
blocks increases by
greater than 75
seconds
The integrity of the
written data is
compromised

Data corruption
and/or errors are
produced

Safety Critical
Design
Requirement

Chain
Ensure RFID Tag
Survivability after
Experiencing the
Most Demanding
Conditions in the
Blood Supply
Chain

Ensure RFID Tag
Survivability after
Experiencing the
Most Demanding
Conditions in the
Blood Supply
Chain
Ensure No
Interference of
RFID High
Frequency (HF)
and
Electromagnetic
Interference (EMI)
with other systems

Entity
at Risk

Cause

Severity
(1 Negligible
2 - Minor
3- Moderate
4 - Critical)

Likelihood
(1 Improbable
2 - Remote
3 - Occasional
4 - Probable
5 - Frequent)

Pre-Mitigation
Risk Level
(A Acceptable
B - Tolerable
CIntolerable)

System

Method of Control
Description

Centrifugation,
Blast Freezing, or
Gamma
Irradiation Effects

2

2

B

Tag design, tag supplier
certification, and reversion to
barcode only procedure in the
event of tag failure.

System

Centrifugation,
Blast Freezing, or
Gamma
Irradiation Effects

2

2

B

Tag design, tag supplier
certification, and reversion to
barcode only procedure in the
event of tag failure.

System

EMI/Wireless
Communication

3

1

B

The HF RFID 13.56 MHz radio
communication protocols as
dictated by the ISO/IEC 15693
standard, as well as the
ISO/IEC 18000-3 mode 1
standard, are used in the RFID
readers for this application. The
16-bit cyclic redundancy check
(CCITT CRC-16) is run on the
message bits right from the
start of the flags to the end of
data and the CRC-16
accompanies the message as it
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Hazard ID

T.5.11.

Hazardous Event

Unauthorized
access during the
communication
between the
transmitter and
receiver

Safety Critical
Design
Requirement

Ensure No
Interference of
RFID High
Frequency (HF)
and
Electromagnetic
Interference (EMI)
with other systems

Entity
at Risk

System

Cause

EMI/Wireless
Communication

Severity
(1 Negligible
2 - Minor
3- Moderate
4 - Critical)

3

Likelihood
(1 Improbable
2 - Remote
3 - Occasional
4 - Probable
5 - Frequent)

1

Pre-Mitigation
Risk Level
(A Acceptable
B - Tolerable
CIntolerable)

B

Method of Control
Description

is sent. Furthermore, additional
protection is provided via the
tag data encoding procedure.
The WLAN communication
used adheres to the IEEE
802.11b and 802.11g standards
which define one Medium
Access Control (MAC) layer
and multiple physical layers
(PHY).
Provisions in the air protocols
and standards that make it
difficult to inappropriately
access data while the
transmitter and receiver are
communicating. Also, the tag
structure design includes data
bits stored on the tag that have
an associated CCITT 16-bit
CRC stored in the tag memory.
Moreover, the key information
for same transfusion is carried
in ISBT-128 barcodes and
human readable form on the
bag itself. Finally, the wireless
network includes data
encryption security that
prevents hackers from
connecting to protected
networks and stealing
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Hazard ID

I.1.2.

I.2.1.
I.2.2.

I.2.3.

I.2.4.

I.2.5.
I.3.1.

Hazardous Event

Safety Critical
Design
Requirement

Entity
at Risk

Multiple users are
allowed access to
update the same
record
User error causes
data to be corrupted
Data is lost or
corrupted due to
hardware disk
crash, other
hardware or power
failure
Data is lost or
corrupted due to
malfunction of
program routine

Prevent Sequencing
Timing Error

System

Prevent Data
Loss/Corruption
Prevent Data
Loss/Corruption

System

Data encountered is
outside the range of
expected values
Duplicate data
enters the system
System fails to
receive accurate
data from the RFID
reader interface

Cause

Severity
(1 Negligible
2 - Minor
3- Moderate
4 - Critical)

Likelihood
(1 Improbable
2 - Remote
3 - Occasional
4 - Probable
5 - Frequent)

Pre-Mitigation
Risk Level
(A Acceptable
B - Tolerable
CIntolerable)

Software design
or unavailable
software
capability
User Error

2

3

B

1

3

B

System

Disk crash, other
hardware or
power failure

3

2

B

Prevent Data
Loss/Corruption

System

Incomplete
transaction

1

3

B

Prevent Data
Loss/Corruption

System

1

3

B

Prevent Data
Loss/Corruption
Prevent External
Interface Errors

System

Undetected
anomaly or user
error
User Error

2

3

B

System

Hardware failure

2

3

B

Method of Control
Description

information.
Relational Database and
Transaction Processing
Techniques, ACID Properties,
"All-or-Nothing" Semantics
Validation logic; BECS
interrogation
Relational Database and
Transaction Processing
Techniques, ACID Properties,
"All-or-Nothing" Semantics;
Best Practice Back-Up
Techniques; SQL
Relational Database and
Transaction Processing
Techniques, ACID Properties,
"All-or-Nothing" Semantics;
Spotlight middleware and
related relational database
technology
Validation logic; BECS
interrogation; reference tables;
drop-down lists; error messages
Validation logic; DIN; BECS
interrogation
Technologies such as reader
self-test diagnostics, inactivity
timers, periodic heart beat
signals, and positioning sentinel
tags to confirm correct end-to-
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Hazard ID

Hazardous Event

Safety Critical
Design
Requirement

Entity
at Risk

Cause

Severity
(1 Negligible
2 - Minor
3- Moderate
4 - Critical)

Likelihood
(1 Improbable
2 - Remote
3 - Occasional
4 - Probable
5 - Frequent)

Pre-Mitigation
Risk Level
(A Acceptable
B - Tolerable
CIntolerable)

Physical damage
from handling
product
Physical damage
from handling
product

3

1

B

2

3

B

Read/Write applications; RFID
TIN

BECS interface, definition of
error messages, system-level
assertion, rolled back
operations
Validation logic; error
messages and disabled
proceeding; application
requirements of data entry in
specific order and format for
particular collections
Validation logic; error
messages and disabled
proceeding; application
requirements of data entry in
specific order and format for
particular collections
Validation logic; error
messages and disabled
proceeding; application
requirements of data entry in
specific order and format for
particular collections

I.3.2.

Tag and barcode
are both unreadable

Prevent External
Interface Errors

System

I.3.3.

Unable to read or
write the RFID tag
data due to a tag
failure
Data received from
BECS does not
pass correct data
structure
Blood unit
information is
recorded
incorrectly

Prevent External
Interface Errors

System

Prevent External
Interface Errors

System

Unrecognized
data is received
from BECS

3

2

B

Prevent Loss of
Traceability

System

System fails to
record data for
whole blood
collection

3

1

B

I.3.4.

F.2.2.

F.2.3.

Blood unit
information is
recorded
incorrectly

Prevent Loss of
Traceability

System

System fails to
capture data for
apheresis
collection

3

1

B

F.2.4.

Blood unit
information is
recorded
incorrectly

Prevent Loss of
Traceability

System

System fails to
identify donation
type

3

1

B

Method of Control
Description

end operation of readers
Product disposal
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Hazard ID

F.2.5.

Blood unit
information is
recorded
incorrectly

Prevent Loss of
Traceability

System

System fails to
identify
autologous
donation

3

Likelihood
(1 Improbable
2 - Remote
3 - Occasional
4 - Probable
5 - Frequent)
1

F.2.6.

Blood unit
information is
recorded
incorrectly

Prevent Loss of
Traceability

System

System fails to
identify
therapeutic
donation

3

1

B

F.3.1.

System fails to
ensure that product
is packed in the
correct container
System fails to
maintain
appropriate
container capacity
for packed product
A container is left
at the collection site

Prevent Packing in
Improper Container
at Collection Site

System

2

2

B

Prevent Packing in
Improper Container
at Collection Site

System

Software design
or unavailable
software
capability
Software design
or unavailable
software
capability

2

2

B

Container properties; user
packing

Ensure
Reconciliation of
Materials from
Collection Site
Ensure Blood
Product Labeling as
Data is Properly
Received from
BECS

System

Software design
or unavailable
software
capability
Software design
or unavailable
software
capability

2

2

B

2

2

B

Numerous pick-up states;
disabled release until loading
complete; user standard
operating procedures
BECS interface, definition of
error messages, system-level
assertion, rolled back
operations

F.3.2.

F.4.1.

F.5.1.

Hazardous Event

System fails to
receive labeling
data from BECS

Safety Critical
Design
Requirement

Entity
at Risk

System

Cause

Severity
(1 Negligible
2 - Minor
3- Moderate
4 - Critical)

Pre-Mitigation
Risk Level
(A Acceptable
B - Tolerable
CIntolerable)
B

Method of Control
Description

Validation logic; error
messages and disabled
proceeding; application
requirements of data entry in
specific order and format for
particular collections
Validation logic; error
messages and disabled
proceeding; application
requirements of data entry in
specific order and format for
particular collections
Product code/product reference
table; container properties; user
packing
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